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INTRODUCTION 
Owner-operatorship has been the goal of the farm family since the 
beginning of the settlement of Iowa in the 1830*s until the present time. 
The Jeffersonian dream of owners operating their individual lands and 
reaping the benefits of their own efforts has always been highly valued 
and has been regarded as an end to be achieved by society. To this end of 
owner-operatorship, society has devised legislative as well as technical 
means to help farm families reach their goals (21, pp. 168-176 and 80, 
pp. 19-20). Intervening decades have not altered this basic goal which 
was described by Murray, "The typical Iowa farmer and his family have a 
strong, continuing desire to own a farm that belongs to them alone. The 
family-sized farm grew up here, and won its popularity as the most practi­
cal unit for this region" (65, p. 1). 
Basic goals of society have not altered, but the accelerated rate of 
technological innovations experienced during the past few decades have 
transformed the relatively simple business of owning and operating a farm 
into a complex undertaking. The introduction of technologically superior 
agricultural inputs—machinery, seeds, pesticides, fertilizers, as well as 
scientific management techniques—has challenged the basic concept of the 
economic organization of agriculture in family farm units. 
This then is our point of departure. The study is undertaken to 
identify and isolate the structural changes and adjustements that have 
taken place in farmland ownership in Iowa due to the impact of technologi­
cal innovations and other changes experienced in recent decades. It is 
not intended to isolate specific technological advancements and their 
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partial effects on farmland ownership. Technological innovations are 
taken as given exogeneously, but their total impact on the characteristics 
of farmland owners through time is analyzed as far as it relates to their 
acquisition and ownership situation. Information gathered will indicate 
the trends that are taking place in Iowa famland ownership. The analysis 
of these trends will help formulate policies that create and/or strengthen 
existing institutions which promote the goals of the society. 
Ownership Norm 
In the development of American agriculture, fundamental importance 
has been attached to the owner-operatorship norm as is evident in the 
following statement: 
Rights in land and the ownership thereof have always been 
of fundamental importance to the development of American agri­
culture and the welfare of farm people. The nature, transfer, 
and valuation of these rights constitute the major institutional 
foundations upon which are built American units of agricultural 
production—farms, ranches, and plantations. Furthermore, farm 
ownership is a basic ideal to which farm people aspire. It is 
one which they continually strive to achieve and maintain. Thus 
the achievement and maintenance of stable and satisfactory 
conditions of farm ownership occupy a pre-eminent role in the 
lives of farm people as well as in the nation's agricultural 
policies (93, p. 79). 
While the norm stresses private ownership of the land by the opera­
tor, in and of itself, it does not imply the organizational form of the 
agricultural unit. The specific form of organization is incidental to the 
norm of ownership and may exhibit any one of several alternatives in a 
given situation. 
Family farm, partnership or corporate organizations are some of the 
alternative forms in pursuit of the ownership norm. Traditionally, 
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however, ownership and form of organization have not been considered as 
distinct phenomena. Fundamental importance has been attached to a form of 
organization centered around the family, as a consumption as well as a 
production unit, in discussing the ownership norm of society. 
The result of neglecting to consider other forms of organization has 
often led to a confusion of ends with the means of attaining these ends. 
It has been observed that a specific form of organization has been substi­
tuted as the norm to be achieved in place of the ownership goal (43, 
p. 539; 60, p. 310 and 56, p. 1005). 
Pursuing a specific form of economic organization as a public policy 
goal is disturbing. As Dorner points out, it may eventually become a 
defense of inefficient institutions if it is not allowed to compete with 
alternative forms: 
Our economic institutions always have been subjected to the 
competition of alternative forms. The family farm is the dominant 
form of economic organization in agriculture because it has given 
better performance than other forms . . . the corporate form in 
industry evolved to dominate our system, not as a result of public 
policy to promote it, but because forms previously existing could 
not compete (19, p. 545). 
With respect to this study, owner-operatorship is taken to be the 
norm the society is striving for but not the specific form of organiza­
tion. In other words, the form of organization is a variable that may 
have to adjust to technological changes In the course of achieving the 
norm of ownership. Changes and trends in achieving the norm of ownership 
in 1970 compared to results of earlier studies in 1946 and 1958 are iden­
tified in this study. Possible reasons for these changes and trends are 
proposed in the interest of explaining the processes underway. 
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Current Situation of Farmland Resources 
Recent decades have experienced an accelerated rate of technological 
innovations in agriculture in the United States. The impact of these 
changes has been felt in Iowa, as would be expected. Table 1, prepared 
from census data, indicates the changes in farm size that have been taking 
place in Iowa since 1930. It can be observed that while percent of land 
in farms to total land area has been rather stable throughout this period 
(declining from 96.6 to 94.1 percent), the average size of farm and total 
number of farms have been changing quite rapidly. 
Table 1. Changing characteristics of Iowa land in the period 1930-1964^ 
Year 
Total 
land area 
(acres) 
Land area 
in farms 
(acres) 
Land 
in farms 
(percent) 
Average size 
of farm 
(acres) 
Total 
farms 
(number) 
1930 35,575,040 34,019,332 95.6 158.3 214,928 
1935 35,575,040 34,359,152 96.6 154.8 221,986 
1940 35,831,040 34,148,673 95.3 160.1 213,318 
1945 35,830,400 34,453,936 96.2 164.9 208,934 
1950 35,868,800 34,264,639 95.5 168.7 203,159 
1954 35,868,800 34,044,533 94,9 176.5 192,933 
1.959 35,860,480 33,830,950 94.3 193.6 174,707 
1964 35,860,480 33,758,321 94.1 219.0 154,162 
^Source: (100, p. 7). 
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In order to observe the changes that have taken place in the char­
acter of iowa farmlands. Figure 1 has been prepared taking the year 1935 
as 100 and constructing an index for these three variables mentioned 
above. It is interesting to note that while percent of land in farms 
declines at a slow rate from one census to the other, the other two 
measures, average size of farms and number of farms, exhibit a fast rate 
of change beginning about 1950. The rate of decline of land in farms is 
0.7, 0.7, and 0.3 percent between 1950-1954, 1954-1959, and 1959-1964, 
respectively. This rate of change can be accounted for by the shift of 
land resources from agriculture to alternative uses, such as recreation, 
transportation and urban development. However, for the same period, the 
rate of growth of farm size and the decrease of farm numbers between 
censuses exhibit a faster change with the rate of each changing at an 
increasing pace. The rate of growth for the average farm size has been 
4.6, 9.7, and 13.1 percent between 1950-1954, 1954-1959 and 1959-1964, 
respectively. However for the same periods the rate of decline in farm 
numbers is 5.1, 9.4, and 11.8 percent respectively. 
It is interesting to note that the two rates above have kept pace 
with each other until 1959. From 1959 to 1964, however, there is a con­
siderable divergence between these two rates. A possible tentative 
explanation is that the average size of the larger farm units may be 
increasing faster in size through absorption of smaller units. 
Changing characteristics of farm size and numbers are identified in 
Figure 1 and Table 1. Table 2 presents the existing situation in the 
seven economic areas of Iowa by 1964. These economic areas have been 
Figure 1. Index of land in farms, farm size and farm numbers (Iowa, 
1930-1964) 
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Table 2. Characteristics of Iowa land by economic areas, 1964^ 
Economic 
area 
Total 
land area 
(acres) 
Land 
in farms 
(percent) 
Average size 
of farm 
(acres) 
Total 
farms 
(number) 
1 4,117,880 96.8 226.3 17,558 
2 4,218,880 95.5 251.4 16,460 
3 2,463,360 96.5 243.0 9,879 
4 4,812,800 95.0 235.4 20,123 
5 6,134,960 92.2 235.2 24,221 
6 5,687,040 94.2 198.6 27,314 
7 8,425,560 92.6 206.0 38,607 
^Source: (100, pp. 208-217). 
drawn to correspond identically with that of the previous ownership 
studies and are presented in Figure 2. It can be observed from Table 2 
that not only has there been a change in land in farms and farm size in 
Iowa over time, but within the economic areas there is considerable 
diversity in the same census year. In some economic areas (such as 1 
and 3) land resources have still predominantly remained in agriculture, 
while for others (economic areas 5 and 7) they have declined below the 
state average. Similarly the average size of farms varies from below 200 
acres in the sixth area to over 250 acres in the second area. Comparison 
of total fairms in each economic area is not meaningful since the size of 
each area is not identical. 
Figure 2. Economic areas of Iowa--1958 and 1970 
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1 
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SOUTHWEST 
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Over time in Iowa and within different economic areas, both land 
resources in agriculture as well as the number of farms are declining 
while the average size of a farm is increasing. Tables 1 and 2 and 
Figure 1 have put this in perspective and indicated the direction of the 
problem with respect to farmland resources. 
Objectives of This Study 
Rapid technological innovations in agriculture have placed additional 
burdens of economic adjustment on farm operators whose goal has been 
owner-operatorship by the farm family. How far these adjustment pressures 
and increased requirements for larger land and capital are in conflict 
with the goal of ownership by the Iowa farmers is the central theme of 
this study. 
The objectives of the study are as follows: 
(1) Identification and measurement of factors influencing tenure 
of farmland owners. 
(2) Determination of the changing characteristics of Iowa farmland 
owners. 
(3) Suggestion of possible remedial measures in closing the gap 
between the norms of the society and the existing situation. 
Methods of Survey 
Iowa farmland ownership structure has been of interest since the 
early days of settlement and to this end two previous studies (90, 95) 
have been conducted. In order to ccaapare the findings of the present 
study with that of the previous ones, the state is divided into 
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identically the same economic areas, and the same questionnaires (except 
with minor modifications) have been utilized. The two kinds of question­
naires mailed, one for individual and one for institutional owners, are 
presented in Appendix A. 
The State of Iowa is divided into seven distinct economic areas 
which are: 
Area 1. Northwest - Livestock 
Area 2. Southwest - Livestock 
Area 3. Northern - Grain 
Area 4. North Central - Grain 
Area 5. Southern - Pasture 
Area 6. Northeast - Dairy 
Area 7. Eastern - Livestock 
Figure 2 identifies the boundaries of each economic area and indi­
cates which counties are included in each one. 
The sample of farms used in this study was obtained from the United 
States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Stabilization and Conser­
vation Service^ addressograph plates in each county. In each ASCS county 
office, these plates are kept in files for each farm in a numbered order. 
From the previous studies, it was expected that about 25 percent of the 
sample of farmland owners would return the questionnaires. In order to 
yield the number of desired questionnaires, specific instructions were 
given to ASCS county officers to pick every 17th addressograph plate 
starting with a random number. 
^Hereafter referred to as ASCS. 
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The questionnaires had been pre-tested in Boone and Story Counties. 
Some minor modifications of wording and structure had been completed 
before it was finally printed and mailed to the sampled farmland owners. 
The results of two mailings provided the desired number of returns to 
proceed with the study. Table 3 provides the number of questionnaires 
mailed and the percentage of returns by economic areas. It should be 
Table 3. Number of questionnaires mailed out and proportion of usable 
ones returned for each area, 1970 
Questionnaires returned Questionnaires ^ 
mailed out Used Discarded Returned/mailed 
Area (number) (number) (number) (percent) 
1 1,418 359 53 29.06 
2 1,287 323 41 28.28 
3 777 195 22 27.93 
4 1,828 447 59 27.68 
5 1,843 387 60 24.25 
6 1,906 533 67 31.48 
7 2,856 695 82 27.21 
Individual 11,915 2,939 384 27.89 
Institutional 605 277 41 52.56 
Iowa, 1970 12,520 3,216 425 29.08 
Iowa, 1958 11,002 2,576 
a 
23.60 
^Information not provided (90, p. 4). 
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noted that in all areas, except five, returns were in excess of 25 per­
cent. Through careful editing, about 12 percent of the returned question­
naires were found to contain inconsistent or irregular answers. In most 
cases, these owners have been contacted by telephone to resolve the incon­
sistencies. In cases where most of the questionnaire was left blank, the 
respondent had to be discarded from the sample. The result of this cross 
checking effort has been a larger and more reliable sample size on which 
to base the findings of the study. 
All questionnaires were edited a second time to correct remaining 
errors and inconsistencies. Items left blank by respondents or in cases 
where questions were inapplicable to that particular individual, an X and 
Y were entered respectively and these items were omitted from the tabula­
tions. The answers were then coded and punched on IBM cards. Tabulations 
were performed by the Iowa State University Computation Center. 
Organization of the Study 
The study is organized in nine chapters. The first chapter is an 
introduction and consists of sections which present ownership norm, 
current situation of farmland resources, objectives of the study, methods 
of survey and organization of the study. 
The hypotheses guiding the study are formulated in the second 
chapter. After a brief introduction on the role and kind of hypotheses, 
the ones guiding the study are identified with the procedures for testing. 
Corrections to obtain a representative sample and a non-respondent 
bias check is included. 
In the third chapter the technique of discriminant analysis is 
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adapted to farmland ownership problems. After a brief discussion of the 
background and presentation of the theoretical model, the analysis is 
applied to a sample of owners in different tenure groups. The objective 
is to identify the group profiles of each tenure class in accordance with 
the established norms of the analysis. Since owners in tenure classes 
are not homogeneous in their characteristics, there exist deviates from 
their declared tenure classes. These will be called the "response likely" 
owners. That is, these are the owners most likely to change their tenures 
within the foreseeable future. Then the analysis is carried to a step of 
identifying these owners and explaining the reasons for their divergences 
from their declared tenure classes. 
The fourth chapter studies the changes that have been taking place in 
characteristics of farmland owners. After a brief discussion of organi­
zation of agricultural units, the study proceeds to identify the charac­
teristics of farmland owners centered around the family, by acreage, 
occupation, age and residency. In the final part of the chapter, hypoth­
eses developed earlier with respect to changes in the owners' character­
istics are tested. 
The fifth chapter is concerned with the changes that have been taking 
place in the concentration of Iowa farmland ownership. After a discussion 
of the concept and measurement of concentration, changes in the concen­
tration of ownership acreage and value for each area between 1958 and 1970 
are identified. Hypotheses developed with respect to concentration of 
ownership are tested. 
The sixth chapter deals with the tenure experience of farmland 
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owners. This chapter includes the extent to which the owners used the 
agricultural ladder in reaching their goal of ownership and their new 
experiences or modifications with respect to this concept. 
Acquisition and transfer methods farmland owners employ are discussed 
in the seventh and eighth chapters, respectively. 
Finally, in the ninth chapter, conclusions and interpretations of 
findings are summarized. 
The study is organized in three parts. The first part is concerned 
with the first objective and covers the third and fourth chapters. The 
second part is devoted to the second objective of the study and is 
treated in the fifth through eighth chapters. The third part concerns 
the third objective and is presented in the ninth chapter. Hypotheses 
developed in the second chapter are tested in the relevant sections of 
these chapters. 
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PROCEDURES FOR FORMULATING AND TESTING HYPOTHESES 
Role of Hypotheses in Inquiry 
The nature of scientific inquiry is one of solving experienced 
problems. The significance of the inquiry largely depends on its contri­
bution to the solution. Salter explains the nature of scientific inquiry 
when he states: 
The function of science is to determine ways of acting that 
will bring activities to a stated consequence. Science is a con­
tinuing process of problem solving in order to give man better 
control over his experience (78, p. 56). 
In order to proceed with the inquiry, the researcher has to formulate 
the problem and construct the hypotheses to be tested. Recognition and 
formulation of the problem to be solved is the first task that the 
researcher has to undertake. While discussing the nature of problems, 
Timmons states that: 
A problem with research potentials arises whenever the con­
sequences or expected consequences fall short of the goal or 
purpose of achievement. The gap between the consequences and 
goal is the problematic situation within which the problem for 
study is delimited (94, p. 9). 
This approach to problem formulation looks at the implied or stated 
goals of the society and determines how far the society has fallen short 
of achieving its goals. The gap, if it exists, between achievements and 
goals becomes the problem for study and alternative means to close it 
become hypotheses for testing and verification. 
The hypotheses play a fundamental role in directing a study. It has 
been pointed out that ". . . the heart of scientific inquiry is disci­
plined and directed thought. Hypotheses are the instruments by which the 
investigator controls and directs his inquiry" (31, p. 41). 
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Hypotheses can be defined as suppositions which the researcher adopts 
tentatively in explaining phenomena. In the course of the investigation 
these tentatively adopted suppositions are put to statistical tests of 
significance to verify their power of explanation. Statistical tests 
determine which hypotheses to accept and which to reject. In the former, 
hypotheses developed are regarded as explaining the observed phenomena 
under question, while in the latter case revised and modified hypotheses 
are brought forth to be put to test until a new set of hypotheses that 
account for all significantly relevant variables are obtained. As Parsons 
points out, goal of the scientific inquiry is . . formulating a family 
of hypotheses as alternative explanations and then eliminating those which 
are less effective" (70, p. 299), in the explanation of observed phenomena. 
Kinds of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses as the tools guiding inquiry are divided into three kinds 
by Timmons (94, p. 24): (1) problem delimiting, (2) diagnostic, and 
(3) remedial. 
Problem delimiting hypotheses delimit the specific problem in terms 
of the gap between goals and achievements of the society. Since most 
goals of society may be hard to quantify and in many instances in conflict 
with each other, oftentimes it becomes necessary for the researcher to 
make judgments about which goals to use in his study and their relative 
ordering. Within this framework, the researcher can further delimit a 
segment of a problematic situation so as to enable him to formulate pre­
cisely the problem to be studied. 
Diagnostic hypotheses follow the problem delimiting phase and 
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"advance possible reasons and explanations for the development and per­
sistence of the problem previously delimited" (94, p. 26). 
Diagnostic hypotheses can be formulated in various forms. They can 
be in the form of questions, or simple declarations, or in terms of con­
ditional (if such and such, then such and such would follow) statements. 
The form of hypotheses employed is incidental to the ideas presented. 
The third kind of hypotheses are of the remedial type. After the 
diagnostic hypotheses are developed, tested for their significance and 
found to be positive, then remedial hypotheses can be brought forth. In 
other words, remedial hypotheses are "means for ameliorating the problem 
previously delimited and diagnosed, by bringing about a more complete 
achievement of a particular end-in-view in the means ends continuum" 
(94, p. 24). 
Formulation and Testing of Hypotheses Guiding This Study 
The accelerated rate of technological innovations and changing 
economic conditions, that have been briefly mentioned in the first 
chapter, have challenged the farmland owner-operatorship goal of the 
society. Guided by the objectives of this study, problem delimiting and 
diagnostic hypotheses are formulated and tested for their statistical 
significance. For each test, the levels of significance are indicated 
with the accompanying tables. 
The diagnostic hypotheses guiding the study are listed under each 
delimited phase of the objective of identifying the structural changes in 
farmland ownership in Iowa. 
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Identification and measurement of variables influencing tenure of owners 
This is the more general and explanatory part of the study. The aim 
is to group farmland owners according to tenure classes and identify and 
measure the variables which are conducive to changes in tenure status. 
The delimiting phase consists of tenure goals of owners and the 
extent to which these goals are achieved. The diagnostic hypotheses 
state that: 
l.a Each tenure group consists of a homogeneous class of owners by 
itself with similar goals and distinctly different from the rest, 
l.b Debt-free full ownership is the goal of all tenure groups 
rather than operatorship. 
1.c Acquisition methods of owned land are the most important 
factors conducive to changes in tenure status. 
The discriminant analysis is utilized in pursuing this objective and 
findings are presented in the third chapter. 
Identification of the characteristics of Iowa farmland owners 
2.a Characteristics of Iowa farmland owners are changing. 
2.a.l Distribution of land and value of assets owned are 
becoming unevenly distributed between owners. 
2.a.2 Age distribution of owners are shifting to older groups. 
2.a.3 The percentage of out-of-state owners is increasing. 
2.a.4 The proportion of farm real estate in acres and value is 
shifting from farm operators to nonfarm operators. 
2.a.3 Nonoperating landlords are in occupations other than 
farming and their ownership share is increasing. 
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The above hypotheses are tested and results presented in the fourth 
chapter. 
2.b Concentration of Iowa land ownership is shifting from operators 
to landlords. 
2.b.l Landlords own larger average sized farms and larger 
average value of farms than operators. 
2.b.2 Landlords have concentrated on high value areas and own 
a greater number of farms than operators. 
2.b.3 Distribution of owned farmland is on a larger acreage for 
the landlords, as opposed to operators. 
2.b.4 Increases in the average number of acres owned have been 
more rapid for the landlords, as opposed to operators. 
2.b.5 Institutional ownership distribution is changing, getting 
unevenly distributed for acreage as well as value of 
these resources. 
2.b.6 In Iowa the concentration coefficient of land and value 
of resources owned is increasing. 
Hypotheses related to concentration of ownership are tested in the fifth 
chapter. 
Determination of the tenure patterns of farmland owners 
Changing technologic conditions in agriculture require larger capital 
investments which are resulting in modifications of the traditional agri­
cultural ladder concept. 
3.a Owners reporting farm experience only are declining while 
nonoperator landlords with no previous farm experience are 
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on the rise. 
3.b Younger owners are using nonfarm employment as a replacement 
for the hired hand and tenancy steps in the agricultural ladder. 
3.C Basic agricultural ladder is used to a lesser extent than in the 
past; other patterns are evolving. 
3.d Owners with nonbasic agricultural ladder experience own a 
greater share of the total acreage. 
Agricultural ladder and hypotheses related to it are tested in the sixth 
chapter. 
Determination of farmland acquisition methods 
4.a Gratuities are important if a farmer is to acquire ownership 
early in his career. 
4.a.l Family assistance to farmers seeking ownership is on the 
rise. 
4.a.2 Nonoperator landlords receive their ownership of land 
mainly by gift and/or inheritance. 
4.a.3 Young owners are increasingly utilizing combinations of 
gifts and inheritances in acquiring ownership of farmland. 
4.a.4 Operators, as opposed to landlords, and farmers, as 
opposed to nonfarmers, use inheritances other than land 
for land ownership purposes. 
4.a.5 Operators, as opposed to landlords, receive a higher 
value of nonland inheritance. 
4.b Farmers are increasingly utilizing purchase contracts and using 
part ownership as a means of acquisition of new farmland. 
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4.b.l The use of purchase contracts is increasing in all areas 
and for all owners. 
4.b.2 Part-owner operators, as opposed to other tenure groups, 
are increasingly using purchase contracts and mortgage-
for-deed. 
4.b.3 Farmers, more than nonfarmers, young owners, as opposed 
to older owners, are utilizing purchase contracts. 
4.b.4 Larger amounts of value of the outstanding debt is on 
the operator class of owners. 
4.b.5 Farmlands of institutional owners, compared to individual 
owners, are increasingly being held free of debt. 
Problems related to acquisition methods delimited in 4.a and 4.b above 
are tested in the seventh chapter. 
Identification of farmland transfer methods between generations 
5.a Individual transfer plans are on the rise. 
5.a.l Landlords rent their lands to their immediate family 
members so as to acquaint them with farming and eventu­
ally help in transfer of farmland to the next generation. 
5.a.2 All owners are making greater use of individual transfer 
plans, both inter-vivos transfers and wills. 
5.a.3 Younger owners are preparing wills more frequently than 
in the past. 
5.a.4 Farmers, as opposed to nonfarmers, make greater use of 
transfer plans. 
5.b Social security payments to farmers are encouraging receivers to 
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retire earlier, providing opportunities for transfer of land 
ownership to younger generations. 
5.b.l Receipt of social security payments by farmers encourage 
retirement by age 65. 
5.b.2 Owners who receive social security payments are increas­
ingly transferring farmlands to the next generation. 
5.b.3 Farmers receiving social security payments are adopting 
inter-vivos transfers more often than those who do not 
receive social security payments. 
Transfer objectives of owners and related diagnostic hypotheses from 
5.a.l - 5.b.3 above are tested and presented in the eighth chapter. 
Procedures Used in Testing Hypotheses 
In all studies it is required that we should have a test to determine 
the significance of our findings. Throughout this study, except in the 
third chapter, findings are expressed in terms of percentages. In order 
to test for a significant difference between two percentage figures, a set 
of nomograms has been used, constructed for the 95 percent and the 90 
percent confidence levels. These nomograms have been adapted from Strand 
(88) by Scott Krane on an idea of H. 0. Hartley and have already been used 
in earlier land ownership studies (89, 91). Similarly, our tests of 
significance is based on these sets of nomograms. A detailed explanation 
of construction and use of the nomograms is provided in Appendix C. 
Differences between percentages were tested first at the 95 percent 
confidence level. When very significant differences were found, they were 
identified by two stars (**). Differences between percentages that were 
25 
not significant at the 95 percent level have been put to test at the 90 
percent confidence level. If they were found to be significant at the 90 
percent level, they were identified with one star (*). For percentages 
with no significant difference at the 90 percent level, it was assumed 
that the difference arose due to sampling variation or non-sampling 
errors. 
In cases where data was subdivided into sample sizes of less than 100 
units, the tests of significance between two independent samples were not 
used. The reason for not testing in such cases is the fact that sampling 
variation, as well as non-sampling errors, which exist in small groups is 
too large to obtain reliable comparisons. 
Probability Corrections of the Sample 
According to ASCS record files in each county, each farm is given a 
specific number. The sample of farms that were drawn into the study con­
sisted of the 17th random farm number in each county. However, farmland 
owners possessing more than one farm had varying chances of being selected 
because they appeared in the records as many times as they had separate 
farm numbers. In addition, in cases where farm lands were owned in part­
nership or in other forms of joint ownership (other than husband and wife), 
each individual owner listed has been sent a separate questionnaire to 
respond to. 
To reflect in the estimates the different chances owners had of 
entering the sample, each questionnaire returned has been adjusted by two 
weights: (1) a weight based on the number of times each individual owner 
would have been expected to appear on the records of ASCS and (2) a weight 
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based on his owned land acreage together with his share of jointly owned 
land corrected for his chance of appearance in the sample. 
Since not all farmland owners drawn into the sample returned the 
questionnaires and the ones that were incompletely returned had to be 
discarded, a correction factor (adjustment in sampling fraction for non-
response) had to be incorporated into the estimates. 
In all economic areas, the original sampling rate for ASCS farms was 
1/17. The probability of any particular owner being drawn in the sample 
depended on the number of ASCS farms he owned (either solely or in part­
nership). ïhus if the i^^ owner in the j^^ economic area (stratum) was 
listed on t^^ ASCS farms, then the probability that he would be selected 
in the sample was 
Since usable questionnaires were not obtained for every owner drawn 
into the sample, it was necessary to make an adjustment for non-response 
as follows: 
(i = 1, 2,"'", np 
(j = 1, 2,..., 7) 
Let 
n^ = number of ASCS farms selected from ASCS county lists 
in the j economic area, and 
n* = number of usable responses returned in the j^^ economic 
area. 
Then 
— = adjustment in sampling fraction for non-response, 
j 
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Combining the probability of selection, with the adjustment for 
non-response, we get the corrected sampling rate: 
C - ë ) C é ) -
The reciprocal of this is 
which is the appropriate weight to use for the i^^ respondent in the 
economic area (stratum) when estimates are being made. 
The second weight, assigned to acreage owned, is formulated differ­
ently, This is because each owner had to report all the land he owned 
(individually or in partnership with others) rather than his personal 
share or of the farm number that brought him into the sample. 
So, if we let 
= acres of land solely (husband and/or wife) owned by the 
i^^ respondent in the stratum, 
= acres of land owned in partnership with others (other 
than husband and wife) by the i^^ respondent in the 
stratum, and 
y^j = i^^ respondent's share of the land owned in partnership 
(or in any other form of joint ownership) in the j*"*^ 
stratum, 
then the weight assigned to i^^ respondent's farm acreage in the j'^ eco­
nomic area (stratum) is 
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r / \ / Mr 1 (i n ) 
'^ij - [^ij (?!]) ("ij)] (j . 1, 2,-.-, 7) 
Estimates of number of owners and farmland acreage has been made for 
each economic area (7 in total) and then summed over areas to get the 
state estimates. 
Formulation of estimates for areas and state totals are: 
(1) Estimate of total number of famland owners in the area: 
n'. 
J 
A T 
" L ^ij 
i=l 
(2) Estimate of total number of farmland owners in the state: 
n! 
7 j 
r' V 
/_. L 
j=l i=l 
(3) Estimate of total acres of land owned in farms in the area: 
n! 
J 
A V 
"j " A i^j 
i=l 
(4) Estimate of total acres of land owned in farms in the state: 
7 
" = I I 
j=l i=l 
The estimated mean of acres of land owned in farms in each economic 
area and the state mean can be represented as: 
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(1) Estimated mean of acres of land owned in farms in an economic 
area: 
-U. = — (j = 1, 7) 
^ N. 
J 
(2) Estimated mean of acres of land owned in farms in the state: 
A Û = &  
N 
It should be noted that findings reported in the tables have all been 
corrected by the above weights appropriately. The only exceptions are the 
"number reporting" figures in each table which indicate the uncorrected 
number of people responding to that particular item. 
Nonrespondent Bias Check 
In mail surveys, it is expected that a large percentage of those who 
were mailed questionnaires would not respond. This observation came true 
in this survey as well. As can be seen in Table 3, about 75 percent of 
the questionnaires were not returned. Since our final analysis rests on 
the data provided from the returned questionnaires, it is important to 
check the characteristics of the nonrespondents and compare them with our 
findings. 
In order to observe the characteristics of the nonrespondents, a bias 
check was made on a random sample of nonrespondents in the North Central 
area (economic region 4). 124 farmland owners representing 115 ASCS farms 
were sampled for the interview. Telephone interviews have been obtained 
from 99 farmland owners (18 owners have refused, 7 sold the farm, died or 
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presented other reasons) and the data thus obtained were tabulated for 
nonrespondents. Comparisons between the respondents and nonrespondents 
have been made for the same economic area on important characteristics 
of the owners. The table of comparisons is presented in Appendix B, 
Table 1, with significant differences noted whenever found. 
The differences between the two estimates came to be insignificant, 
which has increased the confidence attached to our findings. The two 
significant differences observed have been the percentage of owners 
reporting wills and the average value of land per owner. It is indicated 
that more than 95 percent of the nonrespondents, as opposed to almost 78 
percent of respondents, had wills. This is a significant finding and 
further supports the increasing use of planned transfer methods. Average 
value of land per owner reported by the nonrespondents have resulted 
unusually low ($19,134) compared to respondents ($103,823). A possible 
reason for such a low estimate for the former may be due to underreporting 
by the nonrespondents. 
Tests of the hypotheses are further developed and applied in the 
remaining chapters of the study. 
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DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS 
IN IDENTIFICATION AND MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES 
INFLUENCING TENURE OF OWNERS 
Scientific inquiry proceeds after items under study are classified 
into homogeneous groups according to some characteristic, such as sex, 
age or some other qualitative or quantitative measure. However, in some 
research situations the grouping of items under study according to one 
characteristic alone may not reflect adequately the "true" portrait of 
the group. In situations where there are many variables influencing 
the item, it may be more useful if we could go one step further and 
reduce all influencing variables into an index so as to differentiate 
between the groups. In multivariate populations, the problem of distin­
guishing between groups is best done by performing discriminant analysis 
so as to reduce the variates into a single variate. 
As far as this study is concerned, farmland owners are grouped into 
homogeneous a priori groups by one of their characteristics - - tenure. 
For our purposes, farmland owners belong to one of the four tenure groups. 
If they operate only the land they own, they are called full owner 
operators (FOO). If they own and operate their land but rent additional 
land, they become part owner operators (POO). If they own and operate 
part of their land and rent out the remainder, they are operating land­
lords (OL); and when they rent all of the land they own, they become non-
operating landlords (NOL). 
The shortcomings of the above classification are evident since it 
does not take into account either the absolute size of the rented land or 
any of the many other influencing variables in determining who falls into 
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which class. It is very likely to find a heterogeneous group of farmland 
owners put together according only to the manner in which they utilize 
their land. Also from the above classification scheme, it is not possible 
to identify the "response-likely" landowner, i.e. the landowner who is on 
the margin of categories. Thus it is not possible to predict who is most 
likely to change tenure status and which variables influence this shift in 
the absence of discriminant analysis. 
For the reasons mentioned above, and due to the exploratory nature of 
the first part of this study, it was decided to apply discriminant analy­
sis techniques to the study of farmland ownership. 
The objective of the discriminant analysis can be summarized as find­
ing "rules of behavior in the assignment of individuals to predetermined 
classes with optimal properties" (57, p. 144). 
Background of Discriminant Analysis 
The idea of discriminating between multivariate populations is not 
novel and could probably be traced far back in history. Scientifically, 
however, the subject is regarded to have begun with the work of Karl 
Pearson around 1920 (57, p. 111). The original developments in the field 
were mainly concerned in seeking a coefficient which would "measure the 
2 distance" between two populations. Pearson's C (his coefficient of 
racial likeness) was first applied on anthropometric data, on Burmese 
skulls by Miss Tildesley (92). 
About this time, Mahalanobis was interested in the subject and 
2 
came to the conclusion that Pearson's C had not achieved its 
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2 purpose. Therefore, Mahalanobis worked out a new coefficient which he 
2 
called D and used this measure on racial mixture of Bengal in 1925. 
Hotelling's contribution to the analysis came during the 1930's when he 
2 generalized "Student's" t. Hotelling's T was, in fact, equivalent to 
2 
Mahalanobis* D , but it was some time before this fact was realized (57). 
Fisher's contribution into the analysis begins with the publication 
of his paper on classifying plant specimens in the biological sciences 
in 1936 (32). The most important difference between Fisher and Mahalan­
obis was that while the latter was measuring the distance between the two 
populations, the former was only dividing the sample space into two 
regions, allocating an item to one of the populations according to the 
region it fell into. As can be observed, the two approaches are quite 
similar. In this study, we utilize both approaches for constructing the 
critical regions by which the items (in our case, farmland owners) will 
have to be separated into distinct populations of tenure classes. 
Further theoretical developments in discriminant analysis are largely 
attributed to Rao (73, 74, 75 and 76). Meanwhile, quite a few scientists 
were concerned with the practical problems of application (7, 14, 15, 71, 
84 and 101). As early as 1941, economists had realized the potentials of 
the techniques of discriminant functions in application to practical 
economic problems. Durand (20) has adapted the technique and applied it 
successfully in determining good and bad car loans. Tintner (96) utilized 
2 2 
"C varied very much with the sample number and, although it pro­
vided a test of significance, it did not measure the magnitude of the 
difference between two populations" (57, p. 112). 
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it in order to construct an "index" which best discriminates between 
consumers* goods and producers* goods on the basis of cyclical behavior 
of relevant prices. More recently, a similar approach is followed by 
Higgins (49) to discriminate between employment in defense and nondefense 
industries 
Application of linear discriminant analysis in agricultural economics 
has been of more recent origin. Blood and Baker (12) have utilized the 
technique to delineate production situations in Northern Great Plains 
which favor wheat or range forage production. While recently Ladd (58) 
has used the technique in his analysis of ranking of dairy bargaining 
cooperative objectives. The most recent application of the discriminant 
analysis in agricultural economics is reported (62) on farm size and 
efficiency problems in Yugoslavia. 
The Analytic Technique of Discriminant Analysis 
The characteristic of this technique is that it allows various vari­
ables common to the two classes to be examined but collapsed into one 
coefficient to be tested. In other words, the principal feature of the 
technique is to find the linear combination of various variables that best 
discriminate between two classes with the use of the coefficients of the 
discriminant function. These coefficients (let us say represented by Z 
or Mahalonobis* D ), one for each item (in our case farmland owner) will 
cluster around their a priori class. They have the optimum property of 
A very interesting application of 
been made by Adelman and Morris (2) for 
potentials of underdeveloped countries. 
discriminant analysis has recently 
evaluating economic development 
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being the maximum distance apart between the two classes. 
If two classes are distincly different from each other, they will 
form mutually exclusive sets. However, it may still be possible for the 
coefficients thus found to overlap even though a statistically significant 
difference between the two a priori classes exist. An overlap, such as an 
element of Class I's Z value lying in Class Il's set, would mean a mis-
classification. But in our case it can also be interpreted as the 
"response-likely" farmland owner. That is, the farmland owner who does 
not exhibit the characteristics of his assigned a priori class and is 
likely to change status as far as his tenure is concerned. 
However, if there are a large number of misclassifications (or 
"response likely" farmland owners), serious doubt is cast on the ability 
of the model to discern differences between classes. A large number of 
misclassifications may arise even when the discriminant function is sig­
nificant — the reason being the exaggerated influence of the extreme 
values on the mean differences. 
4 
The Model of Discriminant Analysis 
The model for discriminant analysis, as applied to defining tenure 
classes and in testing differences between classes, is elaborated as 
follows. 
Let where i = 1, 2,--*, P and t = 1, 2,"'*, N, be a set of 
random variables drawn from a normally distributed multivariate population. 
Then these observations are grouped into two a priori classes according to 
4 
The model of discriminant analysis for two classes is based on 
Tintner (97, pp. 96-102). 
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land tenure criteria,^ for 
t = 1, 2,"'", and t = N^ + 1, N^ + 2,''', +N2 
where 
+ Ng = N. 
Defining the means in each class, 
X N X. 
K  =  I  i r  ? =  I  1 ^ '  ( 3 - 1 )  
t=l t=N^+l 
The differences of the means then are 
d^ = X^* - 3L (i = 1, 2,'-', p). (3.2) 
We want to find the linear function of the differences of the means 
Z = k,d, + k_d_ + + k d (3.3a) 
i JL z z p p 
P 
Z = y kjd^ (3.3b) 
i=l 
that discriminates best between two sets of classes. The coefficients 
P 
k^, ^2****' ^  may be selected such as to maximize the square of the 
2 difference of its expectation in two populations, Z , which is 
(k^d^ + k^d^ + ••• + kpdp)^ (3.4) 
Land tenure is the criteria adapted in this study. Accordingly, 
farmland owners can be classified into Class I if they are owner-operators 
or part owner-operators and Class II if they are operating landlords or 
non-operating landlords. In the next section, refinement of the classi­
fication procedure is indicated. 
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subject to the condition that the variance, Q, is 
P P 
I 1 "ij "i "j 
i=l j=l 
a constant (say unity), where 
N 
= 2 \t *jt (i'j = 1, 2,..', p) (3.6) 
t=l 
are the elements of the deviations sums of squares and cross products 
matrix S and 
_ (i = 1, p) 
are the deviations from the means. 
Dividing each element of S by N - 1, we get the dispersion (or 
variance-covariance) matrix D where designates its elements. 
In order to maximize Equation 3.4 subject to the condition that the 
variance in Equation 3.5 is a constant, the function 
F = - X Q (3.8a) 
P P P P 
'  Ï  I \ d. d.  X % % a,, k, (3.8b) 
i=l j=l i=I j=l 
is formed where \ is a Lagrange multiplier. 
Differentiating Equation 3.8b partially with respect to k. where 
1 ^ 
j = 1, 2,'"', p leads to / 
38 
p 
i=l i-1 
j Z \ ^ (i'j • 2' ' ' P) • (3-9) 
Simplifying computations by putting X = ^ leads to 
i=l 
P P 
"j I I \ I " i^j "i (3-1°*) 
i=l i=l i=l 
which is 
p 
d j 
i=l 
j = i  »ij "i • 
In terms of system of equations. 
''Al "*• *^^12 •*••••+ '^1 
+ • • • + kpO^p = ^ 2 (3.11) 
kjOpi + k^apj + ... + kpapp = dp 
The linear equations obtained in Equation 3.11 have the solutions 
= a^^dj^ + d^^d^ + ••• + a^^dp (i = 1, 2,'"', p) (3.12) 
where the matrix elements, are inverse to the common dispersion 
matrix elements, a... 
ij 
Tintner emphasizes that "the solutions k^ are proportional to the 
coefficients of the linear function which in the population corresponding 
to the sang)le discriminates best between two groups in the sense defined 
above" (96, p. 475). 
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In the above case, the dispersion matrices for both classes were 
assumed to be the same. Rao (76, p. 289) has shown that if dispersion 
matrices are different, the likelihood ratio surface separating two 
classes is defined by the quadratic expression 
(==: •^ )} ° (3.13) 
i j 
where and are the inverses of the dispersion matrices corre­
sponding to the two populations.^ As in the case where dispersion matri­
ces were the same for two populations, again an individual for whom the 
value of the left hand function exceeds the constant value chosen is 
assigned to the first class, and when it is smaller he is assigned to the 
second class. 
For this case, with two classes and the same dispersion matrices, a 
quantity analogous to the multiple correlation coefficient can be computed 
for a discriminant function 
Then the variance ratio 
^ _ (N - P - 1)R (3.15) 
P(1 - R ) 
has Snedecor's F distribution which can be employed to test the 
6 — — 
Population means |i.., and have been replaced with sample 
means and , respectively, in this presentation in order to con­
form to our original notation. 
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significance of the discriminant function with = p and = N - p - 1 
degrees of freedom. Thus the hypothesis that the empirical discriminant 
function may have been by pure chance where, in fact, there was no differ­
ence between the two classes of the population can be tested. 
Tests for significant differences in dispersion matrices, extension 
of the model to more than two classes and the relevant tests are discussed 
in the next sections of this chapter. 
Extensions of the Model 
In most cases, the basic model of two classes can serve the purpose 
of investigation. In our case, farmland owners can be classified into 
two; operators (land owners who own full or part of their land but 
operate all of it) and landlords (land owners who rent part or all the 
land they own). However, the aggregation of four a priori tenure groups 
into two classes may force the analysis into forming nonhomogeneous class­
ifications and may lead to loss of information if there are in fact sig­
nificant differences between the groups. Besides, other divisions of four 
tenure groups into two classes, such as operators vs. nonoperators, may 
provide more interesting results. What we are interested in, however, is 
to observe if FOG form the class of owners, POO and OL the class of oper­
ators, and NOL the class of nonoperators, or tenures form an operator 
class which consists of FOO, POO and OL, as opposed to a nonoperator class 
which consists of NOL. Thus, the analysis is extended to cases where 
there are more than two classes.^ 
^Extension of the model to more than two classes is based on (6, 16, 
18, and 76). 
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The sequence of analysis for the extension of the model begins with 
the analysis of dispersion matrices for each group (four in our case). 
The null hypothesis of the test of homogenity of dispersions asserts 
that the group populations have equal dispersions. The determinant of the 
dispersion matrix of a group [D^l is employed to be the scalar repre­
sentation of the dispersion estimate in the homogenity test. The determi­
nant of the best estimate of the population dispersion matrix |D | is 
computed from the pooled group deviation sums of squares and cross pro­
ducts matrices. 
An M criterion for testing the null hypothesis of the equality 
of g group dispersion matrices are derived from Barlett and presented in 
(16, pp. 62-63). 
M = n log^ |D| - ^ (n log^ [dj) (3.16) g ' g' 
8 , 
where D = and W is the pooled within-groups devia­
tion score cross products matrix, and n = N - 1 and n = N - 1 are 
g 8 
number of total and group observations, respectively. 
Required parameters for the above criterion are: 
».i7) 
8 
8 8^ 
where p is the number of variables (14 in our case) and g is the 
number of groups (4 in our case). 
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Test statistic F with and degrees of freedom depend on 
2 2 
whether is positive or negative. If A^ - Aj^ is positive, 
then 
(f,+2) f, 
f, = .5(g - l)p(p + 1), f„ 5- and b = g— 
- 4> (1 - A, - ji) 
and the test statistic is 
2 
However, if A^ - A^ is negative, then 
2 
F ^ = r . (3.19) 
(f 1 +2) 
fj^ = .5(g - l)p(p + 1), f2 = —2 and b = 
(^1 • ^2) (1 - A^ + 
and the test statistic then becomes 
^1 ^2^ 
% ° f.(b - M) • 
^2 
If the test of equality of dispersion matrices between groups is not 
rejected, we proceed to test which asserts the equality of the popu­
lation centroids (i.e., mean vectors) . This test is the multivariate 
generalization of analysis of variance of a one-way univariate case. 
Test of utilizes matrices which represent the sums of squares 
and cross-products of deviations from the grand means T, and similarly 
irom group means W^. The latter are pooled (added together) to form W, 
within-groups estimate. 
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The criterion to test H2 is defined as Wilks' lambda by Rao (76, 
pp. 258-262): 
_/V_ - (3.21) 
where W is the pooled within-groups deviation cross-products matrix 
and T is the total sample deviation cross-products matrix. The elements 
of both matrices Ure defined as 
N 
g S 
"ij - I { I (»ikn - y (^Jkn - ^ jk)} (3.22) 
k=l n=l 
N 
'ij = I ihn - \) • j^) (3.23) 
n=l 
where 
Ng = number of persons in group g, 
N = total number of persons in all groups, 
g = number of groups (four in our case), and 
i,j = 1, 2,***, p where p equals number of variables 
(14 in our case). 
As |t| increase relative to | w |  then -/L. gets smaller, thus 
increasing the confidence to reject To test the significance of VL, 
2 
approximation of Barlett or Rao's F approximation may be utilized. 
However, Monte Carlo methods indicate the latter to be slightly better 
(16, pp. 61-62), and so this test is used in the study. 
Let 
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s = \  I  — ^  2^^—  q  =  8 - 1  
(p + q - 5) 
p + q + 1 
m = n - ^ ^ n = N - 1 
= _ £3_^ 
4 
and 
v-yii' • 
Then approximation of the F test which is 
2r 
= (^ ) (T) 
ms+zA. 
F 
y  
with 2r and ms + 2X degrees of freedom is used to test the signifi­
cance of in 
If, however, is rejected, the test of is not valid since it 
assumes a common dispersion matrix. The study then proceeds to compute 
2 Mahalonobis' D for each observation and determine tenure classes and 
discriminant function. 
Sequence of Discriminant Analysis 
The sequence of discriminant analysis for this study is as follows: 
(1) Test of for all tenure groups using all variables. 
(2) Test of for all tenure groups if could not be 
rejected. 
2 (3) If is rejected, compute Mahalonobis' D for each obser­
vation in each tenure group and determine number of classes. 
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Determination of tenure groups in each class and the number of classes is 
identified in the second or the third stage. Discriminant function or 
multiple-discriminant functions are then run, depending on the number of 
tenure classes. 
Cooley and Lohnes (16, pp. 116-118) indicate computations of multiple-
discriminant functions as the vectors associated with the latent roots of 
the determinanta1 equation 
jw'^ A - Xl| = 0 (3.25) 
where 
W is the pooled within-groups deviation cross-products 
matrix (defined previously). 
I is the identity matrix, and 
A = T - W (3.26) 
where 
T = total sample deviation cross product matrix (defined 
previously), and 
A = among-groups cross products of deviations of group from 
grand means weighted by group sizes. 
The elements of A matrix are defined 
g 
k=l 
The matrix equation (W ^A - XI)V =0 is derived from the partial 
derivatives of the ratio 
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v' A V 
(i = 1, r) (3.27) 
(where r is the lesser of g - 1 and m) which is to be maximized such 
that A (among-groups sums of squares) may be large relative to 
v!^ W (within-groups sums of squares) on the discriminant functions 
represented by the latent roots (eigenvalues) and their associated 
vectors (eigenvectors). The relative sizes of eigenvalues indicate 
the extent the associated discriminant functions distinguish among the 
groups (16, p. 118). Derivation of (eigenvalues) and v^ (eigen­
vectors) is explained in (54, pp. 95-103). 
The Variables Used in the Discriminant Analysis 
The above-discussed model of discriminant analysis has been applied 
to a representative sample of returned questionnaires on the land owner­
ship survey of 1970. It was first decided to utilize the simple, two 
class model. The landowners were to be divided into two classes: Class I 
(operators—full or part owners who operate all the land they own) and 
Class II (landlords—operating or nonoperating, but renting out part or 
all of the land they own). 
A simple check of the respondents, however, revealed that this 
classification scheme was not appropriate. It has been seen that non-
operating landlords (NOL) had characteristics different from the rest of 
the tenure groups, so it was decided to call them a class by themselves 
and to test if there were significant differences among the first three 
groups (i.e., F00, POO, and OL). Accordingly, the analysis was extended 
to more than two classes. The results of the test of differences in group 
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dispersions and means follow in the next sections. 
It was decided to have a large number of observations (i.e., land­
owners) to base the results of the discriminant analysis. To this end, 
about one-third of the returned questionnaires have been drawn into the 
sub-sample. Care has been given to have a representative sub-sample of 
each tenure group. A check of owners in the sub-sample revealed unre­
ported data present in some observations. These owners have been dropped 
from the discriminant analysis. Final count of obsep^^ations in the 
analysis totaled 770 (i.e., N = total number of observations = 770). Of 
this, 200 were full owner operator (group 1 = FOO), 211 part owner oper­
ator (group 2 = POO), 194 operator landlord (group 3 = OL), and 165 non-
operator landlord (group 4 = NOL). The analysis proceeded on these groups 
for 14 variables. 
The variables included in the study, their designations, descriptions 
and mean values for each tenure group and total is provided in Table 4. 
Two other variables, (1) number of years respondent worked in farm 
related occupations and (2) number of years respondent was in non-farm 
occupations, were considered for inclusion. However, an analysis of these 
two variates prior to runs indicated the inconsistencies of the respon­
dents' replies (for some owners two occupation categories were not 
mutually exclusive and far too many of the rest had left the questions 
blank). It was decided that these two variables contained excessive 
problems to resolve successfully by editing and thus they were left out 
of the final analysis. 
Table 4. Description and means of variables used in the discriminant analysis 
Means of variable for groups 
Desig­
nation Description of variable 
F 00 
n^ = 200 
POO 
n g  = 2 1 1  
OL 
"3 ~ 
NOL 
"4 = 165 
Means for all 
observations 
Total 
n = 770 
X, 
X. 
X, 
X. 
Land being bought under purchase 
contract (acres) 
Land being bought under mortgage 
(acres) 
47.79 
6 2 . 2 6  
Land bought and fully paid for (acres) 76.57 
Acres of land in partnership or other 12.5 7 
joint ownership (other than husband 
and/or wife) (acres) 
Total value of debt outstanding (under 163.06 
mortgage, deed or purchase contract) 
($100) 
Total value of land and buildings 774.57 
(includes owners' value of solely 
owned land + value of his share in 
partnership acres) ($100) 
Acres of land acquired by purchase 42.96 
from relatives (acres) 
56.32 
80.40 
55.45 
17.75 
224.20 
60 .01  
41.08 
75.12 
165.66 
50.31 
172.46 
45.60 
15.87 
40.92 
165.50 
41.69 
65.45 
919.37 1246.29 1012.05 
39.00 
41.65 
65.98 
112 .28  
29.78 
161.27 
983.63 
47.45 
Table 4. (Continued) 
Desig­
nation Description of variable 
Means of variable for groups 
FOO 
n, =200 
POO 
"2 
OL NOL 
n. 194 n. 165 
Means for all 
observations 
Total 
n « 770 
'10 
'11 
"12 
X 13 
X 14 
Respondents' share (proportion) in 0.031 0.037 0.070 0.082 
partnership or other joint ownership 
acres with others (other than husband 
or wife) 
Acres of owned land acquired by inher- 9.59 6.37 31.73 50.84 
itance of full Interest (acres) 
Total amount of money received through 15.96 19.98 20.74 19.16 
gift, will or estate settlement and 
used in purchase, operation or improve­
ment of farmland ($100) 
Number of children of the owner 2.86 3.21 2.87 2.71 
Number of years land owned by the 18.16 13.26 24.04 25.66 
owner (years) 
Present age of the landowner (years) 53.04 46.39 59.06 63.72 
Number of people (other than husband 0.11 0.13 0.42 0.21 
and/or wife) with ownership interest 
in this land 
0.053 
23.12 
18.98 
2.93 
19.91 
54.99 
0.215 
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Interrelationship between Variables for All Tenure Groups 
To observe the interrelationship between the variables included in 
the discriminant analysis, correlation matrices for each tenure, as well 
as for the group, are presented in this section. Table 5 provides the 
correlation matrix for all the land owners irrespective of their tenure 
status, while Tables 6 through 9 are correlation matrices for FOO, POO, 
OL and NOL tenure groups, respectively. Although there are expected vari­
ations in the magnitudes of the correlations between variables from one 
tenure group to the other, the signs of all elements are in the expected 
direction. For example, acres of land purchased under contract is 
negatively correlated with mortgage acres and fully paid acres X^, 
while positively correlated with value of debt X^ and value of land X^ 
for all tenure groups (Tables 5-9). 
The magnitude of the elements of correlation matrices are also impor­
tant and reveal some interesting relationships. For example, it is hypo­
thesized that although inheritance of land (and to some extent capital in 
the form of money) is important in becoming a full owner (thus the rela­
tionship between X^ and Xg positive), it is conducive to becoming a 
nonoperator landlord. In other words, high correlation between X^ and 
Xg for NOL suggests the possibility that acres of inherited land is one 
of the important factors in becoming a nonoperating landlord. Similarly, 
amount of money received as gift, will or estate settlement X^^ is 
" correlated higher with X^ for OL and NOL, as opposed to FOO and POO. 
NwTjber of children of the respondent X^^^ has been included as the 
variable to test the part-ership arraiigements within the family. 
Table 5. Correlation matrix for all tenure groups (total) 
*1 *2 *3 =4 ^ 
1.0000 
*2 
X3 
-0.0613 1.0000 
-0.1200 -0.1359 1.0000 
X, -0.0898 -0.0469 0.1058 1.0000 
X^ 0.4791 0.6231 -0.1748 -0.0460 1.0000 
X, 0.2260 0.4916 0.5175 0.1405 0.5517 1.0000 
0.1446 -0.0939 0.1458 -0.0004 0.1057 0.2253 1.0000 
-0.1078 -0.0747 0.0206 0.7307 -0.0652 0.0589 -0.0049 
Xg -0.1231 -0.0686 0.4246 -0.0030 -0.1192 0.2070 -0.0405 
X^Q -0.0491 0.0666 0.1861 0.0583 -0.0019 0.1761 0.1217 
X^^ 0.0464 0.1080 -0.0413 -0.1027 0.0871 0.0458 0.1189 
Xj^2 -0.2729 0.0176 0.375 3 0.0641 -0.2024 0.1619 -0.0183 
-0.3363 -0.0744 0.2746 -0.0136 -0.2990 0.0139 -0.1027 
-0.0732 0.0104 -0.0123 0.6243 0.0132 0.0722 0.0175 
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 ^ S 1^0 1^1 1^2 1^3 *14 
1.0000 
Xg 0.0222 1.0000 
-0.0081 0.0460 1.0000 
X^^ -0.1263 -0.1072 0.0018 l.OOOC 
X^2 0.0090 0.1195 0.0415 -0.0027 1.0000 
-0.0389 0.1280 0.0080 -0.0805 0.7044 1.0000 
^24 0.6316 -0.0099 -0.0033 -Ù.0193 0.0119 -0.0490 1.0000 
Table 6. Correlation matrix for tenure group 1—F00 
*1 ^ *3 *4 *5 X? 
1.0000 
-0.1623 1.0000 
-0.1993 -0.2869 1.0000 
X^ -0.0893 0.2238 -0.1006 1.0000 
X^ 0.4674 0.5825 -0.2742 0.2988 1.0000 
X, 0.2987 0.5030 0.2204 0.2166 0.6992 1.0000 
o 
0.2801 0.0279 0.0904 -0.0351 0.1153 0.2838 1.0000 
-0.0864 0.0364 -0.0998 0.9161 0.1029 0.0437 -0.0211 
Xg -0.1099 -0.0516 0.2542 -0.0130 -0.0811 0.0557 -0.0717 
X^Q -0.0535 0.0300 0.0713 -0.0902 -0.0088 0.0426 0.1110 
X^^ 0.0990 0.0711 0.1205 -0.0810 0.0606 0.1980 0.2477 
X^2 -0.2972 0.0360 0.3941 -0.0461 -0.2339 0.0465 -0.1121 
X^2 -0.3357 -0.0560 0.2573 -0.0403 -0.3233 -0.1121 -0.1761 
X^^ -0.09C5 0.1700 -0.1167 0.8225 0.2290 0.1204 -0.0607 
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10 11 X. 12 13 '14 
*9 
1.0000 
0.0243 1.0000 
Xj^Q -0.0968 0.1835 1.0000 
X^. -0.1179 -0.0401 -0.0656 1.0000 
X^ -0.0565 0.0645 -0.0233 -0.0474 1.0000 
^3 -0.0755 0.0253 -0.0169 -0.1o45 0.6607 1.0000 
X., 0.7662 -0.0148 -O.Oo/S -0.0415 -0.0477 -0.0289 1.0000 
Table 7. Correlation matrix for tenure group 2—POO 
Xl *2 *3 ^ 3:5 *7 
X, 1.0000 
X3 
-0.1676 1.0000 
-0.2051 -0.1617 1.0000 
X^ -0.1090 -0.0652 -0.1216 1.0000 
X^ 0.3440 0.6731 -0.2480 -0.1062 1.0000 
XG 0.1699 0.6855 0.1439 -0.0563 0.7269 1.0000 
X^ 0.1010 0.0923 0.0852 0.0726 0.1915 0.1567 1.0000 
XG -0.1371 -0.0643 -0.1487 0.7351 -0.0864 -0.0447 -0.0582 
XG -0.1417 -0.0753 0.2090 -0.0321 -0.1468 0.0188 -0.1151 
X^Q -0.1567 0.0830 0.1482 -0.0565 -0.0616 0.1969 0.1095 
XJ^^ -0.0898 0.1410 -0.0375 -0.1204 0.1152 0.0915 -0.0232 
X12 -0.3786 0.1538 0.2939 0.0240 -0.1136 0.1698 -0.0407 
X-. -0.3753 0.0496 0.2095 -0.0549 -0.2207 0.0429 -0.0640 jlJ 
X^  ^ -0.1155 0.0925 -0.1355 0.4862 0.0309 0.0278 0.0112 
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Xg Xg 1^0 1^1 1^2 1^3 1^4 
Xg 1.0000 
Xg -0.0290 
Xj^Q -0.0737 
X^^ -0.0577 
X^2 -0.0191 
-0.1045 
X^  ^ 0.6619 
1.0000 
0.0057 1.0000 
-0.0324 -0.0201 
0.1180 0.0485 
0.2449 0.0787 
-0.0396 -0.0436 
1.0000 
0.0834 1.0000 
0.0305 0.5302 
-0.0512 0.1095 
1.0000 
-0.0754 1.0000 
Table 8. Correlation matrix for tenure group 3—OL 
1.0000 
*2 
0.0785 1.0000 
X_ -0.0710 -0.0258 1.0000 
X, -0.0941 -0.0902 0.0336 1.0000 4 
X. 0.6119 0.6201 -0.0844 -0.0849 1.0000 
Xg 0.2596 0.5285 0.6362 0.0933 0.5268 1.0000 
X^ 0.0463 0.1470 0.3005 0.0307 0.0428 0.3257 1.0000 
*8 -0.1075 -0.1093 -0.0097 0.7387 -0.1005 0.0256 -0.0003 
Xg -0.1252 -0.0443 0.3527 -0.0776 -0.0977 0.1726 -0.0246 
X^Q -0.0130 0.0888 0.2683 0.1487 0.0409 0.2040 0.2455 
X^  ^ 0.0555 0.0871 0.0230 -0.0673 0.0637 0.0487 0.0811 
X^2 -0.2392 0.0022 0.2963 -0.0027 -0.1909 0.1181 0.0355 
X.g -0.3595 -0.0626 0.1552 -0.1266 -0.3034 -0.0642 -0.0644 
X,, -0.0570 -0.0o21 -Û.0Ô79 0.6108 -0.0361 0.0098 0.0921 X'4 
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8^ S 1^0 1^1 1^2 1^3 1^4 
Xg 1.0000 
Xg -0.0829 
X^Q 0.0730 
X^^ -0.1241 
Xj^2 -0.0792 
X^2 -0.0886 
X^^ 0.5948 
1.0000 
0.0836 1.0000 
-0.1512 0.1297 
-0.0253 0.0671 
0.0350 0.0019 
-0.0552 0.0271 
1.0000 
0.1030 1.0000 
-0.0090 0.7084 
0.0552 -0.0850 
1.0000 
-0.1405 1.0000 
Table 9. Correlation matrix for tenure group 4—NOL 
X, X^ 
*2 
%3 
1.0000 
-0.0388 1.0000 
-0.0168 -0.2419 1.0000 
-0.0460 -0.1119 0.2437 1.0000 
0.4261 0.6557 -0.1615 -0.0821 1.0000 
0.2764 0.2225 0.6054 0.2606 0.4025 1.0000 
*7 
*8 
0.0857 0.0438 0.1123 -0.0732 -0.0191 0.0772 1.0000 
-0.0501 -0.1274 0.0525 " 0.6919 -0.0851 0.1282 -0.0714 
Xg -0.0797 -0.1026 0.5202 0.0167 -0.1160 0.3628 0.0108 
X^Q 0.0729 0.0270 0.2508 0.1180 0.0531 0.2413 -0.0182 
0.0584 0.1147 -0.1824 -0.1460 0.0654 -0.1258 0.1332 
X^^ -0.0966 0.0178 0.2816 0.0632 -0.0934 0.2102 0.1709 
Xj^2 -0.1647 -0.1301 0.1191 -0.0817 -0.1924 -0.0042 0.0230 
X^^ -0.0525 -0.1125 0.0805 0.8116 -0.0824 0.1486 -0.0972 
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10 11 X, 12 13 14 
1.0000 
Xg 0.0571 1.0000 
X^Q 0.0201 -0.0069 1.0000 
Xii -0.1717 -0.1110 -0.0428 1.0000 
Xj^2 -0.0136 0.1036 0.0678 0.0024 1.0000 
-0.1803 -0.0240 -0.0436 0.0052 0.6254 1.0000 
X^  ^ 0.8482 C.0184 0.0273 -0.1258 -0.0136 -0.1910 1.0000 
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Accordingly, it was hypothesized that would be highly correlated 
with the respondents share of partnership with others Xg, especially 
for OL and NOL. Although the direction of the correlation (negative) 
has come out to be as expected, the magnitude was far too low for veri­
fying the relationship. 
The Results of Discriminant Analysis 
In this section the results of discriminant analysis is presented on 
the sequence presented in the earlier sections. In order to be able to 
utilize the pooled within-groups dispersion matrix W, in the case of four 
tenure groups we have to test the homogenity of tenures in If 
could not be rejected we proceed to test equality of mean vectors of 
groups in But if is rejected, we proceed to sequence three and, 
after establishing the number of tenure classes, to discriminant functions. 
Test of homogenity of all tenure groups 
The null hypothesis that FOO, POO, OL and NOL have equal dispersions 
has been put to test as H^. As previously indicated, test statistic M 
requires the determinants of group dispersion matrices and the pooled 
determinant of all the observations in the sample. 
They have been found to be 
IDj^I = 670.1144 X 10^3 group 1 = FOO 
Id^I = 598.5767 X 10^ group 2 = POO 
Id^I = 161.1993 X 10^* group 3 = OL 
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|d^| = 682.6965 X 10^^ group 4 = NOL 
[d^I = 479.6279 x 10^^ t = total 
Even before applying the test statistic M it can be observed that 
there is a wide variation in inter and intra groups and the variation in 
OL came to be the highest as may be expected. 
Applying the M test from Equation 3.16, we get 
M = 70,263.0686 - 67,176.5421 = 3,086.5265, 
thus obtaining the required parameters by Equations 3.17 and 3.18 
= (0.0197654)(1.6037) = 0.03169786 
Ag = (0.00011025)(11.5555) = 0.00127399 
and 
A^ = 0.00100475. 
2 
Testing the difference A^ - A^ showed it to be a positive value of 
0.00026924 and therefore the relevant F test becomes 
from Equation 3.19. The degrees of freedom associated and the parameter 
b is found to be 
^1 315, ^2 ^  ^ .00026924 1,177,388.2 
and 
 ^^  Ô.966j - 0.000268 " 325.401605 . 
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Then the F statistic is 
3086.5265 
325.4016 
= 9.485 
With 315 and 1,177,388 degrees of freedom, any value of F greater 
than 1 is highly significant at the 0.999 level; that is, there is less 
than one chance in 1000 to obtain a value of F as high as was found. 
Therefore the null hypothesis is rejected, suggesting that significant 
differences between group dispersions exist. 
The result of the test precludes the test of and the use of 
pooled within-groups dispersion matrix W as presented in Equations 3.25 
to 3.27 in obtaining the discriminant functions. The analysis for dis­
criminant functions should proceed on the formulation in Equation 3.13; 
2 however, prior to it we have to obtain Mahalonobis' D for each observa­
tion and determine the number of tenure classes. 
2 
Obtaining Mahalonobis D s for each observation 
2 
The analysis of obtaining Mahalonobis D 's for each observation in 
each tenure group is based on a formulation of Dempster (18, p. 206) 
Accordingly, if eacii tenure group is distinct and homogeneous within 
(3.28) 
where 
i = I,---, 4, j = I,---, n^, and t = I,---, 14, 
= value of t^^ variable of observation in i^^ group 
= mean value of t*"^ variable for i^^ group, and 
= dispersion matrix for i^^ group. 
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2 itself, the D..*s for that tenure should cluster around their mean, 
ij 
resulting in maximum separation among tenure groups. However, the results 
of this analysis did not provide homogeneous tenure groups but formed what 
I call "tenure classes". That is to say, when most of the members of two 
or more tenure groups are so alike in their various characteristics that 
it is not possible to identify them separately without making gross mis-
classification errors, in which case these groups are joined together to 
form a tenure class. 
2 Observing D..*s for each tenure group closely, an interesting 
2 
pattern has emerged. Since for each observation there had been four 
values computed (one for its own tenure group and three for others), it 
was possible to rank the closeness of tenure groups among themselves based 
on rankings of each observation in each tenure group. The result has been 
a combination of three tenure groups—FOO, POO and OL—to form operator 
tenure class, as opposed to NOL tenure group now called the nonoperator 
tenure class. 
Conceptually the formation of tenure classes can best be explained 
with the aid of Figure 3. 
The basis of Figure 3 and the formation of tenure classes depend on 
distance rankings by each observation in each tenure group. To be able to 
g 
present them visually, two dimensional scatter plots were prepared 
D plottings on figures are correct representation of rankings of 
individual owners. However, the points immediately around the inter­
section of the abscissa and the ordinate were too numerous to identify 
individually in all cases and therefore should not be accepted as perfect 
representation of the situation. Number of plottings left out of 
representation due to scale of axis are indicated in each figure. 
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Figure 3. Ranking of distance among tenure groups and formation of 
tenure classes 
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2 (Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7) having the group's own tenure D on the hori-
2 
zontal axis contrasted to the rest of the three tenure D on the 
vertical axis. Thus, for example, in Figure 4 members of the FOO group 
rank distance of other tenure groups on the vertical axis. Similarly, 
Figures 5, 6 and 7 are for POO, OL and NOL group membership rankings of 
other tenure groups, respectively. It may be observed that the farther 
away the plotted point from the horizontal axis, the greater the distance 
between the contrasted tenure groups and conversely. Where tenure groups 
2 
are closest to each other, represented by the ranking of D 's as in 
Figures 4 and 5 for FOO and POO for OL, they form tenure classes. That 
is, the most common characteristic of all these owner-operatorships is 
the uniting force which is stronger than the other separating factors. 
Whereas, the strongest factor which distinguishes NOL-nonoperatorship is 
the reason for it to form a distinct tenure class of renters by itself. 
Discriminant function between operators and nonoperators 
2 
The D values for four tenure groups, as well as for two classes, 
are presented with the discriminant analysis data in Appendix D. It must 
be noted that the power of predictability of the model and consequently 
the proper classification of the individual owner into the right tenure 
is increased when tenure groups form tenure classes. This is because each 
individual class is more homogeneous than each group, as has been pointed 
out in the dispersion matrices. 
2 
Figure 8 presents the plotting of D 's for the final two classes. 
2 2 is on the horizontal axis and 2 3 the vertical axis. The 
45°line divides the graph into two equal portions and thus it represents 
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Figure 6. Ranking of distance of other tenure groups by members of OL 
(twelve points could not be plotted because they fell 
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70 
2 2 2 
Ou D|, D| 
80 
64 
Legend 
48 
32 
## OOO 
oo 
64 80 48 32 1 
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2 
Figure 8. Contrasting the ranking of distance, D *s of Class I 
operators versus Class II nonoperators (operator class 
is identified by black dots, nonoperator class by white 
dots; their intersection is marked by a black dot in a 
white dot; twenty-five points of operators and three 
points of nonoperators could not be plotted because 
they fell outside the scale of the graph) 
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an equal chance of an assignment error between the two tenure classes. 
Members of tenure classes are correctly classified when they form 
2 
a cluster around their D and locate in the triangle which represents 
their class. That is, operator class is concentrated on the lower 
triangle and identified by black dots. Its location is due to the fact 
that as a class, members have lower vertical value, thus the least dis­
tance from each other and greater value horizontally which means maximum 
distance apart from the nonoperators. 
Nonoperator class, shown in white dots, is concentrated on the upper 
2 
triangle for similar reasons. That is, they have lowest D value hori­
zontally and therefore least different from each other and highest value 
vertically to reflect maximum distance from operators. Thus a white dot 
in the black dot concentration area or vice versa indicates the misclassi-
fied landowners. 
Along the 45° border line between these two tenure classes there 
exists a band of misclassified owners who would have belonged to either 
category by slight changes in their values of one or the other variable. 
These are the "borderline" landowners who still exhibit the identity of 
their class. 153 of the operators out of 605 owners in Class I and 21 
of the nonoperators out of 165 owners in Class II have been identified 
as "borderline" cases. This is close to 25 percent for the former class 
and about 13 percent for the latter class. 
A seriously misclassified landowner, one who definitely exhibits the 
identity of the other tenure class rather than his declared tenure class, 
is called "response likely" owner. "Response likely" landowners numbered 
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only 36 in Class I and 14 in Class II, which amounts to almost 6 and 8 
percent of total owners in each class, respectively. Definition and 
characteristics of these "response likely" owners are treated separately 
in the final section of this chapter. 
Predictive value of the model rests on its correct classification of 
the observations into their respective tenure classes and identification 
of the "response likely" farmland owners. Applying the analysis between 
two tenure classes resulted in a quadratic discriminant function since 
Equation 3.13 has been utilized and two dispersion matrices have been 
identified. The test for two dispersion matrices is again the test 
and has resulted in 
Di 2 3 = [0.2450691^0 n^ « 605 
= |0.68270161^9 n^ = 165 
=  I  0 . 4 7 9 6 2 8 0 =  7 7 0  
M = 70,263.0686 - 69,445.7256 = 817.343 
= (0.00645279)(4.8111) = 0.03104508 
A^ = (0.00003823)(32.5) = 0.00124247 
A^ = 0.00096379 
2 
Ag - A^ = 0.00027868 and is positive . 
So 
= 105, ±2 = 383,952.9209 
75 
b = 105 
(0.96895492 - 0.00027347) = 108.39476692 
and the F test statistic is 
M ^  817.3430 
b 108.3947 
= 7.54 
with and degrees of freedom computed F of 7.5 is very signif­
icantly different at the .999 level of tabular F of 1, so is 
rejected and it will be concluded that two dispersions are not alike and 
pooled dispersion matrix W can not be used but instead individual 
S.'s should be utilized. 
1 
The quadratic discriminant function obtained is in the form 
ZZ [-''k - ^ii) h -
as previously pointed out in Equation 3.13. In matrix notation, it is 
(x - (x - - (x - î^)' 52^^ - ^) 
which is the same as 
a 
12 
22 
a 
a 
142 *1414 
11 
^1 
\l 
- X 141 
76 
"^ 12 
^2 
^i2 
- X 142 
,12 
,22 
•142 11414 
- X 12 
^2 
1^2 
- X 142 ! 
Accordingly, we need to present the vector of means for the first and 
second classes as well as inverse dispersion matrices and so 
that new observations can be classified. If the cost of misclassification 
is thought to be equal for both classes, that is to say if both classes 
have equal chance of being misclassified and we attach an equal value for 
both misclassifications, then the constant in Equation 3.13 is taken to be 
zero, which is represented by the 45° line in Figure 8. Therefore, when-
2 
ever an observation has positive it will be classified into Class I. 
2 
Conversely, a negative will be classified in Class II. 
The required Class I means X^^, where i = 1,'" , 14, are 48.612, 
72.709, 97.769, 26.479, 187.398, 976.334, 49.750, 0.0455, 15.564, 18.896, 
2.988, 18.337, 52.648, and 0.217. The required Class II means X_2: 
where i = I,---, 14, are 15.873, 40.921, 165.503, 41.691, 65.454, 
1012.050, 39.000, 0.0815, 50.842, 19.158, 2.709, 25.661, 63.715, and 
0.206. The inverse dispersion matrices of the first and second classes 
are presented in Tables 10 and 11, respectively. 
Characteristics of "Response Likely" Owners 
The application of the two class models with two different dispersion 
matrices provided a good classification setup for the land owners included 
Table 10. Inverse matrix class I—tenure groups 1, 2, 3 
Xl 3% *4 *5 3% *7 
0.000229 
*3 
0.000109 0.000152 
0.000037 0.000056 0.000117 
X^ 0.000010 0.000013 0.000010 0.000271 
X^ -0.000039 -0.000030 0.000017 0.000005 0.000034 
X, -0.000009 -0.000013 -0.000018 -0.000005 -0.000005 0.000005 
X^ -0.000022 -0.000010 -0.000012 -0.000003 0.000007 -0.000003 0.000146 
Xg 0.016663 0.011644 0.006121 -0.112095 0.000150 -0.001669 0.007276 
Xg 0.000013 0.000001 -0.000039 0.000014 0.000004 -0.000002 0.000023 
X^Q 0.000017 -0.000004 -0.000005 -0.000016 0.000006 -0.000003 -0.000024 
Xj^j^ 0.000103 -0.000215 -0.000067 0.000470 0.000051 -0.000035 -0.000429 
X^2 0.000030 -0.000131 -0.000249 -0.000159 0.000035 -0.000006 0.000071 
X^^ 0.000210 0.000016 0.000031 0.000131 0.000065 -0.000010 0.000102 
X^^ 0.000734 -0.000131 0.000667 -0.007962 -0.000451 0.000062 -0.001155 
78 
10 11 12 13 '14 
XG 0.000142 
XG 0.003898 0.000284 
0.011027 -0.000005 0,000305 
0.444108 0.000849 0.000055 0.268557 
0.090405 0.000244 0.000082 -0.004969 0.015283 
0.009154 -0.000099 O.OO&ûlO 0.007663 -0.009800 0.015241 
-0.063288 -0.001252 0.000618 -0.071061 -0.006132 -0.000442 0.028431 
Table 11. Inverse matrix class II—tenure group 4 
%1 *2 *4 *5 *7 
0.000221 
*2 0.000127 0.000295 
X_ 0.000012 0.000041 0.000080 
X^ 0.000006 -0.000006 -0.000026 0.000219 
X^ -0.000006 -0.000096 0.000015 0.000005 0.000085 
Xg -0.000006 -0.000007 -0.000011 -0.000003 -0.000007 0.000005 
yLj -0.000025 -0.000026 -0.000013 0.000007 0.000016 -0.000001 0.000197 
Xg 0.005109 0.016071 0.013083 -0.006515 -0.001007 -0.001209 -0.007702 
Xg 0.000018 -0.000002 -0.000036 0.000033 0.000010 -0.000004 0.000014 
X^Q -0.000007 -0.000014 -0.000028 -0.000016 0.000006 -0.000003 0.000020 
X^^ -0.000514 -0.000548 0.000369 0.000104 0.000076 0.000054 -0.000896 
X^2 -0.000058 -0.000314 -0.000122 0.000043 0.000080 -0.000011 -0.000239 
X^2 0.000221 0.000319 0.000054 -0.000109 0.000010 -0.000014 0.000168 
X^^ 0.001349 0.001868 0.003319 -0.041411 0.000924 -0.000230 0.004316 
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X, 10 11 12 13 "14 
Xg 0.000110 
Xg -0.013090 0.000138 
Xj^Q -0.003674 0.000038 0.000334 
Xj^ j^  0.653390 -0.000061 -0.000080 0.239749 
Xj^ 2 -0.046754 -0.000022 -0.000097 -0.001505 0.010278 
X^2 0.059860 0.000147 0.000194 0.000040 -0.006828 0.011025 
X^  ^ -0.003229 0.000197 0.005826 -0.147601 -0.027279 0.069531 0.002286 
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within the study. Full owner-operators, part owner-operators and operator 
landlords formed the operator class (I) with almost 70 percent correct 
classification of observations, while the nonoperator landlord tenure 
formed the nonoperator class (II) with over 79 percent correct classifi­
cation. 
Identifying the misclassified respondents from Figure 8 and Appendix 
D, two kinds of landowners emerged: (1) "borderline" owners, who indi­
cated some characteristics of the class other than the one they have 
declared but still retain their identity as members of their own class, 
and (2) "response likely" owners, who clearly exhibited the character­
istics of the class other than the one to which they belong. These last 
groups of owners numbered 50 and were less than 7 percent of all respon­
dents. 
The "response likely" farmland owner is identified when respondent is 
classified into the class other than his declared tenure class very 
strongly- The strength of classification is measured by the value of the 
2 2 
D 's computed. If a respondent's computed D is twice as big or bigger 
2 for his declared class than his computed D for the opposite class, then 
he is said to be strongly misclassified and called "response likely" farm­
land owner. These owners are expected to change tenure status within the 
foreseeable future. Thus the discriminant function obtained provides the 
tool to predict the owners who are most likely to change their tenure 
status by observing the relative values they attach to different variables. 
Analyzing these "response likely" owners, it is seen that the ones 
who were classified as nonoperators (Class II) by the model, while they 
declared to be operators (Class I), exhibited these characteristics: 
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None of the owners were buying land under purchase contract or 
mortgage agreement and no group member had an outstanding debt. All of 
the lands they own have been fully paid for but ownership with one partner 
dominated the group portrait. 
In acquiring ownership of their lands, very few of them purchased 
from their relatives and even of the ones who did, most have been less 
than 80 acres; however, close to 50 percent had inherited land and 
received some money as gift or estate settlement and used it for buying, 
improving or operating their lands. The value of their owned land varied 
from $2,500 to $300,000, but the great majority—close to 50 percent—had 
lands declared to be in excess of $75,000. 
Years land owned varied between the land owners from 5 to 41; 
however, 33 percent of the time it was 24 or more years. Similarly, the 
age of the owners indicated the group to consist of older men; over 80 
percent were older than 50 years, of which almost one-half were older than 
70 years. 
Further investigation of the individual respondents indicated that 
most "response likely" nonoperators were in all likelihood NOL, even 
though they declared themselves to be operators (FOG, POO and OL). The 
respondent's tenure identification of himself varies from individual to 
individual. Most older owners, even when their son, son-in-law or close 
relative has been actually operating the farm in some partnership form, 
indicated themselves to be involved in the decision-making process of the 
farm and therefore declared to be in Class I. The model has selected 
these landowners and identified them to be nonoperators (Class II) rather 
than operators (Class I). As far as this study is concerned, it is 
possible and the model, therefore, will identify correctly the owner who 
is most likely to change his tenure status within the immediate future. 
Analyzing the owners who were classified as operators (Class I) in 
the model but who declared to be nonoperators (Class II) have these 
characteristics : 
Almost all landowners (over 80 percent) were buying land under pur­
chase contract or mortgage arrangements. For the great majority of all 
the owners, their owned land had not been paid for and only a few were 
in partnership with others. Almost all owners have debts outstanding 
ranging from $400 to close to $200,000, but most were around $16,000. 
In acquiring ownership of their land, very few bought from relatives. 
However, no owner has inherited land or received money as a gift to be 
used in getting started in farming. The value of their owned land varied 
from $20,000 to close to $400,000; most declared the value around $50,000. 
Years land owned varied from 2 to 34, but almost 50 percent owned 
their lands for less than 15 years. Age of owners differed significantly 
compared to the other class of owners. In this class only about one-third 
of the owners were over 50 years old and one-fifteenth of these were over 
70. Age is a good indicator of operatorship status, as can be expected. 
Summarizing the findings of this chapter, it can be stated that the 
real distinction between different owner groups lies in their operatorship 
status rather than their ownership goals. This is apparent when the first 
three tenure groups (FOG, POO and OL) joined to form an operator class, as 
opposed to a nonoperator class (NOL). If ownership had been the real 
distinguishing criteria between the owners, one would have expected to 
find FOO as a class by itself or at least forming a class with NOL as 
opposed to POO and OL separately or jointly. 
The significance of this finding is that the norm of ownership has 
become second in importance to the norm of operatorship. That is, an 
individual farmer seems to be more interested in reaching close to an 
optimum operation scale even if that means renting additional land 
resources. No doubt the decline in per unit costs in operating larger 
acreage and increased land prices have diverted most people from their 
traditional norm of ownership. Further advances in agricultural tech­
nology should be expected to aggravate the problematic gap. 
The model of discriminant analysis has also been useful in identi­
fying the characteristics of the "response likely" landowners. The most 
important variables utilized in predicting the tenure status of an owner 
are his acquisition methods and debt outstanding, his inheritance of land 
and/or money and his age. The landowner who is most likely to become an 
operator is less than 50 years old, buying land under purchase contract 
or mortgate with a debt outstanding on the average of $16,000. In all 
probability, none of his lands is fully paid for; he may have purchased 
less than 80 acres from his relatives, but has not inherited land or 
money. 
The landowner most likely to become a nonoperator, even if he is 
operating now, is more than 50 years old; he has fully paid for all his 
lands and was not buying any under purchase contract and/or mortgage and 
has no debts outstanding. He has nor purchased from his relatives, but 
inherited most of his land together with gifts of money to operate or 
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improve his lands. Most of his owned lands are in partnership with one 
other person, usually a son, son-in-law or a close relative. 
In terms of the diagnostic hypotheses developed in the second 
chapter the first two are rejected. That is, each tenure group is not a 
tenure class in the sense that if they had been sufficiently homogeneous 
each would have been expected to have an entirely different objective 
function to maximize. That is, the full owner's objective function is 
expected to consist primarily of obtaining debt-free title to land while 
the objective function for operators (POO and OL) is expected to be 
maximizing profits and maximizing rent income for the nonoperators (NOL). 
Rather than forming three (or four) different classes, owners formed two 
tenure classes based on their operatorship status. Nor is there evidence 
to substantiate the norm of ownership against the goal of optimum opera­
torship. Economic and technical adjustment pressures are favoring the 
latter, at least in the short run. The third diagnostic hypothesis is 
accepted conditionally because, while acquisition methods of owned land 
has been important in distinguishing owners into their proper classes, 
age of owner, his debt outstanding and value of his assets have also 
contributed to the identification process. 
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CHARACTERISTICS OF FARMLAND OWNERS 
In the third chapter, the model of discriminant analysis applied to 
farmland owners suggested a revaluation of the ownership norm of the 
society. Operatorship, that is efficient utilization of resources at or 
close to minimum cost acreages, has gained increasing importance compared 
to ownership norm. The long-run goal may still be full ownership of land 
resources, but in the short run achieving an economically efficient opera­
tional unit even when land resources are leased appears to be the prime 
target. These findings should affect the economic organization of agri­
cultural units as well as the characteristics of the farmland owners. 
These are the areas treated in this chapter. 
Organization of Agricultural Units 
The economic organization of American agricultural units "from the 
days of Jefferson to the present, . . . (has been) the family-type farm" 
(80, p. 19). Operationally the definition of such an economic unit has 
been rather vague, but generally understood to include at least these 
characteristics (1, p. 207; 35, p. 4 and 81, p. 32): 
(a) ownership of sufficient resources, 
(b) managerial decision vested with the family, and 
(c) most labor contributed by the family members. 
As has already been presented in discussing the ownership norm, the 
above form of organization has been strongly identified with the goals of 
society. The form of organization began to be increasingly substituted 
for the norm of ownership. This came about because the adjustments in 
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size and organization of farms were not considered only an economic 
phenomena but conceived as a socio-political problem identified with the 
roots of democracy and the American way of life (56, p. 1005; 60, p. 310; 
and 64). Such an approach to owner-operatorship confuses the means with 
the ends and does not contribute to our understanding of the causes of 
the problematic gap. 
The continuing stream of new production technology which requires 
more capital and a larger scale of operation is said to be the major force 
in altering the form of business organization. This fact is not a central 
point of our thesis; however, emerging forms of organization may challenge 
the achievement of the norm of ownership and therefore should be identi­
fied. Scofield observes the developing trend when he discusses the 
pressure of these adjustments: 
The emerging problems of the traditional farmer are increas­
ingly those of obtaining access to land and capital, of business 
organization and financial management, and of being able to com­
pete effectively for production inputs and an outlet for his 
products. These are the less obvious, and often hidden external 
economies of scale that give a competitive edge to large scale 
operations, which in turn can often be achieved more readily by 
the corporate form of organization (83, p. 18). 
Thus changing technological and economic conditions in recent decades 
may lead to institutions, such as the family farm corporation, in Iowa 
agriculture. As Harl points out: 
The changes of the next three decades may not be solely 
technological. It appears that agriculture may be on the verge 
of important and perhaps far-reaching structural changes as well. 
With farms of the future likely to be not only considerably larger 
and more highly capitalized but also likely to involve more 
instances of multiple owners, the one-man proprietorship is likely 
to undergo change. For the first time in centuries, important 
structural changes in the organization of the farm business may be 
imminent (40, p. 4). 
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The dominant form of organization in Iowa agriculture is still sole 
proprietorship organized around the farm family. However, alternative 
forms of organization, such as partnership and corporation, have been 
getting increased attention from the farm owners. In light of increased 
resource requirements in agriculture, these alternative forms of organi­
zations may have advantages over sole proprietorship for the beginning 
farmer in acquisition, intra-family operating arrangements and eventual 
transfer of land (30, 44). These points fall outside the scope of our 
9 
study and will not be pursued any further. It is sufficient to indicate 
that there are increasing pressures on the form of organization of agri­
cultural units, and the outcome is bound to influence the ownership norm 
of the society. 
Characteristics of Farmland Owners in 1970 
If one Iowa farmland owner had to be chosen as the most typical one, 
who would he be in the year 1970 and would his characteristics be signif­
icantly different from the typical owner of 1946? 
The typical Iowa farmland owner in 1970 is a male (83.6 percent) 
farmer (45 percent) over 55 years old (59.5 percent) who owns 100 to 279 
acres of land (55.7 percent) which has a market value of about $90,000. 
This land is purchased from nonrelatives but some assistance in the form 
of inheritance and/or gift of land or money have been received (32.1 per­
cent) . Our typical owner operates his own land and rents in additional 
9 
A good discussion of farm partnership is in (67); for various 
aspects of family farm corporations see (39, 41, 42 and 77), and for 
capital and credit needs of changing agriculture see (10 and 66). 
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land (47 percent) resides on a farm (67.5 percent) in Iowa (93 percent). 
These are some of the structural characteristics of the typical Iowa 
farmland owner in the year 1970. Have there been significant changes in 
these and other structural variables over the years and if so in what 
direction? These are the topics delimited under objective 2 and the 
diagnostic hypotheses below are put to test in this chapter: 
2.a.l Distribution of land and value of assets owned are getting 
unevenly distributed between owners. 
2.a.2 Age distribution of owners are shifting to older groups. 
2.a.3 The percentage of out-of-state owners is increasing. 
2.a.4 The proportion of farm real estate in acres and value is 
shifting from farm operators to nonfarm operators. 
2.a.5 Nonoperating landlords are in occupations other than farming 
and their ownership share is increasing. 
Tables 12 to 21 identify the changing characteristics of the farm­
land owners with respect to tenure, occupation, acres of land owned, 
present age and residence. All groupings are self-explanatory; however, 
women indicating no occupations have been classified as housewives even 
if they are not married. The business and professional group includes 
people primarily in business or in decision-making positions. Therefore, 
merchants, as well as doctors, lawyers, teachers, engineers and public 
officials, are classified into this group. The last occupation group 
consists of skilled or unskilled laborers and clerical workers. 
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Acreage, occupation, age and residency 
Since the early settlement days there has been the constant fear of 
nonagricultural people getting into farmlands and thus creating absentee 
ownership and widespread tenancy. These fears are stressed in the classic 
article on farmland ownership; 
The change in the ownership of farmland necessitated by death 
will result in the title passing by inheritance, marriage or other­
wise, to nonfarmers (38, p. 526). 
These common fears proved to be groundless. Table 12 shows that most 
owners are in farming, retired from farming or housewives (most probably 
farm widows). Within the nonoperating landlords, however, there is con­
siderable concentration of ownership by nonfarm related occupants. The 
table does not reflect the true situation exactly since part-time farming 
has been on the increase and many owners who were classified as nonfarm 
related could have been called farmers. 
As far as nonfarm occupants' acreages of owned land is concerned 
(Table 13), they do not differ significantly from the farmers. In fact, 
farmers and retired farmers own larger acres (> 520 acres) more often than 
nonfarm occupants. Therefore diagnostic hypothesis 2.a.5 will have to be 
rejected. Changes that have been taking place with respect to these vari­
ables will be tested after we look into age distribution with respect to 
owned acreage and residency. 
Table 14 and Figure 9 show the distribution of farmland owners with 
respect to their present age and owned acreage. If we classify the owners 
as young (less than 44 years old), middle aged (between 45 and 64) and old 
(older than 65 years old) and proceed accordingly, it is observed that the 
Table 12. Percentage distribution of farm owners by tenure, sex and occupations (Iowa, 1970) 
Percentage distribution by occupation 
Business, 
Owners professional Laborer 
Tenure and reporting Retired or public and 
sex groups (number) Farmer farmer Housewife service other 
All owners 2,692 44.50 15.63 10.80 15.12 13.96 
Owner operators 729 72.97 1.34 0.29 10.19 15.21 
Part-owner operators 430 95.42 — — 1.92 2.66 
Operator landlords 358 45.55 18.59 6.42 13.27 18.18 
Nonoperator landlords 1,175 1.80 31.85 24.26 24.85 17.24 
Men owners 2,442 97.96 97.12 —- 78.77 88.58 
Women owners 497 2.04 2.88 100.0 21.23 11.42 
Table 13. Owners by sex and occupation, by acres owned (Iowa, 1970) 
Percentage distribution by owned acreage Intervals 
Occupation reporting 0- 30- 70- 100- 140- 200- 280- 360- 520- 700 and 
and sex (number) 29 69 99 139 199 279 359 519 699 over 
Sex 
Men 2 ,442 3.61 7.09 13.90 15.14 23, .69 16.85 9.17 6.95 2.21 1.40 
Women 497 3.20 10.90 17.13 13.87 23, .25 17.90 6.33 4.35 1.83 1.24 
All owners 2 ,939 3.55 7.71 14.42 14.93 23 .62 17.02 8.70 6.52 2.15 1.37 
ccupation groups 
Farmers 1 ,283 0.78 3.50 11.25 13.85 26 .50 20.05 11.38 8.53 2.55 1.61 
Retired farmers 441 1.85 2.76 14.73 15.77 27 .99 18.85 7.22 6.59 3.14 1.10 
Housewives 309 1.93 9.66 13.85 12.70 25 .55 21.36 6.65 4.83 1.90 1.58 
Business and 
professional 453 5.89 14.57 16.10 17.22 17 .64 12.12 8.40 4.47 1.78 1.80 
Laborers and 
others 390 11.64 17.12 23.25 16.34 14 .80 8.27 3.82 3.89 0.56 0.32 
Table 14. Percentage distribution of farm owners by owned acres and present age (Iowa, 1970) 
Owned Owners „ ^ ^ .. . 
.. Percentage distribution by age groups 
acreage reporting ° 
intervals (number) < 24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 > 75 All ages 
0-29 89 12.42 17.70 17.00 18.03 21.06 13.76 3.52 
30-69 199 4.06 7.59 14.12 19.29 26.92 17.52 10.50 7.71 
70-99 373 0.27 6.41 14.39 16.08 26.02 23.92 12.91 14.51 
100-139 406 0.30 5.17 11.32 19.58 27.61 22.70 13.33 15.06 
140-199 639 0.16 4.22 10.68 23.80 23.51 23.27 14.35 23.64 
200-2/i) 489 0.44 3.39 14.78 22.39 23.72 21.60 13.68 17.01 
280-359 270 2.95 13.97 26.58 28.09 16.59 11.82 8.53 
360-519 246 2.41 13.33 24.78 27.16 23.80 8.52 6.47 
520-699 93 " - 3.05 10.05 24.75 26.70 19.56 15.89 2.16 
> 700 90 - - 1.66 4.15 36.97 20.15 18.92 18.14 1.38 
Total 2,894 - - — — — — — — — — - — — — — — " — 100.00 
Figure 9. Percentage distribution of owned farmland acres by acreage 
intervals and age groups, Iowa 1970 
PERCENTAGE OF OWNERS IN EACH ACREAGE INTERVAL 
62-0 
6 9 - O E  
e e - o L  
m 
PO 
o 
m 
—4 
m 
6 E I - 0 0 1  
f.G L-Ot-l 
6 Z Z - 0 0 Z  
I— I.o 
G S E - 0 8 Z  
6 1 S - 0 9 E  
6 6 9 - O Z S  
O O Z  <  
\\\\\\\\\\^  
E 3 D  
\\\\\\\\S3 
'y/r'""r>>r'rr7y. 
\\\\\\\\\^ 
W W W W W W M  
7r""r^  
ixWWWWWW^ 
] 
u-| CT> 
_Cr 
i s 
CO -X) 
o 
l— 
a 
o 
f— 
o 
U1 
un 
S-9 
56 
96 
young owners consistently own a lesser share of the owned acreage for all 
intervals compared to the old owners. The young owners* share of owned 
acreage is considerably reduced even further in the bigger ownership units 
(> 520 acres) while the middle aged owners increase their share of owner­
ship and the old owners keep their share at a consistent level. These 
findings indicate that the Iowa farmland owner is quite old. This is an 
important factor in why young farmers have difficulty in achieving their 
goal of owner-operatorship and partially accounts for the fact that we 
have so many landlords appearing in the sample. There is considerable 
evidence to accept diagnostic hypotheses 2.a.2 although it is not tested 
statistically since most important groups of owned acreage intervals had 
less than 100 observations in both cases. 
Turner attaches great importance to the residency of a landowner and 
suggests that "the more distant the landlords residence the more difficult 
for landlord and tenant to remain on satisfactory terms" (99, p. 16). To 
test if there were significant differences between the farm occupants and 
nonfarm occupants with respect to residency on or off a farm. Table 15 
has been prepared. It can be observed that both groups of nonfarm occu­
pants as well as housewives of the nonoperating landlord categories live 
off a farm. If living off a farm is considered to cause problems between 
the landlord and tenant,as has been suggested, then there is cause for 
concern with respect to this finding. However, means of communication and 
transportation have increased to such an extent that it is difficult to 
accept Turner's argument with respect to distance alone. It certainly may 
have been a contributing factor, but I believe the role of distance must 
have declined considerably. 
Table 15. Residence and tenure of farm owners by occupation (Iowa, 1970) 
Percentage distribution by tenure and residence 
Owner Part-owner Operator Nonoperating 
operators operators landlords landlords 
on a off a on a off a on a off a on a off a 
farm farm farm farm farm farm farm farm 
Farmers 1,277 94.88 5.12 47.26 1.87 35.84 1.65 10.84 0.86 0.80 0.88 
Retired farmers 438 60.62 39.38 2.33 0.26 - 12.57 1.17 44.61 39.05 
Housewives 304 34.39 65.61 0.36 0.47 - - - - - - 5.96 1.01 25.68 66.52** 
Business and 
professional 445 28.75 71.25 11.19 9.12 1.11 1.13 6.16 3.94 8.37 58.98** 
Laborers and 
others 385 49.86 50.14 27.04 5.12 2.15 1.22 9.01 4.42 9.09 41.94** 
All owners 2,849 67.45 32.55 26.89 3.03 16.39 1.08 9.62 1.89 12.64 28.47** 
Distribution 
residence 
reporting 
Occupation residence on a off a 
groups (number) farm farm 
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Changes in the Ownership Structure 1946-1970 
Present characteristics of Iowa farmland owners have been analyzed 
in the last section and in the third chapter. It is important to identify 
if these found characteristics differ significantly from the previous 
studies on Iowa farmland ownership. If there have been significant 
changes, which direction have they been and can we make generalizations 
over the importance and implications of these trends? These points are 
discussed in this section and diagnostic hypotheses 2.a.l, 2.a.3 and 2.a.4 
are tested. 
Importance of tenure groups 
In the third chapter the results of discriminant analysis suggested 
a possible shift in importance from the ownership goal towards the norm of 
operatorship. Table 16 provides additional material to test the earlier 
findings. According to this table, indications of a long-time trend is 
hinted. Consistently for both men and all owners share of the owned land 
for owner operators have declined while the share of the part owner 
operators have increased since 1946. 
With respect to the behavior of the landlords the forthcoming trend 
is more difficult to evaluate. When 1970 is compared to 1946 there is a 
slight but nonsignificant decline in the share of the nonoperating land­
lords. However, when 1970 is compared to 1958 for the same tenure group, 
there is a very significant increase in their share of ownership. The 
situation is very similar to the nonoperator landlords where 1970 compared 
to 1946 does not detect a significant change but compared to 1958 there 
Table 16. Percentage distribution of individual owners by sex and tenure within areas (Iowa, 
1946, 1958 and 1970)* 
Number and percentage distribution 
Tenure status and Iowa 12Z5_ 
sex of owner 1946 1958 1970 12 3 4 
Men 86.5 85.2 83.64 79.59 83.84 83.17 80.25 87.76 87.98 84.52 
Women 13.5 14.8 16.36 20.41 16.16 16.83 19.75 12.24 12.02 15.48 
All owners 
* 
Owner-operators 37.6 32.6 29.82* 22.27 27.32 25.83 23.66 42.12 41.91 30.61 
Part-owner-operators 11.2 15.1 17.31** 21.43 16.36 21.58 18.11 20.65 15.81 17.48 
Operator landlords 12.4 5.6 11.52** 8.78 15.01 11.38 9.88 10.31 10.75 13.94 
Nonoperating landlords 38.8 46.7 41.32 47.52 41.31 41.21 48.34 26.92 31.52 37.97 
Number reporting 1285 1860 2597 318 290 176 406 322 476 609 
Men owners 
Owner-operators 42.3 37.2 34.97%* 27.04 32.11 31.05 29.12 45.34 46.31 36.00 
Part-owner operators 12.8 17.6 20.71** 26.92 19.52 25.95 22.57 23.52 17.71 20.46 
Operator landlords 13.8 6.4 12.31** 10.80 16.80 12.83 11.13 10.61 10.80 13.74 
Nonoperating landlords 31.1 38.8 32.01 35.01 31.57 30.17 37.18 20.52 25.18 29.80 
Number reporting 1111 1565 2169 249 243 141 326 283 419 508 
Women owners it 
Owner-operators 7.5 7.5 4.35 3.68 2.45 - - - 1.48 19.05 9.74 1.20 
Part-owner operators 1.2 0.8 0.47** - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.95 1.20 
Operator landlords 4.0 1.5 7.67 0.92 5.71 4.20 4.81 8.16 10.39 15.04 
Nonoperating landlords 87.3 90.2 87.51 95.40 91.84 95.80 93.71 72.79 77.92 82.56 
Number reporting 174 272 428 69 47 35 80 39 57 101 
^Data on 1946 and 1958 from (89, p. 46a). 
^Close to 90 percent significant difference. 
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is a very significant decline in this tenure group's share of the owned 
acreage. 
The above findings indicate a reversal of the role of the owner 
operators and the part owner operators. Increasingly, the latter are 
getting a larger share of the ownership while the share of the former 
tenure group is declining. In terms of the ownership norm, this certainly 
means problematic gap is widening. It also implies production rather 
than ownership has become the high priority goal because the long-time 
trend of decreasing the share of owner operators has not been in favor of 
nonoperating landlords, as is commonly feared. Thus the diagnostic hypo­
thesis 2.a.5 which states an increasing ownership share for nonoperating 
landlords will have to be rejected. The decreases in the ownership share 
for owner operators and nonoperating landlords is matched by an increase 
in the share of operating tenure groups emphasizing the achievement of an 
optimum scale of operation becoming the more important goal as opposed to 
full owner-operatorship of resources for the farm family. 
Shifts in age groups 
Is the Iowa farmland ownership increasingly concentrating on the 
older age groups and thus widening the problematic gap in terms of the 
ownership norm? Table 17 is prepared to indicate the percentage distri­
bution of owners * age groups by their tenures for 1970 and for all tenures 
for 1946 to 1970. The diagnostic hypothesis 2.a.2 of concentration of 
owned land by older owners is tested. It can be observed that, apart from 
a statistically insignificant rise in the ownership share of younger 
owners (< 34 years old) for 1970 compared to the 1958 distribution, the 
Table 17. Percentage distribution of farm owners by tenure, sex and age (Iowa, 1946, 1958 and 
1970)* 
Number Percent distribution by age groups 
Sex and tenure 
groups 
reporting 
(number) 
under 
25 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 
75 and 
over 
Men owners 
Owner operators 717 0.40 7.00 17.18 27.10 33.30 12.39 2.65 
Part-owner operators 432 0.52 11.55 29.17 36.88 19.77 2.11 - - -
Operator landlords 326 - - 4.14 7.78 19.57 28.76 27.44 12.32 
Nonoperating landlords 774 0.35 2.06 5.65 14.04 18.32 37.45 22.13 
Women owners 
Owner operators 17 -- -- - 11.69 18.92 29.88 21.14 18.36 
Part-owner operators 2 - - -- - --- 100.00 - - - - - - - - -
Operator landlords 37 -- --- 2.64 14.71 26.13 29.31 27.22 
Nonoperating landlords 405 0.81 0.29 3.25 10.44 19.32 29.61 36.28 
All owners 
Owner operators 734 0.39 6.83 17.04 26.89 33.21 12.60 3.04 
Part-owner operators 434 0.52 11.50 29.05 37.19 19.69 2.10 - - -
Operator landlords 363 — - 3.67 7.20 19.02 28.46 27.65 14.00 
Nonoperating landlords 1179 0.51 1.44 4.81 12.78 18.67 34.69 27.10 
Iowa 1970 2710 0.42 5.07 12.99 22.00 24.34 21.56 13.63^ 
Iowa 1958 1825 0.1 4.2 14.9 24.3 25.7 21.7 9.1 
Iowa 1946 1247 0.3 5.3 15.6 25.3 23.0 20.4 10.1 
*Data for 1946 and 1958 in (89, p. 39). 
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ownership share of all age groups between 35 and 74 (up to but not 
including the oldest group whose share has increased significantly) 
have declined slightly. Similar observations are obtained comparing 1970 
with the 1946 study, but the decline in the ownership reverses earlier 
(at age group 55-64). However, none of the comparisons were significant 
except comparison of the oldest group (75 and older) with 1958 and 1946 
at the tested levels. 
The diagnostic hypotheses for all age groups (except the oldest) will 
have to be rejected at the indicated test levels. Even when there was not 
a statistically significant shift in the distribution of owned acreage 
between age groups for the time periods under study, it should be noted 
that while an Iowa farmland owner had a 30.5 percent chance of being over 
65 years old in 1946, this chance has increased to 30.8 by 1958 and 35.2 
by 1970. The indications are that Iowa farmland ownership is increasingly 
concentrating at the older age groups, thus contributing to the widening 
of the problematic gap. 
Changes in ownership and value of owned resources 
Concentration in Iowa farmland ownership and changes that have been 
taking place are studied more in detail in the fifth chapter. In this 
section the diagnostic hypothesis 2.a.l which states that distribution of 
owned acreage and value of owned assets is getting uneven is put to test. 
Tables 18 and 19 present the cumulative distribution of owned acreage 
and value, respectively. It can be observed that for both acreage and 
value there is a change from 1958 to 1970. Table 18 indicates that while 
almost 21 percent of the owners had less than 100 acres in 1958, they 
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Table 18. Cumraulative distribution of individual ownership of land 
(Iowa, 1958-1970)* 
Percent of owners Percent of land (acres) 
Acres 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Less than 49 5.38 8.34 0.66 1.01 
Less than 69 7.51 11.26 1.17 1.71 
Less than 99 20.95 25.69 5.58 6.37 
Less than 139 35.21 40.62 12.35 13.68 
Less than 199 57.01 64.25 26.51 29.73 
Less than 279 72.78 81.28 41.00 47.21 
Less than 359 81.96 89.98 52.51 60.41 
Less than 519 90.82 96.51 67.38 76.51 
Less than 699 95.22 98.65 77.90 84.99 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
^Data on 1958 furnished from source material of (90). 
Table 19. Cummulative distribution of value of individually owned land 
(Iowa, 1958-1970) 
Percent of owners Percent of value ($ ) 
Value 
($1000) 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Less than 19.9 16.73 8.53 3.43 0.94 
Less than 49.9 55.95 37.55 24.51 10.65 
Less than 74.9 76.09 56.89 44.42 21.93 
Less than 99.9 85.34 72.32 57.25 35.20 
Less than 124.9 90.56 83.00 66.46 47.70 
Less than 149.9 93.01 87.78 71.95 55.15 
Less than 199.9 96.05 93.94 80.26 68.48 
Less than 249.9 97.43 96.65 85.17 76.30 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
^Data on 1958 furnished from source material of (90). 
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increased to 25.7 percent by 1970. Conversely, for the above 520 acre 
ownership, while 9.2 percent of the owners were in this group in 1958, 
their percent declined to 3.5 by 1970 and the share of large (> 520 acre) 
ownership units similarly reduced from 32.6 percent to 23.5 percent by 
1970. In other words, while the ownership of smaller acreages have 
remained fairly stable between 1958 and 1970 in the larger acreages a 
smaller group of owners own a larger share of the owned land. 
With respect to the value of the owned resources. Table 19 indicates 
essentially what has been found in Table 18. Since the value figures for 
1970 have not been deflated into the 1958 basis, one should not compare 
absolute ownership values but rather what percentage of people owned what 
percentage of the value of resources. On this basis it is seen that 
almost 7 percent of the highest value owners owned 28 percent of total 
value in 1958 for about the same percentage of owners in 1970 their share 
of total value had increased over 32 percent. Among the lowest value 
owners the distribution of their percentage share of the total value has 
not changed substantially between 1958 and 1970. 
It can be concluded that there are indications to suggest that larger 
acreage owners are getting larger while the smallest acreage owners are 
fairly stable in their ownership of acreage and value. Increases of the 
owned acreages of the largest group have been at the expense of the middle 
acreage owner group (particularly owners around 100 to 280 acres). The 
measurement and magnitude of the shift in the ownership situation from 
1958 to 1970 is discussed in the fifth chapter, but now let us identify 
the occupations groups affected most. 
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Table 20 presents farmland owners by their occupation, owned acres 
and value. It can be observed that numbers of farmers have been very 
significantly declining since 1946 against a very significant increase in 
the number of laborers while the rest of the occupation groups have been 
fairly stable (only housewives indicate a significant increase). Owned 
acres have shown the same change; that is, farmers have consistently lost 
their share against the laborers. Business and professional groups have 
indicated a significant decline in their share of acres owned since 1958 
while the opposite is true for the housewives. 
The findings for the changes in the value of farm real estate have 
all been significantly different, for farmers, retired farmers and busi­
ness groups very significantly different. While the share of value of 
farm real estate has declined for retired farmers and business groups, it 
has increased for the farmers, as well as for the other groups. The last 
finding seems inconsistent for the farmers with the previous decline in 
their ownership shares. However, what seems to have occurred is that 
farmers may have less share of the total acreage owned, but these lands 
are in the most highly valued areas as evidenced with the highest average 
value of resources for the farmer compared to all other occupations. 
The increases in the number, share of owned acreage and value for 
laborer occupations is quite surprising. A likely explanation is the 
great occurrence of part-time farming and part-time nonfarm related occu­
pations in Iowa in 1970. Further studies on part-time farmers may yield 
interesting results. 
While the farmers' average acres of ownership has consistantly 
Table 20. Comparative distribution of number of farm owners, acres and 
value of land owned by principal occupation of owner (Iowa, 
1946, 1958 and 1970)% 
Percentage distribution 
of acres, value and owners 
Owners, acres —reporting 
Number Retired 
Farmers farmers 
and value 1946 1958 1970 1946 1958 1970 1946 1958 1970 
Owners 1158 1719 2692 64.9 51.3 45.50 16.5 16.0 15.63 
** 
Acres owned 1167 1719 2692 64.0 50.0 45.95 17.9 17.7 15.07 
Value of farm ** ** 
real estate 1139 1522 2347 66.4 48.9 54.34 15.7 18.7 14.01 
Average acres 
per owner — — — 182 204 222 201 231 204 
Average value 
per owner 
(dollars) — — — 22,273 48,907 93,274 22,009 60,847 85,827 
^Data on 1946 and 1958 in (89, p. 28). 
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Percentage distribution of acres, value and owners 
Business and Laborers 
Housewives professional and others 
1946 1958 1970 1946 1958 1970 1946 1958 1970 
* ** 
4.0 7.1 10.80 8.7 18.3 15.12 5.9 7.3 13-96 
* * ** 
3.9 7.0 10.36 11.3 19.8 14.78 2.9 5.5 13.84 
4.3 6.7 8.57* 9.7 20.4 14.06** 2.9 5.3 9.01* 
173 206 188 240 226 181 92 157 129 
23,381 61,031 81,510 24,222 56,328 76,237 10,577 36,889 56,272 
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increased since 1946, it has declined for the business group. The other 
groups indicate unstable tendencies between periods. One tentative con­
clusion which can be reached is that farmers' share of farm real estate 
and average owned acreage have not declined and, therefore, hypothesis 
2.a.4 has to be rejected. Rather, what seems to be emerging in Iowa and 
is more likely to continue in the 70's is the increasing incidence of 
part-time farming coupled with skilled or unskilled work in nonfarm 
related jobs. This certainly is an interesting development and may have 
implications as far as agricultural income problems are concerned. 
Changes in state residency 
Ownership of the state's land resources by residents of other states 
has been of concern to Iowa residents. The acquisition of land by out­
siders has often been considered as a form of speculation and connected 
with the evils of absentee land ownership. Since the beginning of the 
settlement days Iowa residents have been careful not to let the specula­
tors become established. To this end they have often taken the law into 
their own hands before the courts of law were established (89, p. 40). 
Whether the fears of Iowa residents have materialized in 1970 is analyzed 
in Table 21. 
Testing the diagnostic hypothesis 2.a.3 which states that the per­
centage of out-of-state owners is increasing, no significant difference 
between the two time periods is observed. The hypothesis has to be 
rejected because while 93.6 percent of the owners indicated state resi­
dency in 1958, this group slightly decreased to 93 percent which is 
statistically insignificant. 
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Table 21. Percentage distribution of owners by occupation and state 
residence, Iowa 1958-1970& 
State res idence 
Iowa Other states 
Occupation 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Farmer 54.5 
** 
48.82 17.1 7.43** 
Retired farmer 16.6 15.74 12.8 6.23** 
Housewife 6.3 
* 
9.72 15.5 18.57* 
Business and professional 15.7 12.68 40.0 42.92 
Laborers and others 6.9 
** 
13.01 14.6 
** 
24.85 
All owners 93.6 93.05 6.4 6.95 
Number reporting 1432 2660 98 213 
^Data on 1958 data in (89, p. 42). 
Table 21 still uncovers an interesting fact. Shares of nonresidents 
of Iowa between two time periods, 1958 to 1970, have changes substantially 
in that while farmers (retired or not) owned almost 30 percent of all the 
land, nonresidents claimed their share declined by more than one-half to 
almost 14 percent. The group that has increased its share largest are 
the laborers, although business and professional people still have the 
largest absolute share of all the nonresident claimed land. Iowa land for 
investment purposes may be the motive behind the nonresident nonfarm 
group's behavior; however, this conclusion falls short of explaining the 
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declining share of resident business and professional occupation cate­
gories ownership. Again the increase in the share of laborers (resident 
and nonresident) is noticeable and gives weight to the tentative part-time 
farming conclusion. 
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CONCENTRATION IN ICWA FARMLAND OWNERSHIP 
Farmland ownership studies (4, 5, 51, 69, 72, 85 and 98) have dealt 
with the general patterns rural people travel in achieving ownership 
rights in land. Within these studies, various characteristics of the 
farmland owners, such as age land was acquired, previous experience in 
farming prior to ownership, tenure of owner, etc., are compared to methods 
of acquisition and financing. The results of these studies provide the 
next generation guidelines to follow in achieving their goal of ownership. 
This same method provides the elements of the diagnostic hypothesis in 
dealing with the problematic situation. 
An equally important but often neglected part of the land ownership 
studies is the part that deals with the distribution of the owned land and 
related concentration of ownership. If ownership of farm land is acquired 
increasingly through inheritance and gifts from parents and relatives, the 
unfortunate young farmer will always find himself at a disadvantage in 
achieving the goal of ownership. It is not surprising therefore that 
financement and obtaining land have been ranked to be the two most diffi­
cult problems encountered by the beginning farmers as early as the 1940*s 
(87, p. 524). If the young farmer is to ever realize his goal of owner-
operatorship, adequate land as well as financial resources should be 
available. The problems young farmers face today probably have not 
changed much from the early 1940's. Meanwhile, relative decline in farm 
product prices and the rising land values may have led to changes in the 
concentration of farmland ownership and aggravated the situation. Before 
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going into the analysis of concentration of farmland ownership, it is 
necessary to examine the meaning attached to it. 
Ownership Concentration 
Concentration of ownership (be it income, wealth or land) is neces­
sarily derived from the distribution of the given attribute within the 
population. A high concentration is taken to mean that relatively large 
amounts of the given attribute are owned by a relatively few owners and 
as such depicts an undesirable situation as far as society's equalitarian 
norms are concerned. With respect to land, it means ownership of large 
acres of land by a handful of owners while most others own relatively 
fewer acres. This kind of situation has been closely associated with 
absentee landlordism, exploitation of masses and has been raison d'i"tre 
of land reforms in many underdeveloped countries. 
The traditional measurement of concentration depends on absolute size 
and value, as can be witnessed from Turner: 
The question of concentration of ownership of rented farm 
property may be considered with three different measures . . . 
farms, acres and values (99, p. 4). 
The traditional approach to concentration may be employed in dealing 
with those underdeveloped countries which technological improvements in 
agriculture are nonexistent (thus no change in resource mix) and where 
land resources are owned for their social and investment values rather 
than their productive efficiency. 
However, in countries where substitution of factors of production are 
both feasible and economical, the traditional approach to concentration 
fails to point out the dynamic nacure of the problem. In cases where all 
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resources are undergoing qualitative as well as quantitative changes over 
time, the dynamic nature of the problem dictates new resource mixes as 
relative factor prices alter. Or as new capital resources are introduced, 
it may be privately as well as socially beneficial to increase the size of 
operations by owning larger tracts of land and capture the economies of 
scale associated with reductions in per unit costs. Thus it can be argued 
that setting absolute size norms to define concentration of ownership 
would be misleading. Instead, relative changes in ownership over time is 
stressed in this study. 
In the subsequent sections of this chapter, we approach the measure­
ment of concentration of land ownership in two distinct ways: (1) distri­
bution of land and value among owners independent of absolute size or norm 
of equitable ownership and (2) concentration of land, farms and value 
according to some distinct characteristic (such as tenure, occupation, 
etc.) of the owner. 
The first measure is developed from the Lorenz and Gini measures of 
income distribution and provides an aggregate coefficient independent of 
various characteristics of the owners while the second can be considered 
a more detailed analysis of the particular form concentration takes. 
Lorenz curves and concentration coefficients for each area and the state 
is constructed for 1958 and 1970 and compared in the next section of the 
first measure of concentration. The second measure of concentration is 
explained through the help of tables for the periods 1946, 1958 and 1970, 
and hypotheses developed are tested in later sections. 
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Measure of Concentration 
Distribution of income and wealth and the associated concentration 
of these attributes in the hands of the few have been of interest to 
scientists as well as laymen for centuries. Foundations of income-wealth 
distribution theories and measurement techniques are founded on works of 
Pareto, Gini (36) and Lorenz (59). Although from time to time valid 
criticisms as to their interpretation are raised (11), Lorenz curves 
and Gini ratios are widely used in studies of income distribution (13, 34, 
37, and 48). In the present land ownership study, Lorenz curves for owned 
land and value of this land is drawn for the owners and an accompanying 
concentration coefficient is calculated. 
The Lorenz curve in Figure 10 is drawn by arranging a cumulative 
percentage of units, from smallest to largest, on the abscissa plotted 
against a cumulative percentage distribution of an attribute, again going 
from smallest to largest, on the ordinate. Since both axes are in the form 
of percentages running from 0 to 100, the diagonal 45° straight line 
depicts the line of perfect equality. That is to say, if each percentage 
unit receives identical shares of the attribute, then all the observations 
will lie on the diagonal line. On the other hand, if there was perfect 
inequality, say one percent of the individuals own all of the attribute, 
then the line of perfect inequality will be formed by the abscissa and the 
ordinate on the lower half of the triangle. However, in all cases of 
distribution of a given attribute, be it income, wealth, or land, the 
actual Lorenz curve is located between perfect equality and perfect 
inequality. 
CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE OF UNITS 
Figure 10. Measurement of concentration and the location of Lorenz curve 
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In this study, Lorenz curves for individually owned acres of land and 
its value, in thousands of dollars, is plotted in terms of percentages 
against the observed number of owners for 1958 and 1970. The more the 
Lorenz curve is located away from the line of perfect equality, 45° 
diagonal, the more unequal is the distribution of the attribute and vice 
versa. 
While Lorenz curves provide us with a conceptual tool to identify how 
an attribute is distributed in time or if it has become to be more une­
qually distributed over time, they do not provide a measure to evaluate or 
to compare the concentration in time or over time. To this end, we need 
to compute what is commonly referred to as the Gini index of concentra­
tion (or Gini ratio). The computation of the Gini index of concentration 
is presented in Miller (61, p. 27) based on Morgan (63) as follows: 
Let 
A = area between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal, 
B = area between the Lorenz curve and the lower portion of the 
triangle (area under the Lorenz curve), and 
A + B = total area of the triangle (formed by the diagonal). 
Then 
« - r t r  ( 5 - 1 )  
where 
G = Gini index of concentration. 
Since the cumulative percents on each axis add to 100, the area of 
the entire square is equal to 1 and the area of the triangle (formed by 
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the diagonal) is equal to 1/2. Therefore, the above expression can be 
rewritten as follows: 
••V 
_ _ 1/2 - Area under curve 
1/2 
which is 
G = 1 - 2 (Area under curve). (5.2b) 
If we assume that the curve between any two points is approximated 
by a straight line, the area for any segment of the curve can be expressed 
as 
When summed for all intervals, the area under the curve is 
i («.+1 - -
i=l 
Substituting the expression for area under curve in G above 
yields the formula used in the computation of the Gini index 
= = Z (^i+l - ^i) (5.5a) 
i=l 
which becomes 
k 
 ^= I - A ('i+l " ^ i) (^ i + W • 
i=l 
The Gini index of concentration is defined as the proportion of the 
total area under the diagonal that is between the diagonal and the Lorenz 
curve (61, p. 27). Thus, if the absolute value of the Gini index of 
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concentration increases, it means the distribution is getting more uneven 
and, conversely, if the Gini index gets smaller then distribution is said 
to be getting more equal- Thus a ratio getting close to 1 identifies 
the former and one getting close to 0 indicates the latter situation. 
In computing the concentration measures in this study, a close 
approximation to the Gini index defined as "concentration coefficient" and 
called C is used. The decision to use C instead of G has been 
reached because a previous study on concentration of land ownership (102) 
has used the former measurement. Thus it was possible to cross-check the 
author's findings with that of a similar study and to identify if there 
were significant differences between the two geographical areas. 
Computation of the concentration coefficient C is based on the 
formula (102, p. 1889): 
n 
1 ^ 
2 L 
k=l 
^ ~ - ' (\-l Qk " ^ k ^ k-l) 5000 (5.6a) 
which is 
where 
n 
^ ^  10,000 L (\-l ^ k " \ ^k-l) (5.6W— 
k=l 
= Percent of landowners at k^^ interval, 
= Percent of land acres (or value) at k^^ interval, 
k - 1 = Percent at interval (every fifth percent) preceding k^^ 
interval, and 
C = Coefficient of concentration, to distinguish it from G in 
Equation 5.5b. 
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The findings are presented in Table 22 for each area and for the 
state for 1958 and 1970. Cumulative percentage distribution of owned 
acreage and value is presented for Iowa (1958-70) in Tables 18 and 19, 
respectively. For each economic area, cumulative percentage distribu­
tion of acreage and value tables are provided in Appendix B. The 
accompanying Lorenz curves are in Figures 11 and 12. 
While computing the concentration coefficients for owned acreage and 
value of farmland, we have used the line of perfect equality—the 
diagonal--as a standard of reference (13). This fact is regarded as a 
drawback by some authors (33, 103) and other criterias, such as: "the 
socially desirable minimum degree of inequality" taking into account 
family composition, age differentials, etc., as well as biological, 
anthropological and sociological factors, are suggested. 
However, it should be reminded that drawing the Lorenz curves and 
computing the concentration coefficients for income, wealth, etc., does 
not in itself entitle one to pass on welfare judgments. As Aigner and 
Heins point out: 
Unfortunately our operational measures of equality, e.g. the 
Gini concentration ratio, coefficient of variation, etc., are only 
statistical devices. They measure the relative dispersion of a 
frequency distribution of income without reference to the norma­
tive judgments necessarily involved in describing that same distri­
bution as "good" or "bad" in terms of the welfare it imputes to 
society. It is not that these measures in themselves should con­
tain welfare attributes. The point is when welfare judgments are 
made based upon them, the observer must be making certain assump­
tions about the relation between income, its distribution, and the 
welfare of society. Depending on what these assumptions are, 
objective, statistical measures of income equality may or may not 
yield a correct indication of equality in the normative sense 
(3, p. 13). 
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Table 22. Comparison of concentration coefficients (acreage and value, 
1958-1970)* 
Acreage Value 
„a „v -V 
Economic areas 58 70 58 70 
Northwest Livestock 0.4908 0.4983 0.4076 0.5226 
Southwest Livestock 0.4680 0.5351 0.4370 0.5198 
Northern Grain 0.3986 0.4902 0.3965 0.4998 
Northern Central Grain 0.4257 0.5264 0.4096 0.5021 
Southern Pasture 0.4197 0.4302 0.4660 0.4748 
Northeast Dairy 0.4099 0.4206 0.4120 0.4638 
Eastern Livestock 0.4350 0.4721 0.4332 0.4855 
^ b 
Iowa 0.4381 0.4836 0.4475 0.5045 
Institutional Ownership 0.5793 0.5148 0.6146 0.6527 
^1958 data on concentration have been drawn from source material of 
(90) and are not available in the bulletin. 
State of Iowa estimated without institutional owners. 
As far as this study is concerned, Lorenz curves are drawn and con­
centration coefficients computed for each economic area and the state, so 
as to identify the magnitude of the change that has taken place between 
two time periods. While the absolute magnitudes are of value, we are 
mainly interested with the rate of change on the concentration coeffi­
cients and not on its welfare implications. 
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Figure 11. Distribution of acreage of owned land in Iowa, 1958 and 1970 
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Figure 12. Distribution of value of owned land in Iowa, 1958 and 1970 
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Comparison of Concentration Coefficients 
Comparing the computed concentration coefficients in Table 22 for 
acreage between 1958 and 1970, it is observed that there is an increase of 
magnitude slightly over 10 percent for the state. Taking into account the 
pressures of size adjustments within the last 12 years, this increase can 
be considered slightly significant.^^ 
When state concentration curves of acreage are considered alone, the 
magnitude of the shift is indeed minor. However, when individual economic 
areas are studied for 1958 and 1970, it can be observed that there has 
been a great variation in the magnitude of concentration coefficients. 
For the period 1958-1970, while the concentration coefficient of Northwest 
Livestock area (economic area 1) has almost been stationary—just over 
1.5 percent increase—North Central Grain area (economic area 4) has 
experienced an increase in the coefficient of over 23.4 percent. It is 
interesting to note that the other grain area. Northern Grain (economic 
area 3) exhibits a close rate of increase with over 22.9 percent. On the 
other hand, pasture and dairy areas (economic areas 5 and 6) have shown 
little but almost identical increases of 2.5 and 2.6 percent, respectively. 
Livestock areas have shown variability, with minimum increase of 1.5 per­
cent in the Northwest and maximum increase of 14.3 percent in the South­
west (economic area 2) with the middle range of 8.5 percent in the East 
(economic area 7). Consistent grouping of computed concentration coeffi­
cients with the economic background oi areas indicates, to some extent, 
^^Compared to the concentration coefficient of Great Plain States, 
Iowa has the lowest ratio for 1958. Even 1970 concentration coefficient 
of Iowa is smaller than all Great Plain States' 1958 estimates, except 
North Dakota with 0.45 (102, p. 1889). 
124 
the validity of our findings. 
Comparing the concentration coefficient of the value of owned land, a 
somewhat different picture emerges. It can be observed that between 1958 
and 1970, there has been a considerable increase in this magnitude for 
economic areas as well as the state.Even though in no economic area 
of Iowa we do observe the considerable deviation from perfect equality 
which is characterized in the Great Plain States, nevertheless the shift 
of Lorenz curves within the time period considered has been significant 
with the range of over 12.7 percent for the state. 
Geographically, the rate of increase in the concentration coefficient 
of value has been greatest in the Northwest, 28.2 percent, and similarly 
in the other Northern areas with 26.1 and 22.6 percent for economic areas 
3 and 4, respectively. In the East and Northeast, the rate of increase 
in concentration coefficient of value has been almost identical, 12.4 and 
12.1 percent, respectively. While the Southwest had an increase of 18.9 
percent (combining economic and geographical factors), the rate of 
increase in the Southern Pasture (economic area 5) has been the minimal 
with 1.8 percent. 
Again the consistent groupings of areas, this time more on geograph­
ical aspects, by similar rates of changes of coefficients is noted. This 
observation may indicate, to some degree, the correctness of the absolute 
Comparing the concentration coefficient of value of Iowa in 1958 
with that of the Great Plain States, it is observed that Iowa had the 
least concentration of value. Even the 1970 estimate of concentration of 
value for Iowa is close to the lowest of 1958 of these states—both 
Dakotas and Nebraska with .45 and .49 (102, p. 1889). 
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magnitude of the estimated coefficients. Comparing Iowa with the Great 
Plain States, it has already been indicated that the former still has more 
equal distribution of owned land acreage, as well as value of this land. 
However, within Iowa the concentration coefficients for acreage and value 
have increased in the last 12 years, indicating a shift towards a more 
unequal distribution of the owned resources. The Lorenz curves in 
Figures 11 and 12 indicate the magnitude of the shifts in acreage and in 
value, respectively, for the state between 1958 and 1970. 
Thus, although the magnitude of the change in the coefficients has 
not been great for the state, as far as individual economic areas are 
concerned it has certainly been significant. In the next section we 
identify the group of owners who shouldered the burden of adjustment due 
to an increased concentration in Iowa. 
Burden of adjustment 
Farmland owners may be arrayed in quartiles according to their share 
of an attribute (acres of solely owned land or value) . In doing so we can 
see the changes that have been taking place between 1958 and 1970 between 
quartiles and who in the aggregate is pressured due to adjustments in 
agriculture. 
Table 23 identifies the changes that have taken place between 
quartiles from 1958 to 1970. It can be seen that the share of the highest 
five percent of the owners (owners who have 700 or more acres of land) in 
acreage and in value of owned land has increased considerably over time. 
While the lowest 25 percent of the owners (lowest quartile) has retained 
about the same share in acreage and value over time, the burden of 
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Table 23. Distribution of individually owned acreages and values by 
quartiles and highest five percent (Iowa, 1958-1970)^ 
. ., Percent of acreage Percent of value Quartiles 
Highest five percent 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Lowest quartile 6, .75 6 .25 6 .00 4, .90 
Second quartile 21. 33 19. ,00 20. 82 17. ,55 
Third quartile 43. 75 39. 48 43. 10 38. 60 
Highest five percent 22. ,41 28. .75 21. ,36 27. 60 
^Data on 1958 from source material of (90). 
adjustment to the increasing concentration of ownership has fallen on the 
medium sized (second and third quartile) farmland owners, mostly on the 
ones who have an ownership interest of 100 to 280 acres. 
The possible explanation of this observation may be related to non-
economic factors. It may be that small farmland owners (owners of less 
than 100 acres) resist transference out of agriculture due to possible 
burdens of readjustment in nonagricultural occupations. In most cases, 
their decision to remain in agriculture even though it may not be an 
economically feasible enterprise for them is based on old age, preference 
for farm living or sentimental attachment to land. Admittedly this 
analysis does not take into account those owners who in addition to owning 
and operating their own lands rent additional land to reach an economically 
efficient farm size. But that point will be dealt with in the farm 
adjustment section of this chapter. 
On the other hand, medium sized farmland owners, especially the ones 
at the lower end of the range, have felt the pressure of adjustment to 
the increasing concentration as well as changing agricultural technology. 
These owners have a large investment in land as well as other resources, 
which makes then more conscious of the opportunity cost of not operating 
close to the minimum average cost. So the pressures for adjustment in 
this group may lead them to increase their share of ownership by investing 
in land or by employing their resources more productively in another 
industry. 
The result of increased concentration seems to have fallen on the 
medium group of farmland owners. They may have, in return, reacted by 
increasing their scale of operations through either buying additional land 
or renting-in or leaving agriculture. The analysis is not conclusive at 
this point since it is not necessary to own all the land resources in 
order to operate them. That is why the tenure form of part-owner-opera-
torship may be gaining increasing importance as a prior stage in reaching 
the goal of full ownership in the recent decades in Iowa. 
Changes in the distribution of institutionally owned land 
The increasing importance of other forms of ownership in Iowa 
(other than sole or joint proprietorship) has already been mentioned in 
the previous chapters. Farmlands owned by multiple owners and organized 
as legal entities such as corporations, institutions, estates, city, town, 
state or federal lands have been identified as institutional lands for the 
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purposes of this study. A separate questionnaire is mailed to the above 
farmland owners who were drawn into the sample. The response has been 
encouraging, as the rate of returned questionnaires has been almost double 
for the institutions as opposed to individual owners, as is shown in 
Table 3. 
It was hypothesized that since the previous study in 1958 the struc­
ture of institutional ownership had changed. The diagnostic hypothesis 
2.b.5 stated an uneven distribution for acreage and value of these 
resources. In other words, it was expected that from 1958 to 1970 insti­
tutional owners not only increased absolutely as opposed to individual 
owners, but within themselves the larger owners received a bigger share of 
totally owned lands in acreage as well as in value. Tables 24 and 25 
present the distribution of institutionally owned land acreage and value, 
respectively, for 1958 and 1970. 
It can be observed from Table 24 that although the absolute number 
of large institutional owners have increased, they have remained rela­
tively the same. Furthermore, there has been a significant improvement 
in the distribution of owned acreage as can be understood from the reduc­
tion of concentration coefficient in Table 22. 
Table 25, however, indicates that the readjustment has been towards 
higher valued lands increasingly being owned by the larger acreage owners. 
Concentration coefficient for value have therefore increased, as compared 
to 1958. Thus it can be concluded thai, the share of acreage owned by the 
larger institutional owners has not increased (in fact, it has decreased) 
but their share in the value of these resources has increased, indicating 
Table 24. Distribution of institutionally^ owned land, acreage (Iowa, 1958-1970) 
Acreage 
intervals 
(acres) 
Iowa. 1958^ Iowa, 1970 
Number 
reporting 
Average 
acres 
Percentage dis tribution 
Number 
reporting 
Average 
acres 
Percentage distribution 
Number Acres Number Acres 
< 49.9 7 38 5.15 0.33 15 30 7.06 0.68 
50- 69.9 1 51 0.74 0.06 7 55 3.06 0.54 
70- 99.9 8 83 5.88 0.84 24 81 10.82 2.82 
100- 139.9 7 119 5.15 1.05 18 116 8.47 3.16 
140- 199.9 28 167 20.59 5.88 51 162 22.21 11.57 
200- 279.9 10 230 7.35 2.89 39 228 17.02 12.50 
280- 359.9 26 322 19.12 10.54 28 315 10.31 10.45 
360- 519.9 13 432 9.55 7.06 27 420 8.78 11.87 
520- 699.9 7 620 5.15 5.45 19 615 4.86 9.62 
700-1499.9 15 934 11.02 17.61 23 1022 4.42 14.54 
> 1500 14 2743 10.29 48.28 26 2315 2.99 22.25 
Total responding 136 — 100.00 100.00 277 - - 100.00 100.00 
^Land owned institutionally includes all land held in the form of estate, corporation, 
institution, city, town, state or federal lands. 
^1958 data of distribution of institutional ownership have been furnished from source material 
of (90). 
Table 25. Distribution of value of institutionally^ owned land, value (Iowa, 1958-1970) 
Iowa. 1958^ Iowa, 1970 
Value 
intervals 
($1000) 
Average 
Number value 
reporting ($1000) 
Percentage distribution 
Number Value 
Number 
reporting 
Average 
value 
($1000) 
Percentage distribution 
Number Value 
< 19.9 15 10.60 12.61 0.91 16 9.9 7.04 0.25 
20- 49.9 28 34.26 23.53 5.50 41 34.9 18.39 2.29 
50- 74.9 18 61.89 15.13 6.39 31 61.3 13.22 2.89 
75- 99.9 18 87.98 15.13 9.08 32 84.8 12.62 4.11 
100-124.9 10 116.70 8.40 6.69 17 111.2 7.25 2.87 
125-149.9 8 138.74 6.72 6.37 11 138.2 3.84 1.89 
150-199.9 4 173.25 3.36 3.97 22 164.3 7.90 4.63 
200-249.9 1 216.00 0.84 1.24 12 215.2 3.76 2.88 
250-499.9 9 319.64 7.56 16.50 28 330.4 5.88 6.92 
500-999.9 7 851.70 5.88 34.14 29 865.1 4.41 13.59 
> 1000 1 1600.00 0.84 9.20 39 1101.9 14.69 57.68 
Total 119 - - - 100.00 100.00 278 100.00 100.00 
^Land owned institutionally includes all land held in the form of estate, corporation, 
institution, city, town, state or federal lands, 
^1958 data of distribution of institutional ownership have been furnished from source 
material of (90). 
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tiie difference in the quality of owned lands between owners. It may also 
be possible to think that larger institutional owners owned farmlands 
close to growing cities for investment purposes and hence the difference 
between these two distributions. Such a conclusion has not been put to 
test since the study was not designed for the purpose of identifying large 
farmlands around urban centers. 
Farm Size Adjustments 
Technological innovations in agriculture result in two kinds of 
adjustments in farm sizes to capture the benefit of cost economies. 
First, adjustment can take place in the scale manner; that is, output 
can be expanded by increasing all resources in fixed proportions. Scale 
adjustment exists if we start with 240 acres, 18 months of labor, a 
tractor and $5,000 in operating expenses and increase all resources pro­
portionately to 480 acres, 36 months of labor, two tractors and $10,000 
in operating expenses. Constant returns to scale exist if the adjustment 
results, compared to the first resource mix, in exact doubling of the 
output. In which case cost per unit will be identical for both farms and 
there will be no incentive to increase the farm size due to cost economies. 
However, if output more than doubles, increasing returns to scale 
exist and larger farm operates on lower per-unit costs than the smaller 
farm. In which case, there will be incentives to increase the size of 
operations. If, on the other hand, output increases but does not double, 
decreasing returns to scale exist and cost economies favor the smaller 
c -er i;.ie larger farm. 
The second type of adjustment in farm size takes place when there is 
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â disproportionate increase in resources, that is the resource mix to 
produce an expanded output is altered by holding some resources constant 
12 
while increasing others. Taking the same example as in the first 
adjustment, farm may be held constant at 240 acres while more labor, 
improved seeds and better machinery may be utilized to expand output. Or 
the machinery may be held constant while acreage, labor and operating 
expenses are varied to increase the product. The changes in the resource 
mix result in lower per unit costs if fixed costs associated with the 
fixed resource is large and it is spread over greater output. Average 
total cost per unit of output declines as long as the decline in fixed 
costs is sufficiently greater than increases in variable costs per unit. 
The situation is reversed and average total costs begin to increase if 
variable costs increase faster than the decline of fixed costs after a 
point. 
The above two adjustments we have presented depict the long-run cost 
relationships, when all resources are variable, and the short-run cost 
relationships, when some of the resources are constant. From the view­
point of farm size problems, the concept of long-run costs is more impor­
tant since this is the planning curve. A beginning farmer should consider 
costs in the long-run curve and decide on his farm size by a particular 
point on it. However, once the farm size is determined, the relevant 
decision-making cost curve becomes the short-run cost curve. But in 
agriculture this is rarely the case, as has been pointed out: 
Not all farmers can view long-run costs in the sense of a 
planning curve wherein they select the most profitable point and 
collect together the relevant set of resources. Instead the size 
^^For a discussion of this kind of adjustment, see (55). 
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of the unit in agriculture is partly a historical phenomenon 
wherein a beginning operator acquires a unit of a size determined 
by the limited resources he possesses. Following acquisition of 
the unit, additional inputs are added as capital accumulates 
(47, pp. 426-427). 
This observation does not diminish the importance of the planning 
curve; on the contrary, the long-run cost curve is most meaningful to 
denote the nature of cost economies for farms of different sizes (45, 
p. 143). 
To determine if average farm ownership was close to optimum farm 
size in each economic area, some estimates were made based on Iowa Farm 
Business Summary data for 1968. There are various shortcomings in the 
data which, for our purposes, should be kept in mind when making compari­
sons. The main shortcomings are: (1) farms of less than 70 acres are not 
included in tabulations, (2) average farm in each acreage class is assumed 
to represent the most efficient combination of resource use, and (3) 
different combinations of resources (qualitative and quannative differ­
ences in machinery, management, etc.) can not be identified from the 
aggregate data. Keeping in mind the shortcomings of the data, an estimate 
of minimum average cost size in each economic area was made, finding 
average total cost for each acreage interval through the ratio 
Fixed Costs + Operating Costs 
Average Acres in Interval 
The results are presented in Table 26. In "all areas, the resulting 
average total cost curves were generally in agreement with the shape of 
the curve in theory. In economic areas 3 and 4, the curve has reached 
the absolute minimum in the presented average acre interval; in areas 5, 
Table 26, Comparison of average size of ownership in 1958 and 1970 to estimated minimum average 
cost acreage in 1968 
Area and Average ownership Average ^ wnership Estimated minimum 
tenure groups acres, 1958 acres , 1970 average cost acreage, 1968 
1 294.2 196,2 312 
2 315.8 219.0 311 
3 257.8 219.5 317 
4 241.0 180.2 424 
5 228.3 192.1 422 
6 217.2 190.4 420 
7 231.1 184.6 310 
Iowa 250.4 193.3 320 
^Average ownership acres for 1958 computed from source material of (90). Since the 1958 
study underestimated the number of persons who jointly owned land (because it was not possible to 
identify all the names of the partners from the corn lists and therefore weigh ownership shares 
appropriately) the resulting average ownership acres in 1958 is overestimated and therefore not 
directly comparable with the ownership acres found for 1970. 
^Sources: (17, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29). 
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6 and the state, the curves did not reach an absolute minimum but 
flattened out and reduction of costs per acre were not significantly 
different when operated acreages increased to the next average acre inter­
vals. In areas 1, 2, and 7, however, the average total cost curves have 
flattened at the reported acreages compared to the next intervals, but 
above a critical acreage (over 600 acres) there occurred a significant 
reduction of average costs (about $4 to $8 per acre) and a second minimum 
average cost acreage was reached at 650, 700 and 710 acres for areas 1, 2 
and 7, respectively. The occurrence of double minimum average cost 
acreage in these areas suggests the possibility of two different enter­
prises (such as grain and livestock) being incorporated in the aggregate 
data. It may be that the reported minimum average cost acreages in Table 
26 are for grain and the second largest acreages reported are for live­
stock enterprises. The latter findings are not too drastic, however, con­
sidering that a study by Saupe and Kaldor estimate 659 acres to be the 
minimum-cost Iowa farm by the year 1980 with a 1.75 percent productivity 
increase compounded annually (79, p. 135). 
The reported estimates in Table 26 correspond quite closely to 
optimal farm sizes computed in the previous studies. For example, a 
study based on Carrington - Clyde soils in Northeast Iowa and Ida - Monona 
soils in Western Iowa (which correspond to our economic areas 1, 2 and 6) 
reach to this conclusion: 
Under a farm organization including cash cropping and current 
rotations, minimum per-unit production costs (per dollar of product) 
are attained in the range of 600 to 680 crop-acres. However, the 
reduction in per unit costs is small as acreage is extended from 
400 to 800 crop-acres. With a continuous rotation, minimum per-
unit costs are attained at a size of 320 crop-acres. 
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The static budgeting analysis indicates that, while small 
cost reductions are possible as machinery investment is increased 
and as crop acreage is expanded beyond 320 acres, these savings 
alone probably are not great enough to "force" much larger farms. 
The greatest reduction in cost per-unit of product is attained 
at approximately 320 acres. Up to this point, the high fixed 
costs of modern machinery decline rapidly as acreage and output 
are extended (46, p. 444). 
It is interesting to note that our findings of minimum average cost 
acreages is close to 320 acres in areas 1 and 2, but exceed it by 100 
acres for area 6. However, the general nature of the average cost curve 
which is continuously declining but becoming a smooth one is apparant 
in both sets of estimates. 
The optimal farm size findings of a study on the Shelby - Grundy -
Haig soil association, which corresponds to area 5 of this study, is 
examined to check on the estimated minimum average cost acreage. The 
topographic character of the area has led to three estimates : (1) hilly 
farm, (2) average farm, and (3) upland farm. Since we are interested in 
the average farm, we take the findings for this type of farm. The Ihnen 
and Heady study (50, p. 136) indicates that minimum average cost is 
reached with 2 plow, 3 plow and 3 plow, 3 plow combinations at 320-440 
crop acreages. This finding is also close to the estimated minimum 
acreage for area 5 in Table 26. 
Analyzing Table 26, it can be observed that in all economic areas the 
average ownership unit by 1970 was considerably smaller than the optimal 
operating farm size. In terms of the ownership norm, this naturally indi­
cates the magnitude of the problematic gap. Furthermore, there are indi-
13 
cations that since 1958 this magnitude has been widening. 
— 
However, this point is noz conclusive as has already been mentioned 
in footnote a of Table 26. 
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In other words, while the optimal operating farm size has been 
increasing due to technological advances, the individual share of the 
owner on the owned land has been decreasing due to increases in the number 
of people with interests in land. An owner finally in possession of land 
resources (after having paid for the shares of others) and beginning to 
operate an economically efficient sized farm may find his financial 
resources exhausted while acquiring the title to land. Therefore, there 
seems to be a revaluation and modification taking place with respect to 
the norm. Part-owner operatorship, owning part of the land fully and 
renting additional land to reach an optimum scale of operations seem to 
be gaining importance as the goal to be achieved in contrast to the goal 
of full ownership of land resources. 
Other Characteristics of Concentration 
Other characteristics of concentration are the number of farms owned, 
acreage distribution of owned units and average value of owned resources 
by tenure groups. 
Table 27 is presented to test the hypothesis that within tenure 
groups landlords, as opposed to operators, own large acreages. It can 
be observed that of the large ownership acreages (lands owned in excess 
of 520 acres) full owner operators and part owner operators owned 2.45 
and 2.92 percent, respectively, with no significant difference between 
themselves. Whereas, operator landlords and nonoperator landlords owned 
7.75 and 4.20 percent, respectively, of the large ownership acreages. 
The findings for landlord tenures were significantly different between 
themselves, as well as from the operator tenure groups (the former at 
Table 27. Distribution of owned land within tenure groups by acreage intervals (Iowa, 1970) 
Percentage distribution within acreage intervals 
Tenure Number 30- 70- 100- 140- 200- 280- 360- 520-
groups reporting < 29 69 99 159 199 279 359 519 699 > 700 
Owner 
operators 741 6.34 8.74 13.11 14.10 24.11 16.70 8.96 5.48 1.78 0.67 
Part-owner 
operators 435 1.20 4.39 15.77 13.00 27.50 19.66 10.17 6.28 1.35 0.67 
Operator 
landlords 367 4.89 9.18 12.57 14.76 15.53 15.06 8.67 11.59 3.90 3.85 
Nonoperator 
landlords 1206 0.97 7.56 14.94 16.11 24.19 17.00 7.70 6.32 2.59 1.61 
All tenure 
groups 2749 3.55 7.71 14.42 14.93 23.62 17.02 8.70 6.52 2.15 1.37 
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95 percent and the latter at 90 percent). The interesting point to note 
is that operator landlords rather than nonoperators—who rent all the land 
they own—concentrated on the large ownership acreages. On the basis of 
these findings, the diagnostic hypothesis 2.b.3 cannot be rejected. 
The number of farms owned is another absolute indicator of concen­
tration. Table 28 indicates the changes that have been taking place with 
respect to number of farms owned for all tenure groups from 1946 to 1958 
and 1970. 
It can be observed that for all tenure groups there has been a very 
significant increase in the number of farms owned compared to 1946 and 
1958. This same phenomena is true for both landlord tenure groups. 
However, with respect to operator landlords the increase in the number of 
farms compared to 1958 reverses itself after two farms, but no such 
reversal is observed for the nonoperator landlord group. 
Diagnostic hypothesis 2.b.2 states that landlords have concentrated 
on high value areas, and own more-number of farms than operators. Distri­
bution of the number of owned farms does not differ significantly between 
economic areas. However, the first part of the hypothesis cannot be 
rejected since there seems to be a relationship between the higher the 
per acre value of land (such as in areas 3 and 4) the more the number of 
farms owned by landlords and vice versa. Economic areas considered to be 
least expensive per acre have less than 19 percent in three or more farms-
The second part cannot be tested directly since by definition owner-
operators and part-owner-operators have only one farm. However, when all 
tenure groups are considered, there has definitely been a significant 
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Table 28. Percentage distribution of owners by tenure and number of 
farms owned within areas (Iowa, 1946, 1958 and 1970)& 
Tenure groups 
and number of 
Percentage distribution 
Iowa Iowa Iowa 
within areas . 1970 
! 
farms owned 1946 1958 1970 1 1 2 1 3 4 5 
- 6 7 
All tenures 
50.51** 1 farm 85 86 44.07 44,07 49.53 42.94 63.10 58.19 48.09 
2 farms 12 10.2 38.14** 39.41 41.70 36.09 43.99 29.47 33.70 41.40 
3 farms \ 2.5 8.08** 11.07 10.26 8.49 8.88 6.44 6.28 7.36 
4 farms J 3 0.8 2.52** 4.51 3.26 4.36 3.53 0.78 1.39 2.03 
5+ farms At 0.5 0.75 0.93 0.71 1.53 0.66 0.21 0.44 1.11 
Number 
reporting 1297 1922 2597 318 290 176 406 322 476 609 
Owner-operators 
1 farm 97 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2 farms 3 — — —' — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
3 or 4 farms A — — — — — — — —— — — — — — — — — — — 
5+ farms A — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
Number 
reporting 488 596 740 62 70 38 86 131 185 168 
Part-owner operators 
1 farm 92 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2 farms 7 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
3 or 4 farms 1 — — — — — — * — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
5+ farms A — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
Number 
reporting 145 288 435 59 44 32 65 64 74 97 
Operator landlord 
2.22** 1 farm 59 9.7 4.27 — — — 12.44 5.91 — 2.18 — 
2 farms 32 65.6 79.43** 68.38 76.04 80.83 80.05 79.09 79.68 83.87 
3 farms 8 18.3 14.75 21.37 20.00 3.11 12.56 17.22 16.33 11.58 4 farms J 4.4 2.50 5.13 3.30 1.55 — — — 3.23 1.81 2.67 
5+ farms 1 2.0 1.09 0.85 0.66 2.07 1.48 0.46 — — — 1.87 
Number 
reporting 161 103 350 34 48 22 49 39 61 97 
Nonoperator landlord 
0.69** 1 farm 82 80.5 — — — 0.96 1.72 1.21 1.24 0.74 — — — 
2 farms 12 14.1 75.29** 70.29 73.31 65.24 74.63 79.18 79.73 78.25 
3 farms 1 A 3.5 16.58** 19.35 17.57 19.74 15.81 17.32 14.36 15.13 
4 farms J o 1.2 5.80** 8.55 . 6.70| 10.15 7.30 1.65 3.78 4.37 
5+ farms A 0.7 1.63 1.81 1.46 3.15 1.05 0.62 1.39 2.25 
Number 
reporting 503 935 1072 163 128 84 206 88 156 247 
^Data on 1946 and 1958 in (89, p. 37). 
^Less than 0.5 percent. 
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increase in the number of farms owned compared to the previous studies. 
The value of land owned and its distribution between tenure groups 
and over years is another measure of concentration. Table 29 presents 
the comparative importance of tenure groups with respect to the average 
number of farms, acreage and value by owners. 
The most interesting observation is the very significant increase 
in the share of part-owner-operators and operator-landlords with respect 
to the number of farm owners, total acreage owned and value of this owned 
land. This finding is highly significant and substantiates the earlier 
findings in the third and fourth chapters with respect to the modifica­
tions on the ownership norm. 
Owner-operators, except for the number of farms owned, do not show 
significant changes with respect to other measures compared to 1958. 
However, there is definitely an indication (from 1946 to 1970) of their 
relative position getting worse. In terms of absolute size and value of 
owned land, it has been better. 
The nonoperator-iandlord's share has declined very significantly in 
all measures except the number of farms owned which has increased signifi­
cantly. Relatively and absolutely, they have lost their share of total 
land resources. Their average owned acreage per owner is not different 
than what it was in 1946 while, of course, the value of this land has 
increased. 
Testing the diagnostic hypothesis 2,b.l, which states that landlords 
own larger average sized farms and larger average value of farms than 
operators, it is observed chat z.-.e hypotnesis cannot be rejected in 
Table 29. Comparative importance of tenure groups measured by number, 
acreage, and value of farms owned (Iowa, 1946, 1958 and 
1970)* 
Items 
reported 
Number 
reporting 
1946 1958 1970 
Percentage distribution of 
Owner 
operators 
1946 1958 1970 
Number of 
farm owners 1297 
Number of 
farms owned 1297 
Acreage owned 1297 
Value of land 
owned 
Average number 
of farms per 
owner (farms) 
Average owned 
acreage per 
owner (acres) 
Average value 
of land per 
owner (dollars) 
Average size 
of each farm 
owned (acres) 
Average value 
of each farm 
owned (dollars) 
1281 
1909 
1909 
1909 
1888 
2692 
2692 
2347 
2347 
37.5 
33.6 
31.4 
33.7 
1 . 1  
152.0 
141.5 
32.2 
27.2 
1.0 
178.2 
178.2 
30.72 
26.8 18.71 
27.1 28.46 
** 
26.90 
1.0  
184.1 
19,319 44,000 73,892 
184.1 
17,526 44,000 73,892 
^Data on 1946 and 1958 from (89, p. 27). 
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average number of farms. acres or value owned bv owner tenure eroups 
Part-owner 
operators 
Operator 
landlords 
Nonoperator 
landlords 
1946 1958 1970 1946 1958 1970 1946 1958 1970 
11.2 14.6 
** 
19.04 12.5 5.2 
** 
11.34 38.8 48.0 
**• 
38.91 
10,2 12.3 11.59 16.2 9.6 15.18** 40.0 51.3 
* 
54.52 
8.0 11.1 
** 
18.48 18.4 10.8 14.11** 42.2 51.7 
** 
38.95 
8.7 11.2 
** 
20.17 17.8 9.2 
** 
13.68 39.8 52.4 
** 
39.25 
1.1 1.0 1.0 1.6 2.3 2.2 1.2 1.3 2.3 
130.0 161.3 192.8 267.0 416.5 247.2 198.0 228.1 198.9 
16,444 39,316 89,390 32,312 91,325 101,834 24,061 59,214 85,137 
118.5 161.3 192.8 171.4 184.6 112.4 159.6 177.6 86.4 
14,883 39,316 89,390 19,137 40,305 46,300 17,376 46,270 36,989 
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absolute differences. However, when relative increases are considered, 
it can be seen that largest increases in owned acres and value have been 
made by the part-owner-operator group. 
The problem of concentration of Iowa land ownership has been 
delimited as a shift from operators to landlords. The previous sections 
of this chapter identified that there has been some change in concentra­
tion of Iowa land, but this was not in favor of landlords. Rather, it 
has been towards operators and against nonoperators. 
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TENURE EXPERIENCE OF IOWA FARMLAND OWNERS 
Some of the personal characteristics of farmland owners have already 
been discussed in the fourth chapter. One characteristic, past tenure 
experiences of farmland owners, is very important in influencing the 
achievement of the norm. Therefore, in this chapter the objective is to 
identify and analyze the routes individuals follow in achieving farm 
ownership. Traditionally farmland owners have followed a sequence of 
tenures in their assent to ownership. Whether the same routes are being 
utilized or if the impact of economic and technical changes has led to 
alternative routes is the topic analyzed in this chapter. 
The Agricultural Ladder Concept 
Spillman has introduced the concept of the agricultural ladder into 
economics (86) in order to establish how young farmers become owners. 
However, it has been argued that the popular belief on which the theory 
is based is generations old and rests on the roots of American tradition 
(9, p. 31). 
Generally the concept of a ladder implies various economic rungs 
people ascend to the very top. The rungs of this ladder are unequal in 
width and become narrower as one gets to the top, so only a certain 
number can be accommodated at each stage. The duration of each person at 
each rung is not necessarily equal since some will be climbing up faster 
than the others. Such a concept as the ladder implies economic and social 
mobility. Essentially it is the schematization of the American dream 
that with hard work and perseverance every young man has a chance of 
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climbing to the very top of his chosen field of endeavor even if he 
starts at the very bottom. 
With respect to agriculture, more specifically, this ladder was 
thought to consist of four basic stages or rungs: 
(1) number of years occupied as an unpaid family laborer on the 
parents * farm, 
(2) number of years spent as hired man on other peoples' farms, 
(3) number of years spent as tenant operator—renting and operat­
ing a farm, and finally 
(4) number of years spent as owner-operator—operating all the land 
owned. 
A farmer who had touched all the rungs of the ladder (but not 
necessarily in the same order) is said to have gone through the basic 
agricultural ladder experience. 
This original agricultural ladder definition has been enlarged and 
modified in later studies (9). The final stage has been modified to 
include the landlord stage, first as an operator—operating some and rent­
ing the rest of his lands—and then as a nonoperator—renting all the 
owned land. The nonfarm experience—time spent out of agriculture—of 
the individual prior to ownership may be included as a check for possible 
accumulation of resources in other sectors for financing land ownership. 
In this study, individual owners are analyzed according to their 
patterns of experience with respect to: tenure groups, economic areas, 
acres of owned land, age groups, and occupations. Implicit in the dis­
cussion of the agricultural ladder concept are the successive stages of 
the rungs. However, this need not be so. A farm owner may have nonfarm 
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experience prior to being a renter or vice versa without affecting the 
form of the experience pattern. That is the ordering of the ladder is not 
important. Another note connected with the agricultural ladder is the 
implication that each successive rung has higher tenure status. As 
Barlowe and Timmons (9) argue, this implication is somewhat artificial 
and cannot be defended without reservations. No such status is implied 
throughout the study. 
Patterns of Tenure Experience 
This study breaks down the experience of farmland owners since their 
14th birthday into 5 patterns in Table 30, following the classification 
of owners with or without nonfarm (with or without N) experience. The 
first pattern of experience is the basic agricultural ladder group and 
consists of owners who have indicated touching all rungs of the ladder or 
skipping just one (for example, not worked on parent's farm, so no P or 
not worked as hired hand, so no H but not both). They may or may not 
have nonfarm experience N and they may be operator or nonoperator 
landlords L at the final rung of the ladder. 
The second pattern is called other patterns of experience previous 
to owner operatorship and consists of individuals who have stepped more 
than one rung of the ladder. This pattern consists of H/RO, H/RNO, 
14 
PO and PNO groupings; R stands for renter—tenant operator renting 
all the land he operates—and 0 stands for owner-operator—operating 
only all the land owned. The owner-operator without previous farm 
14 
Which tenure experience pattern consists of which tenure grouping 
is indicated in Appendix B, Table 3. The sign / stands for and/or. 
Table 30. Tenure experience patterns reported by men owners by tenure 
groups^ (Iowa, 1946, 1958 and 1970) 
Number 
Tenure . .,, 
reporting All owners 
experience ° 
patterns 1946 1958 1970 1946 1958 1970 
Owners reporting 
nonfarm experience 551 620 1266 59.5 52.8 61.28 
Owners reporting farm 
experience only 375 550 710 40.5 47.2 38.72 
~i 
** 
** 
Basic agricultural ^ ^ 
ladder experience J 462 688 1022 49.9 58.8 53.70 
Other patterns of 
experience previous r II ^ 
to ownership 342 314 418 36.9 26.8 20.69 
Owner-operator 
without previous r III 
farm experience 49 34 72 5.3 2.9 3.59 
Nonoperator land­
lords with previous ^ 
farm experience but j IV 
not as owner 
** 
operator 23 89 265 6.2 7.6 12.57 
Nonoperator land­
lords with no y 
previous farm J 
experience 16 45 199 1.7 3.9 9.45^ 
Number reporting 926 1170 1976 926 1170 1976 
^omen indicating tenure experience have been included in 1970 data 
on 1946-1958 in (89, p. 53). 
indicates less than 0.05 percent. 
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Percentage distribution by tenure groups 
Owner Part-owner Operator Nonoperator 
operators operators landlords landlords 
1946 1958 1970 1946 1958 1970 1946 1958 1970 1946 1958 1970 
** irk ** ** 
55.6 53.4 60.70 56.9 41.3 59.46 60.7 35.3 56.86 65.8 62.6 70.31 
** irk irk irk 
44.4 46.6 39.30 43.1 58.7 40.54 39.3 64.7 43.14 34.2 37.4 29.69 
** ** 
56.9 62.6 62.91 67.5 75.0 82.44 40.7 65.7 51.56 36.1 43.4 31.77 
36.3 32.4 30.73 31.7 24.1 16.62** 51.1 31.6 27.04 33.1 21.2 12.72** 
6.8 5.0 6.36 0.8 0.9 0.94 8.2 2.7 7.15 3.7 1.6 1.62 
A A — A A — A A 9.47 21.2 22.5 30.34 
A A — A A — A A 4.77 5.9 11.3 23.55 
339 445 529 123 239 352 135 79 278 269 397 817 
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experience pattern consist of operators or landlords indicating nonfann 
experience only. 
The fourth pattern consists of nonoperator landlords with previous 
farm experience but not as an owner-operator and includes RL, RNL, 
P/HL and P/KNL groups. 
The final pattern consists of nonoperator landlords %ith no previous 
farm experience. That is, these people only indicate a nonfann experience 
prior to becoming nonoperator landlords, thus NL group. 
The number of years an owner has stayed on any one rung has not been 
utilized in this study. The reason for it is that checks of respondents' 
answers to tenure experiences prior to statistical runs revealed far too 
many errors and inconsistencies. For some of the owners, time spent on 
each rung was not mutually exclusive and therefore problems of correct 
allocation of years between occupations did arise. Instead of intro­
ducing a possible bias by editing in the number of years spent on each 
rung, the owners * response to ever having been at a particular stage is 
utilized in the tabulations. The findings are presented in Tables 30-34. 
Experience Patterns and Tenure of Owners 
Diagnostic hypothesis 3.a states that owners reporting farm experi­
ence only have been declining while nonoperator landlords with no previous 
farm experience are on the rise. This hypothesis is tested and the 
results of the findings are presented in Table 30. 
It can be observed that there has been a very significant change in 
both che patterns of ownership for all tenure groups. That is to say, 
owners reporting nonfarm experience (with N) prior to ownership have 
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very significantly increased while owners with farm experience only 
(without N) declined very significantly for all tenure groups compared 
to those of 1958. On the basis of these findings, the first part of the 
diagnostic hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
For all owners the findings indicate that there has been a very 
significant decline in the pattern of basic agricultural ladder experi­
ence. This decline is very significant for nonoperating landlord tenure; 
however, while owner-operator tenure indicates no significant change, the 
increase in the use of the agricultural ladder by the part-owner operators 
is very significant and somewhat surprising. This finding partly rejects 
the diagnostic hypothesis 3.c which argues for a lesser use of the agri­
cultural ladder. 
Other patterns of experience prior to ownership have declined for all 
tenure groups as can be seen in Table 30. The second part of diagnostic 
hypothesis 3.a, when tested under the light of the findings, cannot be 
rejected at the 95 confidence level, but a qualification is needed. Land­
lord tenures are exhibiting an increasing deviation from the traditional 
agricultural ladder and in some cases skipping all the in-between-rungs in 
climbing up to the top. However, part-owner operators have been increas­
ingly using the ladder as a means of achieving the ownership norm. 
Do the tenure experience patterns with respect to owned acreages 
differ among the owners? It will be tested, in other words, if as formu-
ated in the diagnostic hypothesis 3.d, owners with nonbasic agricultural 
ladder experience own a greater share of the total lands, can be rejected. 
Table 31 presents the findings with respect to the breakdown of 
Table 31. Tenure experience patterns by owned acreage intervals (Iowa, 1970) 
Tenure 
experience 
patterns 
Number 
reporting < 39 
Percentage distribution by owned acreage intervals 
40-
69 
70-
99 
100-
139 
140-
199 
200-
279 
280-
359 
360-
579 
All 
580 acres 
P/HRO 
P/HNRO 1 
329 
322 
0.31 
0.72 0.71 
0.71 
1.82 
1.12 
1.35 
3.14 
5.23 
2.76 
4.29 
17.19 
24.02 
27.99 
24.72 
46.78 
37.15 
24.86 
24.99 
H/RO 
ll/RNO 
PO 
I'NO 
II 
18 
50 
54 
154 0.73 
4.26 
2.20 
6.47 
8.83 
2.10 
4.20 
14.91 
10.00 
9.74 
6.15 
5.13 
5.68 
6.69 
21.28 
18,18 
25.78 
17.81 
31.82 
20.73 
21.59 
22.77 
40.75 
28.21 
36.94 
27.02 
1.44 
4.09 
4.13 
11.77 
NO III 55 -- 4.27 7.43 15.32 4.00 23.79 30.36 14.83 4.14 
u . 
h !. 
P/HI. 
P/HNL 
IV 
4 
23 
33 
131 0.95 
5.63 
3.54 
1.57 6.03 
2.82 
12.39 
6.78 
32.77 
8.35 
25.48 
6,06 
28.35 
5.63 
21.45 
26,24 
25.59 
14.99 
26.64 
38.87 
51.97 
22.16 
25.74 
0.31 
1.57 
2.42 
9.33 
NL V 154 0.81 2.15 0.81 1.74 12.17 9.05 21.39 29.37 22.52 10.94 
All tenure 
experience 
patterns 1327 0.43 0.93 2.52 2.34 7.19 5.64 20.93 25.70 34.31 100.00 
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tenure experience patterns and acreage intervals. The first two tenure 
experience groups make up the agricultural ladder experience, identified 
as I, as in Table 30. Similarly, the make-up of each tenure experience 
pattern is identified with the Roman numerals and the groups which go 
into it. 
The share of the largest owned acreages (lands > 360 acres) owned by 
landlords who have indicated nonbasic agricultural ladder experiences 
(such as only N or P/HN) are about 52 percent of their total land 
ownership. This corresponds to almost 75 percent for operators who have 
experienced the agricultural ladder without nonfarm employment and 57 
percent with nonfarm employment. The diagnostic hypothesis 3.d is 
rejected at 95 percent confidence. In 1970 the largest Iowa acreage 
owners have still followed the traditional agricultural ladder. 
Similarly, to test for the changing use of the basic agricultural 
ladder in Iowa and in different economic regions. Table 32 is presented. 
It can be observed that generally the distribution of tenure experience 
patterns did not differ widely between economic areas.In all economic 
areas the majority of the owners indicated to have utilized the agricul­
tural ladder. However, with respect to the state total and over time, 
there has been a significant decline in the utilization of this pattern 
since 1946, even though the majority of the owners still utilize it. 
It should be noted that economic area 5 (Southern Pasture) compared 
to richer areas (in terms of per acre value of land) has significantly 
less NL and more PNG tenure experience grouping, implying the greater 
use of nonfarm earnings to accumulate enough capital to achieve owner-
operatorship. The same finding has been observed in 1958 (89, p. 57). 
Table 3?.. Tciiure experience of men owners (Iowa, 1946, 1958 and 1970;^ economic areas, 1970) 
Percentage distribution by types of tenure experience pattern 
Economic Number 
I II III IV V 
areas reporting P/HRO P/HNRO H/RO H/RNO PC PNG NO RL RNL P/HL P/HNL NL 
1 250 29.56 25.92 0.48 3.46 2.28 9.08 2.56 0.24 0.72 4.38 6.16 15.15 
? 234 26.06 25.92 0.99 3.48 4.68 12.27 3.00 0.50 1.24 0.99 10.76 10.10 
152 36.47 22.78 0.41 2.05 5.20 8.04 2.03 2.87 3.28 6.51 10.47 
326 25.80 25.22 2.01 3.04 4.07 10.14 ' 4.10 0.36 1.46 4.68 8.67 10.45 
249 22.49 26.89 3.21 4.07 6.21 14.89 6.27 0.43 0.64 - - 9.96 4.93 
388 27.12 27.80 1.30 4.49 5.70 11.64 4.15 0.29 1.16 0.72 8.40 7.21 
7 471 27.85 28.04 1.20 4.21 7.42 9.95 2.70 0.60 1.64 1.60 6.92 7.85 
State 1946 926 27.2 22.5 0.8 7.3 10.8 18.0 5.3 1.1 1.5 0.5 3.1 1.9 
State 1958 1237 34.2 24.5 1.1 2.3 11.3 12.2 2.9 0.5 1.1 - - - 6.0 3.9 
State 1970 2070 27.17** 26.57 1.49 3.75 5.40** 11.05 3.67 0.39 1.31 2.04 8.21 8.95** 
^In cases where women respondents have indicated that they have had tenure experience (on or 
off the farm) they have been included in 1970 analysis. Data on 1946-1958 in (89, p. 55). 
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A very significant increase is observed in PO and NL tenure experi­
ences which implies the increasing importance of inheritance and nonfarra 
occupation (for accumulating the financial resources) in achieving farm­
land ownership. 
As a result the diagnostic hypothesis 3.c, which states that the 
basic agricultural ladder is used to a lesser extent than in the past and 
other patterns are evolving, cannot be rejected. 
Modifications of Tenure Experience Patterns 
Over the years improvements in techniques of agricultural production 
have brought about changes in methods of farming. Economic criteria 
forced increasing capital substitution for labor and the introduced 
machines cultivated larger acres by fewer men. The result of changes in 
the resource mix have led to decreased demand for labor in agriculture 
and correspondingly would-be hired farm hands had to seek employment in 
nonfarm sectors. In terms of the tenure experience patterns, these 
changes in the resource mix have resulted in one rung of the traditional 
agricultural ladder completely losing its importance. In its place non-
farm employment is gaining increasing importance as a rung in the ladder 
where individuals spend a number of years accumulating enough financial 
resources prior to farming. 
The tenure experience patterns discussed in the previous section do 
not take into account the relative changes with respect to various rungs 
of the ladder. A new grouping of tenure experiences is required if the 
relative importance of these rung changes are to be contrasted. Since 
importance has been on the hired hand and nonfarm experience, these 
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groupings are contrasted in Tables 33 and 34. It should be remined that 
these groupings do not represent a new ladder, but simply to contrast the 
relative importance of two rungs. 
The nonfarm experience group in Tables 33 and 34 consists of all 
owners who have indicated having been employed in nonfarm occupations 
prior to ownership, but at no time were they farmhands. Hired hand exper­
ience alone, on the contrary, consists of owners who were never employed 
out of agriculture but indicated touching the H rung. Nonfarm and hired 
hand experience is for owners who touched both rungs while the last group 
is for owners who touched neither of the rungs. 
Testing diagnostic hypothesis 3.b, which states that "younger owners 
are using nonfarm employment as a replacement for hired hand and tenancy 
steps of the agricultural ladder," it is observed in Table 33 that for all 
ages there is a very significant increase in nonfarm and a very signicant 
decline in hired hand experiences. The last tenure grouping has declined 
very significantly as well. 
Some age groups have less than 100 respondents for either of the 
years and therefore have not been tested for significant differences but 
for age groups 35-44 and 45-54 nonfarm experience has increased and 
hired hand experience has declined very significantly. Both age groups 
also indicate a very significant decline in the last tenure experience 
group (neither nonfarm nor hired hand experience) while the younger age 
group indicates a very significant increase in nonfarm and hired hand 
experience. The interpretation of these findings is that the hypotheses 
cannot be rejected; however, it seems that nonfarm employment and the 
Table 33. Tenure experience of men within age groups (Iowa, 1958-1970)® 
Percentage distribution within age groupe 
Tenure 
experience 
groups 
All ages 0 - 24 25 - 34 35 -44 45 - 54 55 - 64 > 65 
1958 1970 1958 1970 1958 1970 1958 1970 1958 1970 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Nonfarm 
experience 28.3 37.96** 100 38.72 52.5 39.06 34.7 48.84** 20.7 40.36** 27.9 31.64* 22.1 35.69 
Hired hand 
experience 18.2 13.75** - 19.07 6.7 5.00 16.6 4.19** 18.7 9.84** 19.2 21.26 24.2 16.95 
Nonfarm and 
hired hand 
experience 24.0 25.45 - 16.52 23.4 42.59 20.6 35.23 27.9 29.69 23.9 21.87 17.9 16.62 
Neither non-
farm nor 
hired hand 
experience 29.5 22.84** - 25.69 17.7 13.34 28.1 11.74** 32.7 20.11** 29.0 
* 
25.23 35.8 30.73 
Number 
reporting 12 30 2046 1 11 73 111 228 288 347 485 509 535 72 616 
*Data on 1958 from (89, p. 60). Women indicating tenure experience have been included in the 
1970 study. Identification of tenure groupings are in Appendix B. 
Table 34. Tenure experience of owners according to occupational distribution (Iowa, 1970) 
Percentage distribution by occupation 
Tenure experience Number Retired Business and Laborers 
groups reporting Farmers farmers Housewives professional and others 
Nonfarm experience 795 
Hired hand experience 270 
Nonfarm and hired 
hand experience 500 
Neither nonfarm nor 
hired hand experience 471 
Total reporting 2036 
27.19 
20.07 
23.11 
29.63 
951 
18.16  
27.15 
15.44 
39.25 
304 
32.73 
1 . 6 1  
0.92 
64.74 
69 
69.01 
29.71 
1.28 
392 
54.79 
1.50 
40.18 
3.53 
320 
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hired hand stage are not used as substitutes but rather as compliments 
in achieving ownership of land. As has been expected, there has been no 
decline in hired hand experience of older owners. 
Tenure experience of these owners according to various occupational 
groups is presented in Table 34. It is again noted that farmers very 
significantly differ from the retired farmers with respect to all the 
four tenure experience groups. Again the findings indicate that over 
time importance of nonfarm experience has increased and hired hand exper­
ience has declined when farmers and retired farmers are contrasted. 
Similarly, the complementarity of nonfarm and hired hand experience is 
implied when a very significantly greater number of the farmers, as 
opposed to retired farmers, indicate nonfarm and hired hand experience. 
The last tenure experience group, however, is very significantly more for 
the retired farmers. A tentative explanation is that in the earlier days 
resource requirements for getting established in farming may have been 
much less than today and consequently fewer people had to accumulate 
financial resources prior to being a renter or an owner. 
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FARMLAND ACQUISITION THROUGH GIFT, INHERITANCE AND PURCHASE 
The important consequences of accelerated technological innovations 
in agriculture and changing economic conditions within the last decades 
have already been touched upon in the previous chapters. This chapter 
concentrates on the effect of these changes in farmland acquisition 
through gift, inheritance and purchase. 
Acquiring Farmland Ownership 
Acquisition of property, be it farmland, an automobile, or a house, 
requires capital to finance it if it is not an outright gift or an inheri­
tance. To finance an acquisition, the prospective buyer has to rely on 
his own savings, savings of others, and institutional savings. He should 
also consider the net returns of his investment, repayment of his debt 
outstanding, and the ultimate value of his land. 
With respect to farmland owner-operatorship, acquisition of a debt-
free title to land has been a basic goal of Iowa farmers. However, the 
problem of accumulating enough capital to reach this end has become more 
difficult and takes a longer time due to changes in technology and 
economic conditions. Bachman has observed the developing trend by the 
early 1950's : 
Perhaps the greatest potential danger of instability in 
income arises because of the increased capital requirements in 
modern farming that occur with increased sizes of farms and 
increases in machinery and other types of capital required. 
Investments averaging above $30,000 per farm commonly are required 
for operation of the medium and larger commercial farms in the 
United States. This represents more than a lifetime of saving 
for the average individual. A reasonable degree of stability for 
the less advantaged young farmer seeking to establish efficient 
159 
and up-to-date farm may call for substantial revisions in tenure 
and credit practices (8, pp. 171-172). 
Existence of family assistance, in the form of land and nonland gifts 
and inheritances, has simplified the problem of acquiring land and begin­
ning farming for the fortunate few, but for the majority the problem has 
been aggravated, as has been pointed out below: 
Farm mortgage lenders, prospective land buyers, and observers 
have expressed increased concern in recent years about the con­
tinued rise in farm real estate prices without apparent support 
from farm income. Nationally, farmland prices have advanced more 
than 50 percent in the past decade, whereas net farm income per 
acre in 1963 was only 4 percent higher than 10 years earlier. 
This widening disparity between land prices and farm income, 
coupled with the rapid increase in farm size, has contributed to 
a doubling in outstanding farm real estate debts in the past 
decade. Credit policies of commercial lenders have undergone sub­
stantial changes in response to these forces, and noninstitutional 
sources of credit have emerged. Beginning farmers have found it 
increasingly difficult to accumulate from farm earnings the funds 
needed for land purchases. Steadily mounting capital requirements 
have forced many to modify their traditional goal of debt-free 
ownership. Alternative tenure arrangements such as part-ownership 
and the family farm corporation have become more prevalent 
(82, p. 13). 
Acquisition of Farmland through Gift and Inheritance 
The consequence of the increasing amounts of initial capital outlays 
being required in present-day agriculture is the attaching of a great 
importance to gratuities in land acquisition. As a result, farmers 
increasingly rely on family assistance to acquire ownership of land. 
Gratuities can take the form of gifts and/or inheritance of full or 
part interest on land. Family assistance can also be provided by gifts 
or inheritances other than land. These family assisted funds, in return, 
may be used in improving operations and/or purchase of land. The problems 
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of financing the acquisition of farmland is simplified for the family 
assisted fairmer. Even when the land is partly inherited, he will have a 
beginning resource and the possibility of buying the shares of the other 
parties with interest in this land. 
The increasing importance of gratuities in acquiring farmland 
ownership is delimited as hypothesis 4.a and tested in this section. 
Diagnostic hypothesis 4.a.l states that family assistance to farmers 
seeking ownership is on the rise. This hypothesis is tested below and 
the findings are presented in Tables 35 and 36. 
As can be observed in Table 35 for all owners of both sexes the 
importance of single methods in acquisition of farmlands have declined 
very significantly compared to a combination of methods. It is still 
true that a majority of the owners still purchase their lands without 
gifts and inheritances from their families but their percentages have 
declined very significantly as compared to 1946 and 1958. However, it 
is interesting to note that acquisition through outright inheritance or 
gift has not changed over the years. Instead, what seems to have occurred 
is a very significant increase in the method of acquisition which is a 
combination of purchase with family assistance in the form of gift and/or 
inheritance of land. 
This above finding is true for all occupation categories as well, as 
can be tested in Table 36. There has been a very significant decline in 
purchase methods and a very significant increase in the methods which 
combines purchase of land wicr. fô.r.ily assistance. This finding is 
supported very significantly for the farmers. Other occupation groups 
Table 35. PerceiiLagc distribution of farm owners by method of farm ownership acquisition (Iowa, 
1946, 1958 and 1970)* 
All owners Men Women 
Method of acquisition 1946 1958 1970 1946 1958 1970 1946 1958 1970 
Single methods 
Land purchase 
a. From relatives only 
b. From ncnrelativcs only 
c. Both relatives and 
nonrelatives 
11.9 
51.2 
4.4 
14.0 
51.1 
5.8 
13.76 
44.35** 
4.91 
12.9 
55.3 
4.7 
14.6 
54.6 
6.1 
14.51 
47.90** 
5.27 
5.4 
24.2 
2.7 
10.2 
30.7 
4.4 
9.94 
26.19 
3.08 
Gift or inheritance 11.1 11.7 10.24 5.5 7.3 6.48 47.5 37.1 29.43 
Other or undetermined method 2.1 0.2 2.0 0.1 " - 3.4 0.9 - -
Combinations of methods 
Combinations involving 
gift or inheritance 17.5 17.2 21.81** 17.8 17.3 20.64** 15.4 16.7 27.81 
Combinations involving 
purchase from relatives 
but no gift or inheritance 0.7 -- 2.09 0,8 -- 2.26 -- -- 1.23 
Combinations involving no ^ 
family assistance 1.1 A -- 1.0 A -- 1.3 
Number reporting 1121 1810 2871 972 1548 2375 149 262 496 
*Data on 1946 and 1958 in (89, p. 66). 
^Less than 0.05 percent. 
Table 36. Distribution of farm owners by occupation and by farm acquisi­
tion (Iowa, 1946, 1958* and 1970) 
Percentage distribution 
by method of acquisition 
Combinations 
Number Gift or including gift 
. . reporting inheritance or inheritance Occupation " 
groups 1946 1958 1970 1946 1958 1970 1946 1958 1970 
Farmers 642 791 1246 5.9 5.1 5.21 17.5 18.1 22.52 
Retired 
farmers 162 252 424 2.5 6.8 6.21 20.4 23.7 25.32 
Housewives^ 106 300 34.8 30.17 20.0 25.45 
Business and 
professionals 303 446 17.5 14.54 17.0 22.09 
Laborers and 
others^ 115 385 10.6 12.54 9.6 17.61 
All owners 1567 2801 10.1 10.36 18.2 22.49 
*Data for 1946 and 1958 in (89, p. 69). 
^Close to 90 percent significance. 
^Data for 1946 unavailable. 
^Less than 0.05 percent. 
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Percentage distribution by method of acquisition 
Combinations 
without gift 
Purchase or inheritance Other 
1946 1958 1970 1946 1958 1970 1946 1958 1970 
72.8 76.8 68.97 
9rk 
1.9 3.30 1.9 
75.3 69.5 65.28 
44.4 42.93 
1.8 3.19 
1.45 0 .8  
65.2 63.09 0.1 0.27 0 . 2  
79.8 69.72 
71.5 64.95 
0.13 
2.20 0 .2  
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show evidence of this fact but the findings are not significant at 
the tested levels. Thus there is evidence to support the hypothesis 
that farmers, as opposed to other occupations, are increasingly utilizing 
gift and inheritance of land combined with their own resources in acquir­
ing ownership of farmlands. 
Gratuities are an important factor in acquiring farmland for the 
beginning farmer. However, it also enables nonoperators to receive 
lands and therefore contribute to the widening gap of the problematic 
situation. In other words, do the nonoperator landlords receive their 
lands mainly by gratuities as stated in diagnostic hypothesis 4.a.2? 
Table 37 presents the methods of acquisition in 1958 and 1970 with 
respect to tenure groups. Evidence indicates that were it not for gifts 
or inheritances from the family, a sizeable portion of the nonoperator 
landlords would not have been farmland owners, and definitely a portion 
of the operator landlords would have remained as owner-operators. The 
share of lands acquired by gifts and inheritances (even when partly 
purchased) in both landlord groups is definitely and very significantly 
larger than operator tenures. In other words, family assistance has 
encouraged farmland owners to become landlords. 
The importance of family assistance in acquiring farmlands early in 
one's life is shown in Table 38. Testing diagnostic hypothesis 4.a.3, 
which states that young owners are increasingly utilizing combinations of 
gifts and inheritances in acquiring ownership of farmlands, it has been 
found that there has not been a significantly different distribution of 
acquisition methods by age groups in 1970, as compared to those in 1958. 
Table 37. Tenure of owners by method of acquisition (Iowa, 1958 and 1970)® 
Method of 
acquisition 
Percentage distribution of owners by tenure group 
Number—and—percentage reporting Owner Part-owner Operator Nonoperator 
1958 1970 operators operators landlords landlords 
number percent number percent 1958 1970 1958 1970 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Purchase only 1171 70.7 1645 61.33** 81.9 75.44** 83.9 75.27** 60.3 58.84 60.0 53.94** 
Gift or inheri­
tance only 208 12.5 277 10.33 6.0 5.89 6.8 4.66 2.4 8.35 20.1 17.52* 
Combinations 
involving gift 
or inheritance 273 16.6 694 
** 
25.88 11.9 16.41* 9.3 16.59** 37.3 30.43 19.6 
** 
27.02 
Combinations 
involving no 
gift or inheri­
tance 1 a" 66 2.46 2.26 3.69 2.39 0.1 1.52 
Other 3 0.2 - - 0.2 0.2 
Total reporting 1656 100.0 2682 100.00 502 718 265 430 99 363 790 1171 
Data on 1958 in (89, p. 70). 
Less than 0.05 percent. 
Table 38. Distribution of owners by method of farmland acquisition according to age at first 
acquisition (Iowa, 1958 and 1970)^ 
Percentage distribution by age at first land acquisition 
Number 
Method of reporting 0 - 24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-over All ages 
Acquisition 1958 1970 1958 1970 1958 1970 1958 1970 1958 1970 1958 1970 1970 
Purchase from 
relatives 205 363 9.2 7.73 37.0 35.75 36.1 35.68 14.1 15.04 3.6 5.80 14.32 
Purchase from ^ * 
nonrelatives 837 1189 9.5 10.04 36.0 39.40 35.7 32.65 14.0 13.70 4.8 4.20 46.19 
Purchase from 
Gift or 
89 147 13.1 18.61 48.0 47.31 29.7 28.69 9.2 3.30 -- 2.10 5.17 
inheritance 110 257 9.7 8.60 27.6 20.37^ 31.9 26.66 18.3 30.80** 12.5 13.57 9.70 
* . * 
Other 2 100.0 
Combinationo 
with gift or 
inheritance 264 698 15.7 13.84 35.8 31.71" 31.8 30.04 13.9 17.46 2.8 6.95 22.40 
Combinations 
without gift or 
inheritance 3 66 -- 7.22 27.5 54.64 74.3 33.47 -- 4.67 -- -- 2.22 
All methods 1510 2714 10.7 10.80 36.3 36.06 34.4 31.73* 14.0 15.66 4.6 5.75 100.00 
*Data on 1958 is in (89, p. 67). 
^Close to 90 percent significance. 
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In fact, evidence suggests the opposite, that family assistance to the 
young owners has declined since 1958. However, the importance of family 
assistance for all age groups is still considerable. In light of present 
evidence this hypothesis is rejected; that is, no relationship between 
the age of farmland owners and the increasing utilization of family 
assistance is detected. 
Family Assistance Other Than Land 
Family assistance in acquiring farmland ownership has so far been 
measured in terms of gifts and inheritances of land. Another equally 
important measure of assistance in the acquisition process is the use of 
gifts and inheritances other than land. This form of assistance is 
mainly gifts of capital in the form of money. Evidence indicates that 
this form of gift is quite common, since almost 37 percent have reported 
receiving such assistance, and of this group 52 percent indicated to have 
used it in acquiring, improving or operating their land, as shown in 
Table 39. 
Diagnostic hypothesis 4.a.4 states that operators, as opposed to 
landlords, and farmers, as opposed to nonfarmers, use inheritances other 
than land for land ownership purposes. This hypothesis is tested with 
the help of Tables 39 and 40. 
It can be seen in Table 39 that a slightly larger percentage of 
women, as opposed to men, have received inheritance other than land for 
both 1958 and 1970. This finding can be explained by the observation 
that women receive their share of inheritance in the form of money more 
Table 39, Proportion of farm owners by sex, tenure and occupation who used inheritances other 
than land for land purposes (Iowa, 1958-1970)^ 
Received inheritance 
other than land 
Number Percentage 
Classification 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Used inheritance for land 
Number Percentage 
1958 1970 1958 1970 
Sex 
Men 1582 921 36.0 35.82 569 508 60.6 54.54 
Women 243 218 42.3 40.90 103 91 59.7 42.10 
Tenure 
Owner-operator 559 253 35.6 33.80 202 157 64.1 61.73 
Part-owner 262 136 29.0 31.64 79 78 63.9 56.74, 
Operator landlord 103 169 44.7 42.50** 50 92 60.6 52.26, 
Nonoperator landlord 785 530 29.9 41.32 236 245 58.4 45.32 
Occupation 
Farmer 817 485 35.3 36.28 287 296 63.2 60.69 
Retired farmer 255 182 44.9 38.61 112 111 67.1 59.34. 
Housewife 109 136 45.1 41.28 46 52 61.0 39.301 
Business or professional 306 180 35.4 37.51 105 77 49.4 40.61. 
Laborer 114 136 30.8 32.32 34 53 48.9 38.47 
All owners 1825 1119 36.8 36.79 672 589 60.4 52.26 
^Data on 1958 is in (89, p. 92). 
Table 40. Comparison of percentage of owners compared to total farmland owners who used inheri­
tances other than land for acquiring land ownership (Iowa, 1946, 1958 and 1970)* 
Number reporting 
Classification 1946 1958 1970 
Percentage of owners compared to total 
farmland owners who used their nonland 
Inheritances for acquiring land ownership 
1946 1958 1970 
Sex 
Men 837 1582 912 20.8 21.8 19.54** 
Women 131 243 218 26.7 25.3 17.22** 
Tenure 
Owner-operator 364 559 253 14.8 22.8 20.86 
Part-owner operator 108 262 136 19.4 18.5 17.96* 
Operator landlord 120 103 169 35.8 27.1 22.21** 
Nonoperator landlord 376 785 530 24.2 23.3 18.73 
Occupation 
Farmer 629 817 485 19.4 22.3 22.02 
Retired farmer 155 255 182 23.9 29.4 22-91** 
Housewife 39 109 136 23.1 27.5 16.23 
Business or professional 87 306 180 24.1 17.5 15.23 
Laborers and others 58 114 136 15.5 15.0 12.43 
All owners 968 1825 1119 21.7 22.2 19.22* 
*Dat8 on 1946 and 1958 from (89, p. 74). 
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often than men. This observation is supported by the finding that women 
use their inheritance less often than men for land ownership or utiliza­
tion purposes. 
The distribution of received inheritance other than land between 
tenure and occupation groups have not altered between the two studies, 
except nonoperator landlords have received this assistance very signifi­
cantly more often than in 1958 but used it less often for land purposes. 
A similar observation is true for the operator landlords, though in a 
diminished magnitude. 
Within the occupation groups, the number of people receiving assis­
tance other than land have not altered between 1958 and 1970, However, 
among occupations a very significant difference of utilization of inher­
ited capital is observed. Nonfarmers have increasingly utilized it for 
nonland purposes, as opposed to farmers. The evidence gathered in Table 
39 rejects the diagnostic hypothesis 4.a.4. 
Observing the long-run changes since 1946 of nonland inheritance 
used for acquiring land ownership in Table 40, it is seen that there is 
an overall decline in the percentage of tenures, as well as occupations, 
who have used their nonland inheritances for land purposes. This decline 
is particularly significant for the landlords and housewives. These 
findings can be taken as one evidence that alternative investment oppor­
tunities in nonagricultural sectors have been attractive for most non-
operator or nonland inheritors and their gifts have been used to a lesser 
extent than in the past in investing in farmlands. Thus this form of 
family assistance has been contributing less to a rise in farmland prices. 
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The value of nonland inheritance, as well as its distribution 
between tenure groups, is important if it is to assist in acquisition of 
farmland. Table 41 presents the distribution of nonland inheritance 
between the tenure groups for 1970. 
It can be observed that for all tenure groups almost 45 percent of 
the inheritors received $7,000 or more. In terns of a down payment for 
acquiring farmlands and beginning farming, the total value of nonland 
inheritances is certainly impressive. However, with respect to the dis­
tribution of this inheritance within tenure groups, nonoperator landlords 
have significantly received more than $11,000, compared to owner-operators 
(26.7 percent for the former and 17.3 percent for the latter). Part-
owner-operators and operator-landlords indicate 25.2 percent and 22.6 
percent, respectively. 
The evidence with respect to these findings indicates that families 
have used inheritances other than land more often as an intra-family 
transfer method. The nonoperator survivors have received the nonland 
inheritance and the operating members of the family remaining in agri­
culture inherited the land. These conclusions reject the diagnostic 
hypothesis 4.a.5, which states that operators, as opposed to landlords, 
receive a higher value of nonland inheritance. 
Acquisition Methods of Institutional Owners 
Farmland resources increasingly owned by institutions (such as 
schools, churches, city, state and federal governments or corporations) 
necessarily widen the problematic gap for the individual pursuing his 
Table 41. Percentage distribution of value of inheritance other than land by tenure groups 
(Iowa, 1970) 
Percentage distribution of value 
between tenure groups 
Total value of nonland Number All tenures Owner Part-owner Operator Nonoperator 
inheritance (dollars) reporting (percent) operators operators landlords landlords 
< $500 10 2.46 5.31 - - 1.80 
$500- 1,999 46 10.50 10.46 4.43 19.95 10.08 
$2,000- 3,999 81 19.15 23.49 13.23 12.46 20.21 
$4,000- 6,999 104 23.32 22.57 22.25 26.49 23.43 
$7,000-10,999 101 21.82 20.83 34.89 18.55 17.71 
$11,000-15,999 41 8.65 4.59 10.69 12.31 10.22 
$16,000-21,999 36 7.23 8.24 8.08 5.68 6.43 
$22,000-29,999 15 2.76 2.78 0.85 4,72 
> $30,000 25 4.11 1.73 6.42 3.72 5.39 
Number reporting 459 100.00 136 69 73 181 
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owner-operatorship goal. This individual will have to compete for scarce 
farmland resources against a better organized and financed group of 
would-be farmland owners. Unequal competition may be further aggravated 
if the institutional owners have been increasingly receiving farmlands in 
the form of gifts and inheritances. 
Table 42 presents the acquisition methods of institutional land 
owners in the years 1958 and 1970. As can be observed from the table, 
important changes seem to have occurred between two time periods. There 
is a considerable increase in the number of institutional owners who 
have acquired their land by purchase as opposed to inheritance in 1958. 
Generally acquisition by a combination of methods has not changed in 
total, but the composition of this subgroup seems to have changed in 
favor of a combination of purchase methods. Significance tests are not 
performed since the number of respondents in 1958 were less than 100. 
Purchase Methods of Acquiring Farmlands 
Acquiring farmlands through purchase methods can be basically in 
four categories: (1) outright cash payment, (2) purchase contract, 
(3) mortgage, and (4) some combination of the second and third categories. 
It has already been stated that outright cash payment in financing 
farmland acquisition necessitates long periods of tenancy or nonfarm 
jobs. Furthermore, the optimal operating size of farms has been such as 
to preclude practically all beginning farmers from financing their acqui­
sition by their own accumulation of savings. As a result, farmland 
acquisitions have been increasingly financed by purchase contract. 
Table 42. Comparison of acquisition methods of institutional farm land-owners (Iowa, 1958-1970) 
Acquisition methods of institutional owners 
1958* 1970^ 
Percentage Percentage 
Number distribution Number distribution 
Method of acquisition reporting number owned acres reporting number owned acres 
Purchase 
Gift 
Inheritance 
Other 
Combination with gift 
and inheritance 
Combination with purchase 
and gift 
Combination with purchase 
and inheritance 
Combination of purchase, 
gift and inheritance 
All methods of acquisition 
37 43.53 49.74 
3 3.53 2.49 
33 38.82 23.87 
1 1.18 2.25 
0 0 0 
3 3.53 3.84 
6 7.06 13.34 
2 2.36 4.46 
85 100.00 100.00 
79 77.81 70.06 
5 3.92 12.45 
10 7.28 8.92 
2 1.96 1.34 
9 4.35 8.45 
7 3.32 6.18 
2 1.36 2.60 
114 100.00 100.00 
^Data on 1958 have been furnished from source material of (90). 
^157 institutional owners have reported their ownership as an estate but have not indicated 
their methods of acquisition, which therefore makes 1970 estimates not directly comparable with 
that of the 1958 study. 
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mortgage or some combination of both. The next sections of this chapter 
briefly discuss the advantages and disadvantages of these methods and 
proceeds to identify the changes that have been taking place with respect 
to the use of purchase methods. 
Acquisition by purchase contracts and mortgage^^ 
Purchase contract (or installment land contract) is an agreement 
reached by the buyer and the seller to transfer ownership of land. In 
this agreement, the buyer agrees to pay a certain down payment and 
promises to pay the rest of the purchase price in installments over a 
period of time. Usually the seller promises to transfer possession and 
use of the land at the time the contract is made, but retains legal 
title until the last installment has been completed. 
Land contracts differ from mortgages in two main aspects; 
(1) Land contracts require lower down payments—about one-fifth 
to one-fourth of the purchase price compared to two-fifths 
or over for mortgages. 
(2) In case of default, installment land contracts may be forfeited 
summarily upon a thirty-day notice of default (53). For mort­
gages there is the requirement that all mortgages be foreclosed 
by a statutory special execution sale from which a one-year 
period of redemption is provided (52). 
The greater difficulty involved in foreclosing a mortgage makes the 
lenders unwilling to make a mortgage loan unless the down payment is high. 
^^For a more detailed study of purchase contracts, see (44). 
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On the other hand, the association of a low down payment and the for­
feiture provision provide a unique legal-economic character to the 
installment contract. 
A low down payment may be an advantage for both buyer and seller. 
To the former, low-equity financing provides a means to own land without 
seriously depleting his operating capital. To the latter, a low rather 
that a high down payment provides an income tax advantage by spreading 
this taxable gain over a number of years. Because the interests of both 
parties are not in conflict, land contracts seem to be favored more than 
mortgages. 
Another advantage of the land contract is the security it provides 
for both parties. To the buyer, it provides security of possession at 
an early age. Because of this security, the buyer has more freedom to 
improve the land. To the seller, it provides relatively rapid and inex­
pensive settlement of his claim in case the buyer defaults. Another 
advantage to the seller would be to consider the installment payments as 
a convenient "annuity program" to retire on. 
The disadvantages of land contract for the buyer occur because of 
default. He has less time (30 days) after a default to make up his pay­
ments than with a mortgage. He may lose his equity in the farm (along 
with his expenses on improvements) if the seller regains possession 
through forfeiture. The land contract buyer is without the protection 
of the mortgage laws for his equity in the farm. 
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The disadvantage of the land contract for the seller is the high 
burden of the risk involved. Although the seller may repossess the farm 
in case of default, there still is some risk of loss to the seller due to 
cost of foreclosure and deterioration of the property. Another point in 
this connection is the seller's difficulty of getting his money out of 
the farm in case of unexpected need. 
One other point with respect to land contracts is related to the 
fluctuations in general economic conditions over time. Depending upon the 
economic conditions (inflationary or recessionary) following the contract 
agreement, the buyer or the seller, or both, may be worse off. Thus, 
depending on the general state of the economy as well as the trend of 
agricultural prices and land values over a long period of time, it may 
make the use of land contracts disadvantageous for the buyers and the 
sellers. 
Combinations of purchase methods 
Although used to a lesser extent, a combination of purchase contract 
and mortgage arrangement is possible. This combination arrangement is 
possible by including a provision permitting the conversion of the pur­
chase contract into a deed-and-mortgage arrangement. Essentially the con­
version takes place when the buyer's interest reaches a previously agreed 
level. The seller then delivers the deed to the buyer and accepts a mort­
gage to secure the unpaid balance. This combined method of purchase con­
tract and mortgage agreement is beneficial to both parties concerned. 
The advantages of such a combination for the buyer may be summarized 
in three points; (1) the removal of the forfeiture clause, (2) more 
177 
favorable financial terms if installment payments were spread over a short 
period of time in the contract, and (3) the improvement in his credit 
rating—especially to obtain production credit to operate the farm. 
The advantages accruing to the seller can also be grouped into three 
points if it calls for (1) a higher rate of interest, (2) rescheduling of 
repayment of principal according to his changed needs, and (3) the possi­
bility of a discount market for mortgage but nonexistence of such a market 
for the purchase contract due to its original high risk. 
While there are definite advantages to both parties in a combination 
of purchase contract and mortgage arrangement, the low incidence of use in 
Iowa is surprising. This is explained to be due to the "unfamiliarity and 
inexperience with such provisions and lack of knowledge of their economic 
value" (44, p. 71). In future research, these combined arrangements of 
finance methods should be studied in detail and their shortcomings, if 
any, should be identified. Another contribution of these studies would be 
to enlighten the would-be beginning farmers to this specific purchase 
me thod. 
Purchase Methods of Iowa Farmland Owners 
Diagnostic hypothesis 4.b.l states that the use of purchase contracts 
is increasing for all owners as a means of acquiring farmlands. Testing 
it in Table 43, it can be observed that there has been a very significant 
decline in the number of farmland owners free of debt. The other two 
very significant changes since 1958 have been between the increasing 
utilization of purchase contracts as opposed to the use of mortgage-for-
deed. However, the former cannot be tested statistically since the 
Table 43. Percentage distribution of purchase methods of all owners within areas (Iowa, 1958® 
1970; economic areas, 1970) 
Percentage distribution of purchase 
1958 1970 methods by areas in 1970 
Method of — 
purchase Number Percent Number Percent 
Free of debt 1025 63.6 1410 56.25 52.48 57.09 49.90 55.94 60.35 53.42 58.41 
Purchase 
contract 88 5.8 414 16.96 16.69 15.93 17.12 13.11 14.24 20.69 19.05 
Mortgate 491 30.0 620 24.38** 27.62 25.71 29.07 28.84 23.95 22.66 20.10 
Mortgage and 
purchase 
contract 10 0.6 50 1.73 2.12 0.82 3.01 1.69 1,06 2.47 1.61 
Other 
unspecified 
methods --- --- 25 0.68 1.09 0.44 0.90 0.42 0.40 0.76 0.83 
Number 
reporting 1614 100.0 2519 100.00 299 277 163 378 334 463 605 
*Data on 1958 compiled from (89, pp. 82-84). 
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observations for 1958 were less than 100. 
These above-mentioned changes have occurred in all economic areas, 
as can be seen in Table 43. There are variations between the percentage 
of farmland owners with respect to the purchase method employed among 
areas. However, in no area is this significant change of increasing use 
of purchase contracts, as opposed to mortgage-for-deed, reversed. There­
fore the diagnostic hypothesis 4.b.l cannot be rejected. 
It is hypothesized, as in 4.b.2, that part-owner operators, as 
opposed to other tenure groups, would make increasing use of purchase 
contracts and mortgage-for-deed. Table 44 contrasts the purchase methods 
of tenure groups in 1958 and 1970. 
It can be observed from Table 44 that there have been some shifts 
between landlords as far as land held free of debt is concerned. Although 
nonoperator landlords are still the majority users of this method, they 
have lost a significant share to operator-landlords. The other two tenure 
groups have also lost their shares of free-of-debt ownership, but this 
decline is not statistically significant at the tested levels. 
There are definite indications to support the diagnostic hypothesis 
4.b.2, in that the use of purchase contracts as well as mortgage methods 
have increased for the part-owner-operators. However, the former cannot 
be tested statistically, as has already been pointed out while discussing 
Table 43, and the latter is very close to a significant difference at the 
90 percent significance level. An equally interesting finding is the 
similarly significant increase in both methods for the operator landlords. 
Owner-operators and nonoperator-landlords, however, indicate 
Table 44. Percentage distribution of purchase methods of owners by tenure groups (Iowa, 1958-
1970)® 
Method of 
purchase 
Number 
reporting 
Percentage distribution of purchase methods by tenure groups 
Owner Part-owner 
operators operators 
Operator 
land lords 
Nonoperator 
land lords 
1958 1970 1958 1970 1958 1970 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Free of debt 1025 1410 
** * 
27.5 26.77 10.9 9.50 5.4 11.28 56.2 52.44 
Purchase 
contract 88 414 58.9 43.60 26.4 35.31 2.1 11.14 12.6 9.95 
Mortgage 491 620 39.8 34.44 22.4 25.80 6.5 13.10 31.3 26.66 
Mortgage and 
purchase 
contract 10 50 17.4 35.77 29.2 46.13 15.3 12.47 38.1 5.64 
Other 
unspecified 
methods 25 32.17 30.00 19.85 17.99 
*Data on 1958 in (89, p. 82). 
^Close to 90 percent significant difference. 
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significant declines in the use of purchase contracts and mortgage-for-
deed since 1958. These above findings support the above stated diagnostic 
hypothesis. It also validates the grouping of operator tenures into one 
class and contrasting them against a nonoperator class as has already been 
applied in the third chapter. 
How significant the difference is between the purchase methods of 
occupation groups is presented in Table 45. This table is also used to 
test the first part of the diagnostic hypothesis 4.b.3 which states that 
farmers, more than nonfarmers, young owners, as opposed to older owners, 
are utilizing purchase contracts. The second part of this hypothesis is 
tested in Table 46. 
It can be observed in Table 45 that almost 56 percent of all farm­
land owners held their ownership titles free of debt, but the distribution 
of lands held free of debt between occupation groups has been very sur­
prising. The common belief and expectation was to find retired farmers 
and housewives in the free-of-debt category. The returns, on the con­
trary, revealed that fanners very significantly dominated this method as 
opposed to all other occupation groups. 
The first part of the above-stated diagnostic hypothesis is 
supported, however, at the 95 percent confidence level. It can be 
observed in Table 45 that fanners, as opposed to all other occupation 
groups combined, utilized both purchase contracts and deed-for-mortgage 
more often. 
The age distribution of the purchase methods of owners is presented 
in Table 46 and the second part of diagnostic hypothesis 4.b.3 is tested. 
Table 45. Percentage distribution of purchase methods of owners by occupation groups (Iowa, 1970) 
Method of 
purchase 
All owners 
Number 
reporting Percent Farmers 
Percentage distribution of purchase 
methods by occupation groups 
Retired 
farmers Housewives 
Business and 
professional 
Laborers 
and others 
Free of debt 
Purchase 
contract 
Mortgage 
Mortgage and 
purchase 
contract 
Other 
unspecified 
methods 
1370 
407 
612 
50 
25 
55.85 
17.08 
24.61 
1.77 
0.70 
37.21 
** 
67.49 
** 
60.00 
77.64 
83.56 
** 
21.78 
3.22 
11.30 
3.79 
8.89 
13.77 
1.35 
2.57 
14.35 
14.65 
11.16  
14.07 
5.40 
12.90 
13.29 
15.02 
4.50 
2.15 
Table 46. Percentage distribution of purchase methods of owners by age groups (Iowa, 1970) 
Percentage distribution of purchase 
Method of Number Percent o£ methods within ape firoups 
purchase reporting methods < 24 25-34 35-44 45-54 > 55 
Free of debt 1390 
Purchase contract  410 
Mortgage 613 
Mortgage and purchase 
contract 50 
Other unspecified 
methods 24 
All respondents 2487 
56.11 -- 0.74 
17.02 1.38 17.83 
24.45 0.60 4.50** 
1.75 -- 14.01 
0.67 
100.00 0.38 4.79 
4.21 15.66 79.39 
31.27 29.49 20.02 
** ** 
17.78 31.77 45.34 
40.62 28.51 16.85 
25.98 52.92 21.10 
12.92 22.43 59.47 
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As can be expected, the great majority of free-of-debt owners are over 
55 years old; however, the utilization of purchase contracts and mortgage-
for-deed is surprisingly high for this age group. Contrasting purchase 
contracts with mortgage-for-deed, it is observed that young farmland 
owners (25 to 44 years old) have very significantly utilized the former 
method more often than the latter. The two methods are used in about 
equal frequency for the 45 to 54 age group and reverse very significantly 
at the next oldest age group. These findings support the second half of 
the diagnostic hypothesis 4.b.3 which states that young owners, as opposed 
to older owners, are utilizing purchase contracts. 
Earlier tables have indicated that close to one-half of the farmland 
owners have debts outstanding with respect to acquisition of farmlands. 
The total value of debt outstanding in achieving farmland ownership, as 
well as its distribution within tenure groups, is presented in Table 47. 
The diagnostic hypothesis 4.b.4 which states that the larger amounts of 
value of the outstanding debt is on the operator class of owners is tested 
within the findings of this table. 
It can be observed in Table 47 that close to 31 percent of all 
owners have an outstanding debt of $30,000 or more. In each tenure group, 
however, this rate varies from the least of 24 percent for the nonoperator 
landlords to the most of 41 percent for the part-owner-operators. The 
other two groups average about 30 percent of the owners reporting this 
much debt. There is evidence to support the above-cited hypothesis, since 
all operator tenures have larger percentages of people reporting a larger 
value of the outstanding debt, as opposed to nonoperator landlords. This 
Table 47. Percentage distribution of value of outstanding debt of owned land by tenure groups 
(Iowa, 1970) 
Percentage distribution of value 
Total value of All tenures of outstanding debt by tenure groups 
outstanding debt Number Owner Part-owner Operator Nonoperator 
(dollars) reporting Percent operators Operators landlords landlords 
<$500 4 0.36 0.33 — 0.72 0.61 
$500- 1,999 14 1.45 2.12 1.21 1.19 0.89 
$2,000- 3,999 71 6.54 6.73 3.85 9.62 7.72 
$4,000- 6,999 111 10.30 9.43 7.54 12.14 13.68 
$7,000-10,999 129 11.89 11.08 10.15 15.86 12.98 
$11,000-15,999 119 10.73 12.21 9.66 8.11 11.11 
$16,000-21,999 174 15.26 16.84 12.74 12.38 17.25 
$22,000-29,999 139 12.47 13.04 13.47 10.14 11.72 
$30,000-49,999 203 16.96 15.01 24.05 14.64 13.02 
$50,000-99,999 144 11.74 10.92 16.11 11.02 8.43 
> $100,000 35 2.30 2.28 1.22 4.18 2.60 
All owners with I outstanding debt 1143 jlOO.OO 35.28 27.54 12.32 24.86 
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finding has not been tested statistically, however, since the number of 
observations in outstanding debt classes were too few to make any statis­
tical comparison reliable. 
- Diagnostic hypothesis 4.b.5 which states that farmland of institu­
tional owners compared to individual owners is increasingly being held 
free of debt is tested with the findings of Table 48. In this table, 
purchase methods of institutional owners in 1970 is compared to the find­
ings of the 1958 data. 
The result of the breakdown of purchase methods of institutional 
owners reveals that free-of-debt owners have very significantly declined 
in number, as well as in the amount of acreage held in 1970. Within these 
groups of farmland owners, the most significant increases seem to have 
been in the increased use of purchase contracts. However, the breakdown 
of the number of reporters according to purchase methods provide far too 
few observations to test the significance of these findings. On the 
basis of the fewer free-of-debt institutional owners in 1970, as opposed 
to 1958, the diagnostic hypothesis is rejected. However, it is still true 
that a greater percentage of owned acres are held free of debt for insti­
tutional, as opposed to individual, owners. 
Table 48. Comparison of purchase methods of institutional farmland owners (Iowa, 1958-1970) 
Institutional land ownership 
1958 1970 
Number Percentage distribution Number Percentage distribution 
Method of purchase reporting Number Acreage reporting Number Acreage 
Free of debt 114 
Mortgage 11 
Purchase contract 1 
Mortgage and purchase 
contract 1 
Part purchase contract 
and partly paid for 
Part mortgage and 
partly paid for 
Purchase contract, 
mortgage and partly 
paid for 
Total 127 
87.76 
8 . 6 6  
0.79 
0.79 
94.17 
4.86 
0.86 
0 . 1 1  
100.00 100.00 
192 
22 
11 
3 
10 
16 
7 
265 
76.78 
9.27 
4.69 
1.05 
2.98 
4.48 
0.75 
100.00 
** 
65.78 
11.27 
6.14 
1.43 
4.18 
6 .18  
5.02 
100.00 
** 
*Data on 1958 have been furnished from source material of (90). 
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TRANSFER OF FARMLAND WITHIN GENERATIONS 
Family assistance in acquiring ownership of farmland resources is 
becoming increasingly more important in Iowa, as has already been pointed 
in the seventh chapter. The most important way this assistance takes 
shape is the intra-family farm transfer. However, serious problems con­
front the farm family when there are conflicting objectives and continuity 
of rights in farm property. 
Most farm families would like to keep their farm within the family 
and help their children who want to farm get started at an early age. 
However, most Iowa farm families have only one farm but two or more child­
ren. How all the children can be treated fairly without breaking up the 
farm or the heir remaining on the farm with a heavy mortgage (assumed to 
pay his brothers and sisters) is the dilemma the farm parents will have to 
face sometime. To resolve the problem of transferring the farmland within 
generations, it is important to specify the objectives to be achieved and 
consider all the alternative means in reaching these objectives. 
Intra-family Transfer Objectives 
Obviously, each farm family may have certain specific objectives in 
mind when planning for transfer of farm property and it is difficult to 
generalize for the individual case. However, intra-family farmland trans­
fer objectives may be generalized into nine categories of which one or 
more may be appropriate for the individual case. These nine categories 
(68, p. 8) are: 
(}) To provide sufficient income for the parents during the rest 
189 
of their lives; 
(2) To treat all children fairly; 
(3) To help one or more of the children start farming; 
(4) To keep the farm within the family; 
(5) To maintain continuity in farming operations between generations 
without dispersing the herds, flocks, land, and improvements 
built up over a lifetime; 
(6) To reward certain children for special favors or contributions 
to parents * welfare or for improvement of the farm; 
(7) To indicate to prospective heirs what to expect relatively early 
in life so they can plan their lives accordingly; 
(8) To minimize estate settlement costs; and 
(9) To minimize all taxes to the family, including gift, inheri­
tance, estate, and income taxes. 
In any particular case, these objectives may lead to conflicts and an 
acceptable resolution of all ends to all the parties concerned may depend 
on the trade-offs between the objectives. Suppose a specific farm family 
has objectives 2 through 5 in mind when they leave their farm to one of 
their four children. It may be that the son who chooses to remain in 
agriculture must mortgage the farm to pay off equal shares to his three 
brothers and sisters. If this results in excessive debts beyond the 
ability of the heir in agriculture to amortize, the family farm may be 
lost, thus not achieving objective 4. 
When farm families have no specific objectives in mind and when no 
plans are made for eventual transfer of farmland property, expensive and 
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extended estate settlements as well as excessive taxes may result. The 
farm may have to be divided into uneconomic units or the going concern 
value of the farm may disintegrate through a dispersal sale required to 
settle the estate (68, p. 4). The importance of planning in farm trans­
ference between generations is emphasized by the above example. The most 
appropriate means to achieve the objectives of transferring the family 
farm is not within the limits of this study and will not be pursued any 
further. Rather our concern is to identify various methods of intra-
family transfers and to see if the use of wills, transfer plans, and 
family assistance has been increasing in Iowa compared to the last 
decades. 
Transfer arrangements 
There are essentially three kinds of transfer arrangements: (1) 
inter-vivos transfer--transferring property prior to the death of the 
owner, (2) transferring ownership by will to be implemented at the death 
of the owner, and (3) transferring property according to laws of descent. 
Farmland owners who are not indifferent to the disposition of their 
ownership rights will have to choose a plan based on the first or the 
second alternative above. When a farm owner dies without leaving a 
specific plan or will behind, his property is distributed among his 
spouse and heirs-at-Iaw according to a fixed plan based on the state 
statutes (68, p. 16). Naturally, this form of a transfer arrangement, 
i.e., according to laws of descent, is the least desirable one if the 
owner has specific objectives in mind. Furthermore, the property may 
pass on to distant relatives and even if not, involves costly settlement 
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arrangements or inconveniences. 
Contrary to the third, under first and second alternatives, the owner 
can plan his transfer of ownership rights and maximize his objectives 
outlined in the previous section. To this end. inter-vivos transfer has 
great advantages over the use of a will. This is especially true when the 
next generation can get the resources sufficiently early in their lives 
so as to enable them to combine the talent of the older generation 
together with their own knowledge to develop the farm resources effi­
ciently. The possible disadvantage of such a transfer plan arises from 
the older generation's viewpoint. Aside from the moral of psychological 
factors (such as, the belief that a person should acquire ownership by 
his own toil and "hard work" or reluctance to part with things acquired), 
there is a strong economical disincentive consideration. In most cases, 
the family farm represents not only the source of present living expendi­
tures but also the accumulation of savings stored up for use in the future, 
i.e., the income of the farm parents until their death. If the older 
generation "depends on this resource for their future income, their reluc­
tance toward transferring the property to the next generation prior to 
death is understandable. 
Extension of Social Security payments to farmers may have the effect 
of facilitating inter-vivos transfers since the economic disincentive 
factor is eliminated to a great extent. This point will be analyzed 
further in the next sections. 
A will is another form of planned transfer of property to the next 
generation. A will is made for the purpose of disposing the owner's 
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property at death according to his wishes. The law is quite free of 
restrictions on an owner's right to dispose of his property by will. A 
few restrictions exist, the major limitation being the prevention of a 
surviving spouse of a share of property. In other words, the surviving 
spouse is entitled to a share no less than the laws of descent would have 
provided (68, p. 19). Otherwise he or she may reject the will and get 
the share according to law. Whether the use of wills as a transfer plan 
has been increasing in Iowa is another point that will be dealt with in 
the next sections. 
Differences in farm organization on intra-family transfer methods 
Transfer methods discussed in this section can be used during life, 
or by will at death, or a combination beginning during lifetime but 
completed only after death. The objective in all cases is transferring 
land as a unit within the family to one or more heirs while at the same 
time providing enough income (or inheritance) for other persons involved. 
Some of the most important intra-family transfer methods (68, p. 23) 
are; (1) sale of property, (2) sale and gift combined, (3) life estate, 
(4) joint tenancy, (5) tenancy-in-common, (6) private annuities, (7) com­
mercial annuities, (8) life insurance, (9) trusts, (10) partnerships, 
and (11) corporations. 
As can be observed, the list of tools of intra-family transfer 
methods is extensive and can also include lease with an option to buy. 
Each of the methods provided above may have definite advantages over the 
others, depending on the particular situation. However, as far as the 
form of organization is concerned, all except the last two methods are 
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concerned with sole proprietorship. Joint tenancy and tenancy-in-common 
are joint ownership forms, close to partnership arrangement. In fact the 
latter could be combined with a father-son partnership form. 
The first two methods—sale of property and sale and gift combined— 
are the simplest ways of transferring ownership. If the heir has accumu­
lated savings, he can provide the full payment and the parents together 
with other heirs can get their share at once. In most cases, however, 
other sale arrangements could be worked out with payments spread over 
time at low or no interest. This transaction could be effected by a 
purchase contract or a deed and mortgage. The second method is essen­
tially the same except a portion of the property is given as a gift. 
Life estate is the third method whereby the son is assured to receive 
the farm at the death of his parents while the latter reserve a life 
estate or life use. Accordingly, while the son actually owns an interest 
in the land, the right to use it belongs to his parents in their lifetime. 
However, life estate will have to be combined with other methods in order 
to provide for other heirs. 
Joint tenancy and tenancy-in-common are forms of joint ownership 
whereby several persons can own the same farm in undivided shares. The 
important distinction between these two methods is that in the former, 
the surviving owner has a right to the whole farm since equal shares of 
all other owners pass to him at death, whereas no such right exists for 
tenancy-in-common. In this last method, each share is owned outright and 
passes to the heirs of the owner and not to other shareholders. The 
danger of using these two methods as a transfer plan may arise due to the 
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right of each joint tenant or tenants-in-common to break up the arrange­
ment and insist on his physical share of the land. This aspect may create 
an uncertainty on the farming heir which may result in disincentives for 
him to invest and improve the farm. 
Private and commercial annuities are two other methods of trans­
ferring the farm into the next generation and providing an income for the 
parents. In the first method, the parents may transfer the farm to their 
son in return for a promise to pay an annual sum for their life. Or a 
flexible arrangement could be worked out where the son may pay according 
to the yearly income of the farm. The parents can retain the right of 
foreclosure if the payments are not paid, thus providing them the neces­
sary security. A commercial annuity differs from a private one in that 
it is purchased from an insurance company by the heir who pays the costs. 
In return the insurance company assumes the obligation of regular monthly 
or annual payments to the parents named in the contract. Life insurance 
is another method which can be used in family plans to settle claims. The 
objective here is to prevent sale or mortgage of the farm due to the 
owner's death. The son then may insure his father's life and collect the 
insurance at the latter's death in order to provide the purchase money for 
buying the farm and settling all other claims. 
A trust is another useful method to handle the transfer problems of 
the farm to the next generation. "A trust is an arrangement whereby the 
management, control, and legal title to property is placed in one person, 
the trustee, who manages or operates the property for the benefit of other 
persons, the beneficiaries" (68, p. 29). In many respects, this form of 
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transfer has a lot of advantages when there are several heirs (especially 
minors) involved. Thus the operations of the farm as a going concern 
might not be hampered whereas the shares of all heirs are protected. 
However, the liability and responsibility of a trustee should be clearly 
and effectively determined prior to the formation of a trust. Otherwise, 
costly legal problems may result. 
Partnership in agriculture can also be effectively used as a tool of 
intra-family transfer arrangement. Operating partnership between father 
and son can be extended whereby the son is permitted to buy the father's 
interest over the years. The father may sell his shares to the son until 
the Tn-rm'Trnmi point is reached consistent with the income he expects out of 
this partnership. The son can purchase the father's interest at death 
and agree to pay his mother and other persons who would inherit the 
father's interest. 0'Byrne e_t al. argue that: 
Properly planned, the farm partnership with a buy and sell 
agreement is an effective and flexible device that can be adjusted 
to suit the needs of the family and particularly to provide some 
inheritance for the nonfarming members of the family without 
dividing the land itself (68, p. 31). 
Corporations in agriculture have great advantages as far as a tool of 
intra-family farm transfer plans are concerned. The obvious advantage 
is that it converts the physical resource shares of the diverse owners to 
readily transferrable certificates without disturbing the functional unit 
of the farm. A father may incorporate his farm and in return be hired as 
a manager by the corporation which issued all shares of stock to him. His 
son can also be hired by the corporation and his interest in the farm can 
be increased as he purchases his father's share of stock of the 
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corporation. The remaining share of the father could be left to other 
members of the family at his death with options for the son to buy. 
Thus, like the partnership arrangement, efficient operation of the farm 
is assured while all other members of the family are protected for their 
share without destroying the unity of the farm. Besides their limited 
liability provisions which were discussed earlier, farm corporations have 
definite advantages in intra-family transfers. These two points, together 
with tax advantages, are making them increasingly interesting to Iowa farm 
owners. 
Transfer Plans of Iowa Farmland Owners 
The objective of identifying intra-family transfer plans of Iowa 
farmland owners is delimited into two hypotheses: 5.a, which states that 
individual transfer plans are on the rise, and 5.b, which states that 
social security payments to farmers are encouraging receivers to retire 
earlier, providing opportunities for transfer of land ownership to the 
younger generation. The problematic gap with respect to the former 
delimited hypotheses is treated in this section below while the latter in 
the next section. 
Facilitating transfer arrangements 
While discussing the differences in farm organization on intra-family 
transfer methods, the possible use of operating partnership arrangements 
as one tool of inter-vivos transfer has already been mentioned. Is this 
form of an arrangement being used to facilitate intra-family farm trans­
fers? In other words, diagnostic hypothesis 5.a.l, which states that 
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landlords rent their lands to their immediate family members so as to 
acquaint them with farming and eventually help in transfer of farmland 
to the next generation, is tested. Table 49 presents the percentage of 
landlords reporting land rented to sons or sons-in-law. 
It can be observed in Table 49 that compared to 1958 there has been 
a very significant decline in the percentage of landlords who rent their 
lands to their sons or sons-in-law. Compared to 1946, however, the per­
centage of people renting to immediate family members has not changed 
appreciably. These findings are difficult to interpret. It is not 
apparent if differences between the 1958 and 1946-1970 results are due to 
sampling variations or to genuine economic considerations on the part of 
the landlords. The findings are therefore unreliable and a statistical 
test of significance should be used with discretion. Even then it is 
apparent that a fairly good percentage of landlords are using partnership 
operating arrangements as an initial tool of intra-family transfer 
arrangements. 
Diagnostic hypothesis 5.a.2 states that all owners are making greater 
use of individual transfer plans, both inter-vivos transfers and wills. 
The importance of planning for intra-family transfer arrangements has been 
touched upon in the first part of this chapter. In Table 50 the percent­
age of owners reporting transfer arrangements are presented. 
It can be observed in Table 50 that individual transfer plans in Iowa 
have gained increasing importance since 1946. The use of inter-vivos 
transfer arrangements, as well as wills, has increased. The change in 
the latter is highly significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
Table 69. Percentage of landlords reporting land rented to sons or sons-in-law (economic areas and 
Iowa, 1958-1970)8 
Number of 
landlords 
reporting 
Percentage of landlords renting to their sons or sons -in-law 
Economic 
areas and 
the state 
All 
landlords 
Nonoperator 
landlords 
Operator 
landlords 
1958 1970 1958 1970 1958 1970 1958 1970 
1 120 60 36.6 30.96 36.4 31.39 39.1 28.63 
2 86 39 27.7 22.08 27.8 25.07 27.3 13.85 
3 114 29 37.4 30.16 39.0 29.47 24.1 32.64 
4 115 87 31.2 34.07 29.6 34.14 46.1 33.74 
5 123 30 27.9 25.94 28.9 30.31 23.2 14.53 
6 81 58 35.4 26.36 35.8 28.66 30.4 19.60 
7 143 95 49.4 28.34 50.1 30.76 46.0 23.61 
Iowa 782 398 36,1 
** 
28.61 36.2 30.41* 35.2 22.65** 
Iowa, 1946 665 27.0 30.0 19.0 
*Data on 1946 and 1958 in (90, p. 35). 
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Table 50. Percentage of owners reporting inter-vivos transfers and plans 
for land transfers (Iowa, 1946, 1958 and 1970) 
Percentage of owners 
reporting ownership transfers 
Nxiinber reporting and plans for transfers 
Nature of transfer 1946 1958 1970 1946 1958 1970 
Inter-vivos transfer 961 1664 95 2.8 2.2 3.35 
Have made out wills 1093 1915 2086 31.3 58.3 
** 
70.81 
Have made other^ 
definite plans to 
transfer ownership 
__b 
725 122 
__b 
15.2 4.73 
^Not mutually exclusive categories for 1958. Data on 1946-1958 in 
(89, p. 88). 
Data on 1946 not available. 
The percentage of owners who have reported to have used inter-vivos 
transfers are quite small although it shows a slight increase over 1958. 
This percentage does not reflect the true situation, however, since only 
the landowners who had transferred some of their land already are 
included. Individuals who have transferred all of their lands are no 
longer farmland owners and therefore did not enter the sample. It is 
expected that the actual percentage of inter-vivos transfers is much 
larger than is shown in Table 50. 
It is seen that the great majority of Iowa farmland owners (almost 
80 percent) have some plan to transfer their rights of ownership to the 
younger generation. In light of this evidence, the diagnostic hypothesis 
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cannot be rejected. 
The existence of a will and the age of a farmland owner is positively 
correlated as can be expected. But it was hypothesized in 5.a.3 that 
younger owners prepare wills more frequently than in the past. The reason 
for this diagnostic hypothesis is the increasing awareness on the part of 
all owners to plan for an orderly transfer of the family farm in case of 
an unexpected event. 
The distribution of percentage of owners with wills in each age group 
is shown in Table 51. This distribution is surprisingly similar to the 
one obtained in 1958. The oldest group of owners (65 years old and older) 
are barely significant at the 90 percent confidence level from the same 
group of owners in 1958. Compared to 1946, however, this group of owners 
does not indicate significant change. The difference between 1958 and 
1970 for these owners can probably be attributed to sampling variation. 
The results of tests of significance of differences are negative and the 
diagnostic hypothesis is rejected. 
The occupations of farmland owners are expected to affect the trans­
fer plans. Since farmers, as opposed to nonfarmers, have a greater 
interest in their own lands, they should make greater use of transfer 
plans as stated in diagnostic hypothesis 5.a.4. The results of these 
findings did not support the above hypothesis, as can be observed in 
Table 52. 
Farmers as a class have very significantly less members who have 
prepared a will compared to business and professional men. In this 
respect, only laborers have very significantly less of their members who 
Table 51. Percentage of owners reporting wills within age groups (Iowa, 1946, 1958 and 1970)* 
Percent of owners with wills in age groups All ages 
Year reporting < 24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 > 65 Number percent 
State, 1946 340 1.0 10.0 22.0 26.0 41.0 1093 31.3 
State, 1958 1105 0.1 3.2 13.2 22.2 26.5 34.8 1120 58.3 
State, 1970 2846 - - 3.01 11.15 22.27 25.64 
* 
37.93 2894 71.16 
*Data on 1946 and 1958 in (89, p. 89). 
^Less than 0.05 percent reported. 
Table 52. Percentage distribution by occupation of farm owners and of owners reporting wills 
(Iowa, 1946, 1958 and 1970)* 
Percentage of owners reporting wills Percent of owners with 
° wills compared to their 
Occupation 1946 1958 1970 own occupation, 1970 
Farmers 41,6 
Retired farmers 28.1 
Housewives 5.1 
Business and professional 13.7 
Laborers and others 4.5 
Number reporting 313 
45.5 44.55 68.52 
19.1 16.83* 78.94 
7.0 11.02** 77.14 
** 
22.2 15.93 75.78 
"kic 
6.2 11.66 59.72 
991 2042 2042 
^Data on 1946 and 1958 in (89, p. 93). 
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have planned for transfer of lands. A high number of retired farmers and 
housewives, as can be expected, have planned for eventual transfer of 
their land. This high percentage of planning for these groups can be 
accounted for by their old age. 
Changes over time with respect to the percentage of owners with wills 
have indicated significant reallocations between occupation groups. The 
first three columns identify the increasing use of wills by housewives and 
laborers with declines in retired farmer and business groups. This obser­
vation is another manifestation of the changing ownership shares of each 
occupation group over time. 
Social security payments and transfer plans 
Older generations regard their family farm as their stored up wealth 
to be consumed throughout their remaining lifetime. In the earlier sec­
tions of this chapter this fact has been mentioned as the most important 
economic disincentive for inter-vivos transfers. A reliable and continu­
ous income throughout the remainder of a farmland owner's lifetime may 
just be the required factor to facilitate inter-vivos transfers. Social 
security payments can serve this purpose very suitably. Therefore, this 
last section delimits the problem with respect to social security payments 
and its effects on transfer plans, as stated in diagnostic hypothesis 
5.b. 
It is expected that the receipt of social security payments by 
farmers encourages retirement by age 65, which has been formulated as 
diagnostic hypothesis 5.b.l. The use of social security and its influence 
on retirements is presented in Tables 53 and 54. 
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Table 53. Percentage distribution of farmers 50 years or older according 
to social security and retirement status (Iowa, 1970) 
Have retired Have not retired 
Social security from farming from farming 
status Number Percent Number Percent 
Receive payments 139 28.99 348 71.11 
Do not receive 
payments 653 89.22 85 10.78 
The findings of Table 53 are very interesting. It is observed that 
farmers 50 years or older who receive social security payments have 
retired from farming (probably) very significantly higher than comparably 
aged farmers who do not receive payments and have not retired from farming 
yet. But looking at the data from a different perspective, it is seen 
that farmers who do not receive social security payments indicate retire­
ment from farming very significantly more than those who do receive pay­
ments I There is a contradiction in these findings which may be explained 
by arguing that while social security payments contribute to early inter-
vivos transfer between generations, other factors, such as farmer's 
health, philosophy of life and work ethic, may be more important in indi­
vidual circumstances. 
Farmer's use of social security payments by retirement age (Table 54) 
can also be utilized in testing the above diagnostic hypothesis 5.b.l. It 
can be observed from this table that fanners as a whole have started 
Table 54. Use of social security payments by retirement age of farmers (Iowa, 1958^-1970) 
Social security status (percent) 
Receive payments Do not receive payments 
Retirement age 1958 1970 1958 1970 
0-49 0.6 0.92 7.7 7.66 
50-54 0.3 1.84 20.2 10.93 
55-59 3.3 4.47 26.4 39.58 
60-64 11.6 23.82** 22.7 23.43 
65-69 52.4 49.54 13.7 10.68 
70-74 23.0 12.97** 4.8 5.73 
75-over 8.8 6.44 4.5 2.00 
Number reporting 120 321 173 72 
%ata on 1958 In (89, p. 97). 
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retiring at an earlier age in 1970, as compared to 1958. Hcwever, there 
is no indication that social security payments have caused an inducement 
for this fact. In fact the evidence is to the contrary; close to 70 per­
cent of the owners who receive social security payments retired 65 or 
older, as compared to only about 19 percent for the nonreceivers of social 
security. The diagnostic hypothesis tested is inconclusive on social 
security payments and its effect on retirement age, since the number of 
respondents were few to make a statistically safe argument. 
The direct effect of social security payments for all owners on the 
transfer of ownership to next generations is formulated as diagnostic 
hypothesis 5.b.2 and presented in Table 55. 
Table 55. Percentage of owners who have and have not transferred owner­
ship to their children by social security status (Iowa, 
1958-1970)a 
Social security 
status 
Have transferred 
ownership 
Number reporting (percent) 
Have not trans­
ferred ownership 
(percent) 
1958 1970 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Receive payments 187 456 5.8 7.70 94.2 92.30 
Do not receive 
payments 1148 1488 1.9 1.64 98.1 98.36 
^ata on 1958 data in (89, p. 99). 
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From the above table it can be observed that from 1958 to 1970 there 
has been an increase in the number of owners who receive social security 
payments and have transferred ownership of some of their lands. However, 
this increase is not statistically significant. This observation again 
neglects the number of owners who have transferred all their lands and 
therefore did not show up in the sample. The actual percentage of the 
transferred ownership figure should be higher, but by how much is not 
known. 
With respect to the diagnostic hypothesis, one cannot support or 
reject it since the evidence is not conclusive. Evidence, however, indi­
cates that there may be some positive relationship between social secur­
ity payments and farmland transfers. In depth research in this area is 
needed to identify the magnitude of this relationship. 
The last diagnostic hypotheses, 5.b.3, states that farmers receiving 
social security payments are adopting inter-vivos transfers more often 
than those who do not receive social security payments. This hypothesis 
is tested for 1970 and the findings are presented in Table 56. 
A cross classification of farmers reporting with respect to the 
nature of transfer and social security status has fallen below the 
statistically acceptable levels and therefore no test has been performed. 
However, indications are such that as far as inter-vivos transfers (or 
nature of transfers) alone are concerned, there exists no significant 
difference between receiving social security payments and not receiving. 
The data on this problem consists of a very small sample, as has been 
mentioned earlier already, and therefore no statistically conclusive 
results are to be expected or attempted. 
Table 56. Transfer plans of farmers 50 years or older according to their social security status 
(Iowa, 1970) 
Social security status 
Receive payments Do not receive payments 
Nature of transfer Number Percent Number Percent 
Inter vivos transfers 27 
Have made out wills 253 
Have made other plans 8 
Have made no plans 51 
Total reporting 339 
7.33 9 11.30 
74.34 57 68.63 
2.55 2 3.17 
15.78 14 16.90 
100.00 82 100.00 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The farmland ownership norm has remained an important goal of rural 
lowans. In order to test the degree of achievement of this norm, the 
problematic gap between the existing situation and the achievement norm 
has to be identified. Then the diagnostic hypotheses formulated have been 
tested to see if they have contributed to widening or narrowing this gap. 
The primary objective of the study was to evaluate the conflict 
between the pressures of rapid technological innovations which are leading 
to increased resource requirements and the ownership norm of the society. 
The investigation is conducted in two parts. The first part concentrated 
on the identification and measurement of factors influencing tenure of 
farmland owners. The second part concentrated on the determination and 
changing characteristics of the Iowa farmland owners. 
The whole state of Iowa was selected as the area of investigation. 
From ASCS records in each county, a statistically representative sample 
of farmland owners were drawn. These farmland owners were divided into 
individual or institutional owners, depending on the form in which the 
farmlands were held. If farmlands were owned by corporations, estates, 
city, town or federal governments or institutions, such as churches and 
schools, then they were mailed an institutional questionnaire. In all 
other cases they were mailed an individual questionnaire. Both sets of 
schedules returned were edited prior to assignment of statistical weights 
and tabulations. The results of the findings, according to various 
characteristics of farmland owners, are exhibited in the tables of the 
previous chapters. These findings are statistically tested for 
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significant differences at 95 and 90 percent confidence levels and, if so, 
are identified with two stars (**) and one star (*), respectively. 
In identifying the tenure patterns of farmland owners the technique 
of discriminant analysis was used. The reason for the use of this method 
was to distinguish between the four tenure groups optimally. These four 
tenure groups consisted of; (1) full-owner operators (FOO)—owners who 
operate only the land they own, (2) part-owner operators (POO)—owners 
who own and operate their lands but rent additional lands, (3) operating 
landlords (OL)—who operate part of their land and rent out the rest, and 
(4) nonoperating landlords (NOL)—who rent all the land they own and 
operate none. Identification of at least three distinct tenure classes 
was expected: (1) owners, (2) operators, and (3) nonoperators. The 
first to be formed by FOO, the second by POO and OL, and the third by 
NOL, since each expected class, if sufficiently homogenous, had to have an 
entirely different objective function that is maximized. The owner's 
objective function was expected to have consisted primarily of obtaining 
ownership of debt-free title to land, while this function was expected to 
be maximizing profits for the operators and maximizing rent income for the 
nonoperators. 
The findings did not confirm the expectations and the first three 
tenure groups, FOO, POO and OL, formed the operators class. This result 
casts doubt to the overriding importance of the norm of ownership, at 
least in the short run. Because characteristics of operatorship have been 
the strongest linking force between these tenure members, as opposed to 
ownership, the last tenure group, as expected, formed the nonoperator 
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tenure class. 
A discriminant analysis performed on operator and nonoperator classes 
of owners has successfully classified farmland owners into their declared 
tenures. The rate of successful classifications was 70 percent for the 
operators and 79 percent for the nonoperators. The misclassified owners 
were identified as "borderline owners" if they exhibited some of the 
characteristics of the opposite class, as opposed to their declared class, 
but still retained their class identity. However, there were still a 
minority of owners, less than 7 percent, who strongly indicated belonging 
to the opposite class instead of their declared class, and these owners 
have been identified as "response likely" owners. These are the owners 
who are expected to change tenure status within a foreseeable future. 
Thus the analysis has been extended to predicting the owners who are 
likely to change their tenure status, that is, predicting who will become 
operators or, conversely, nonoperators. 
The second part of the study concentrated on identification of the 
characteristics of Iowa farmland owners in 1970 and tested for signifi­
cant changes on these since 1946. Two previous studies (90 and 95) on 
Iowa farmland ownership have been utilized in reaching this objective. 
Changing characteristics of Iowa farmland owners are studied under the 
above mentioned four tenure groups, occupations, acquisition and transfer 
methods since 1946. Ownership concentration and farm size were treated in 
one separate chapter in order to identify the effects of increased pres­
sures of economic size adjustments on the farm ownership situation. 
Separate tables have been prepared to identify the changes in the 
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characteristics of the institutional farmland owners. 
The results of the second part of the study indicate that farmers 
are still the majority (50 percent) of Iowa farmland owners. Although 
the nonoperator landlords' share of the control of ownership of total 
farmland is more than any other tenure group (over 41 percent owned), it 
has declined significantly from the findings of 1958. A similar observa­
tion is true for the full-owner operators who indicate a decline in their 
ownership share, from 37.6 percent in 1946 to close to 30 percent. 
The compensating increases in the share of part-owner operators and oper­
ator landlords provide new evidence to the increasingly important goal of 
operatorship at or close to minimum cost acreages rather than ownership 
norm. 
The distribution of owned acres between farmland owners has become 
slightly more uneven for the state since 1958. This same observation is 
true for the distribution of the value of owned land between owners. 
However, the difference in the rate of change of concentration between 
economic areas since 1958 is very noticeable. The increases in ownership 
concentration are largest in grain areas (3 and 4) where it is around 23 
percent, as opposed to a minimal 2.5 percent, in pasture and dairy areas 
(5 and 6). Livestock areas have shown variability with a minimum increase 
in the ownership concentration of 1.5 percent in the Northwest (area 1) 
and a maximum increase of 14.3 percent in the Southwest (area 2) while 
the East (area 7) indicates a middle range of 8.5 percent. Even with the 
increasingly uneven distribution of owned land between the number of 
owners and the consequent increases in the concentration, Iowa still ranks 
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close to the least concentrated state as compared to the Great Plains 
states. 
Both the size of an economic farm and the consequent adjustments 
required by the owner seeking full-owner operatorship are increasing. In 
other words, ownership acres in all economic areas are significantly lower 
than the expected minimum cost acreages, and thus an owner is pressured 
into buying additional land resources if he wants to reach the norm of 
ownership and be economically competitive at the same time. As a result, 
part-owner operatorship is gaining increasing importance. These owners 
utilize their own lands and rent additional lands in order to reach an 
economically efficient farm size. This observation again supports the 
thesis of the first part of the study, namely that operatorship, rather 
than the ownership of land, has become the goal. 
The agricultural ladder concept was developed to explain the various 
stages of tenure an individual progresses through in becoming a farmland 
owner. It was decided to test if farmland owners were still utilizing 
the agricultural ladder or if new means leading to ownership had evolved. 
Evidence indicates that there has been a very significant drop in the 
percentage of all owners who used the agricultural ladder from 58.8 per­
cent in 1958 to 53.7 percent in 1970. The new methods leading to owner­
ship are indicated to be nonfarm occupation and then direct nonoperator 
landlordism. In other words, the increases in the percentage of people 
who indicate no agricultural experience and yet farmland ownership indi­
cate transfer of lands to nonfarm owners through inheritance or outright 
purchase by these owners. It is also interesting to note that part-owner 
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operators have very significantly indicated to have increased using the 
basic agricultural ladder, from 67.5 percent in 1946 to 82.44 percent for 
1970. Similar but modest increases are observed for the full-owner 
operators. 
Acquiring farmlands without family assistance is becoming less and 
less possible in Iowa. Although still the majority of the owners purchase 
the land they have bought, 63 percent in 1970 as opposed to 70.9 percent 
in 1958, some combinations of gifts and inheritance with purchase are 
increasingly used. The fact that purchasing from relatives only is also 
considerable and should indicate monetary or nonmonetary assistance 
rendered to the new owner. A considerable portion of the nonoperator land­
lords, 17.5 percent, have received their lands solely by gift and inheri­
tance. The comparable figure is less than 6 percent for owner-operators 
or part-owner operators. This is one evidence to suggest that nonoperator 
landlords have obtained ownership in the course of farm settlement between 
generations and have not actually sought it. 
The importance of planning for transfer of farmlands between genera­
tions is understood by the Iowa farmland owners. In order to attain the 
specific objectives of farmland transfers between generations, the owners 
have been using wills increasingly. The percentage of people who indi­
cated making wills increased from 31.3 percent in 1946 to 58.3 percent and 
70.8 percent in 1958 and 1970, respectively. There is also a slight 
increase in the percent of owners who have utilized inter-vivos transfers. 
The effects of social security payments on retirement plans of farmers are 
hard to evaluate. There is an indication that social security receivers 
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have retired from farming more often than the farmers who do not receive 
payments and have not retired. However, the majority of the retired 
farmers do not receive social security payments. The results are not 
conclusive and the data is not sufficient to make statistically reliable 
comparisons. 
It can be concluded that significant changes as to the norm of owner­
ship and the characteristics of the Iowa farmland owners were identified. 
An evaluation of the norm of ownership is needed for further studies 
before accepting it as the goal of society and delimiting the problematic 
gap within its boundaries. The evidence of this study indicates that, at 
least in the short run, the norm has become operatorship at the minimum 
cost acreage rather than full-ownership of resources. In order to achieve 
an economically efficient operating unit, farmers have been renting 
additional land. This process naturally increases the importance of the 
part-owner operator who may or may not use this tenure stage in reaching 
the ownership norm in the long run. 
The common fears of nonfarm related landlords owning most of Iowa 
farmlands have not materialized. However, getting established in farming 
is becoming increasingly more difficult for the younger generations. 
Some form of family assistance has almost become mandatory in order to 
ever hope to acquire farmlands. Public lending policies should be 
adjusted so as to provide an equal opportunity for the tenant with no 
family assistance. The changes that can be made to improve purchase 
methods and the effects of using combinations of purchase contract and 
mortgage methods would be areas for further study. 
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The role institutional owners are playing, especially corporations, 
in widening the gap between the achievement of the ownership norm and the 
existing situation is another area for study. Providing security of 
income for the older generation and therefore promoting inter-vivos 
transfer of farmlands to younger generations, is among the many important 
problems of Iowa agriculture that are left unanswered, waiting for further 
detailed studies. 
Remedial measures in closing the gap between the ownership norm and 
the existing situation consists of designing policies promoting younger 
generations easy access to land resources early in their lifetime. To 
this end changes in acquisition methods would be helpful. The new 
methods should require less down payments from the would-be-farmland 
owner but credit policies should be designed based more on his potential 
productivity. New and imaginative approaches to credit policies are 
necessary if potential farmers are to rely less on gratuities from their 
families. 
Another remedial hypothesis consists of finding positive inducements 
for older generation of farmland owners to transfer their lands to younger 
generations. Social security payments is one possible method of providing 
steady income for older generations. Other methods, such as partnership 
between father and son where the latter over the years buys the share of 
the former and pays it in yearly installments, thus providing a continuous 
stream of income for the father. This is another possible inter-vivos 
transfer arrangement which promotes farmland ownership at an early age. 
Other possible methods of arrangements should be explored for achieving 
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the ownership norm. 
The increasing role of part-time farming and part-owner-operatorship 
in Iowa is another indication of the magnitude of the problematic gap. 
Remedial measures in this area are related to agricultural price levels 
and low farm incomes. The solutions to these problems with respect to 
ownership norm is related to long-term structural changes in U.S. agri­
culture. The end result of these changes may not only be a lower number 
of farms and farmers, but a different organization of agricultural units, 
such as the family farm corporation. The impact of price and income 
policies in agriculture should be evaluated for its contribution in 
achieving the ownership norm, as well as its role in affecting the orga­
nization of agricultural units. 
Finally, increasing concentration of ownership necessarily widens 
the gap between the existing situation and the norm of ownership. If the 
trend of increasing concentration of farmland ownership continues, an 
equal access to farmlands for the would-be-farmers becomes difficult if 
not impossible. In order to prevent further accumulation of farmlands 
in the hands of a few farmland owners, policies of direct and progressive 
taxation of farmlands could be implemented. Specific fiscal policies 
could also be used effectively as a negative inducement for the nonoper-
ator landlord who is interested in Iowa farmlands for investment and 
speculative purposes. 
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APPENDIX A 
Iowa Land Ownership Survey 
Individual Questionnaire 
A. 1. How many acres of farm land do you (and your wife or husband) own 
in Iowa? Include land mortgaged or land in which you own only an 
interest as well as land owned free of debt. acres 
a. How many of these acres in "A.l." above do you (and your wife or 
husband) own as sole owner(s)? acres 
Of these solely owned acres: 
(1) How many acres are you buying under purchase contract or con­
tract for deed? (Do not include mortgaged land) 
acres 
(a) How much debt is still owed? $ 
(2) How many acres are mortgaged? acres 
(a) How much debt is still owed? $ 
(3) How many acres are fully paid for? acres 
b. How many of the acres in "A.l." above do you have a life estate 
in? (Life estate refers to land which you own and control during 
your lifetime, but cannot sell, trade, or otherwise transfer) 
acres 
c. How many of the acres in "A.l." above are in unsettled estates 
(other than life estate), partnerships, or other undividv 
interest? acres 
Total acres from a, b, and c (should agree with acres in 
"A.l."). acres 
B. How much do you think all of your Iowa farm land including present 
buildings would sell for? $ 
C. How many acres of your farm land did you (and your wife or husband) 
acquire through: 
1. Purchase from relatives? acres 
2. Purchase from others? acres 
3. Gift? (other than inheritance) acres 
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4. Inheritance of full interest? acres 
5. Inheritance of part interest and purchase of rest from others? 
acres 
6. Inheritance of part interest without purchase of rest from others? 
(Report total acres, not just your share) acres 
7. Other? acres 
a. Please explain "other". 
Total acres (should agree with acres in question "A.I.") 
acres 
D. 1. Have you ever received money (including proceeds from the sale of 
property) through gift, will or estate settlement? 
Yes No 
a. If yes, did this enable you to purchase, improve or operate any 
of your land? Yes No 
b. If yes, about how much of this money did you use for this 
purpose? 
E. 1. Are you actually farming (by yourself or with hired labor) any of 
the land you own in Iowa? Yes No 
a. If yes, how many of the acres you own do you operate? 
acres 
2. Do you rent out any of your Iowa farm land to others? (including 
livestock-share partnership or lease) Yes No 
a. If yes, how many acres do you rent to others? acres 
b. If yes, how many different farms or tracts do you rent to others? 
number 
c. If yes, how many of these farms or tracts do you rent to sons or 
sons-in-law? number 
3. If you rent land to others, is any of this land supervised by a 
professional farm management service? Yes No 
a. If yes, how many acres? acres 
4. Do you farm any land which you rent from others? 
Yes No 
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a. If yes, how many acres? acres 
F. 1. Have you made out a will covering your land? 
Yes No 
a. If no, have you made other definite plans for any of your child­
ren or other relatives to eventually acquire ownership of your 
land? Yes No 
G. Is any of the land you (and your wife or husband) own in Iowa owned as 
a corporation? (incorporated under Iowa Law)Yes No 
H. 1. How many children do you have? number 
2. Have you already transferred ownership of any land to your children? 
Yes No 
a. If yes, how many acres? acres 
I. 1. If you have ever operated a farm, have you retired from farming by 
turning over most or all of the farm work and management to someone 
else? Yes No 
a. If yes, at what age did you retire? age (or year) 
2. Do you receive social security benefits based on past farming 
operations? Yes No 
J. Has or will some member(s) of your family or other relative take over 
or continue the actual operation of your farm? 
Yes No Don't Know 
K. 1. At what age did you first own land? years 
2. Since you were 14 years old have you spent any time: 
a. working with or without wages on your parent's farm? 
Yes No If yes, years 
b. working on other farms as a hired hand? 
Yes No If yes, years_ 
c. working full time at nonfarm employment, including armed 
services, school, etc.? 
Yes No If yes, years_ 
d. operating a farm either individually or in partnership with 
others? Yes No If yes, years_ 
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If yes, for how many of these years did you: 
(1) rent from others all the land you farmed? years 
(2) own all the land you farmed? years 
(3) own part and rent part of the land you farmed? years 
1. How is your land owned? 
a. By husband and/or wife, jointly or separately acres 
b. As a single woman (including widow or divorced) acres 
c. As a single man (including widower or divorced) acres 
d. In joint ownership, other than with husband or wife 
acres 
Total acres (should agree with acres in question "A.I.") 
acres 
(1) Explain nature of joint ownership of land entered in d. above 
(2) How many people, other than yourself and your husband or 
wife, have ownership interests in this land? number 
(3) How many of these people live in states other than Iowa? 
number 
General Information: 
1. What is your present age? years 
2. Are you single , married , widow or widower 
1 
3. What is (was, if retired) your principal occupation? 
a. Are you retired from that occupation? Yes No 
4. Do you live on a farm? Yes No 
5. Are you depending on the land you rent to others as your principal 
source of income? Yes No 
6. Do you (and your wife or husband) live in Iowa? 
Yes No 
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N. 1. On how many ASCS farms in Iowa are you listed as an owner (or 
co-owner) ? number 
2. Please complete the table below using one line for each ASCS record 
on which you are listed as an owner (or co-owner). 
Line 
ASCS farm 
number 
town­
ship farm 
County 
holding 
ASCS 
Total acres 
listed 
on this 
Number of other 
owners (other than 
husband or wife) 
listed on this ASCS 
rec ord who are : 
Residents 
Not 
residents 
Is this 
land in 
an estate? 
(Check 
appro­
priate 
c olumn) 
no. letter no. record ASCS record of Iowa of Iowa Yes No 
0. Any further information about your land ownership situation you wish to 
sned us will be greatly appreciated: 
P. Do you want us to send you a copy of the report of this study? 
Yes No 
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Iowa Land Ownership Survey 
Institutional Questionnaire 
A. Are you reporting for a corporation , estate , city 
or town , institution , or other ? 
If "other", please explain. 
B. 1. How many acres of farm land does the corporation, institution, 
estate, government, etc. now own in Iowa? (Include land mortgaged 
or land in which only an interest is owned, as well as land owned 
free of debt.) acres 
Of these acres: 
a. How many are being bought under purchase contract or contract for 
deed? (Do not include mortgaged land.) acres 
b. How many are mortgaged? acres 
c. How many are fully paid for? acres 
d. How many are owned under other ownership arrangements? 
acres 
(1) Please explain "other" ownership arrangements 
C. How much do you think all this Iowa farm land, including buildings, 
would sell for? $ 
D. How many acres of this land were acquired through; 
1. Purchase? acres 
2. Gift from person living at time of transfer? acres 
3. Inheritance from estate of deceased persons? acres 
4. Other? acres 
a. Please explain "other". 
Total acres (should agree with acres in question "B.l." acres 
E. 1. Is any of this Iowa land actually being farmed by hired laborers 
under the direct supervision and management of the corporation, 
institution, estate, government, etc.? Yes No 
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a. If yes, how many acres are being operated in this manner? 
acres 
2. Is any of this Iowa land being rented to others? 
Yes No 
a. If yes, how many acres are being rented to farm operators? 
acres 
b. If yes, how many different farms or tracts are being rented to 
farm operators? number 
c. If yes, is any of this land being handled through professional 
farm management services? Yes No 
(1) If yes, how many acres? acres 
F. If you are reporting for an estate, how many of the heirs live: 
1. In Iowa? 
2. In other states? 
3. Residence not known? 
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APPENDIX B 
Table B.l. Comparison of basic characteristics of respondents to non-
respondents (in economic area 4) of Iowa land ownership 
survey 
Item Respondents Nonrespondents 
Number reporting 408 99 
Acres per farm 134.3 126.2 
Acres per owner 198.6 202.7 
Average value of land per owner ($) 103,823 19,134 
Percentage distribution by tenure 
Owner-operators 23.66 21.14 
Part-owner operators 18.11 17.52 
Operating landlords 9.88 7.25 
Nonoperating landlords 48.34 54.09 
Percentage distribution by occupation 
Farmers 38.67 36.24 
Retired farmers 18.21 16.71 
Housewives 15.48 16.61 
Business or professional men 14.73 15.34 
Laborers and others 12.91 15.10 
Percentage distribution by acquisition method 
Purchase from relatives 13.74 13.89 
Purchase from nonrelatives 46.58 49.53 
Purchase from relatives and non-
relatives 3.72 1.81 
Gifts or inheritance and combinations 
with purchase 35.96 34.77 
Percentage of owners who reside in Iowa 85.79 82.48 
Percentage of owners who have made wills 77.73 95.77 
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Table B.2. Average number of farms, acres or value owned and percentage 
distribution by owner tenure and economic areas 
Economic Number Owner Part-owner Operator Nonoperator 
Item area reporting operators operators landlords landlords 
Number 1 287 23.09 21.31 8.30 47.30 
of farm 2 261 25.06 15.09 35.68 44.06 
owners 3 168 24.22 22.05 10.18 43.54 
(percent) 4 350 21.63 20.37 10.13 47.86 
5 296 42.74 20.37 10.48 26.40 
6 444 40.51 16.18 9.09 34.20 
7 541 29.29 19.27 14.03 37.41 
Iowa, 1958 1909 32.2% 14.6% 5.2% 48.0% 
Iowa, 1970 2347 30.72 19.04 11.34 38.91 
Number 1 597 12.95 11.95 10.83 64.27 
of farms 2 521 13.82 8.32 19.68 58.18 
owned 3 344 14.13 12.86 11.88 61.13 
(percent) 4 678 12.55 11.83 12.11 63.52 
5 443 30.07 14.33 16.04 39.56 
6 722 26.71 10.67 12.60 50.02 
7 1001 17.60 11.58 19.33 51.49 
Iowa, 1958 1909 26.8% 12.3% 9.6% 51.3% 
Iowa, 1970 4306 18.71 11.59 15.18 54.52 
Total 1 597 20.62 17.91 14.75 46.72 
acreage 2 521 22.21 14.04 19.00 44.75 
owned 3 344 22.38 20.62 11.47 45.53 
(percent) 4 678 20.55 17.59 15.67 46.18 
5 443 38.76 23.49 11.03 26.72 
6 722 39.29 17.75 10.41 32.56 
7 1001 27.25 17.94 15.99 38.82 
Iowa, 1958 1909 27.1% 11.1% 10.1% 51.7% 
Iowa, 1970 4306 28.46 18.48 14.11 38.95 
Total 1 19.72 19.84 15.01 45.43 
value of 2 21.06 19.48 16.42 43.04 
land 3 22.29 23.68 12.22 41.81 
owned 4 22.32 18.29 15.36 46.49 
(percent) 5 37.45 24.93 10.88 26.74 
6 38.06 19.57 9.84 32.53 
7 27.24 19.47 14.83 38.46 
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Table B.2. (Continued) 
Economic Number Owner Part-owner Operator Nonoperator 
Item area reporting operators operators landlords landlords 
Iowa, 1958 1888 27.2% 11.2% 9.2% 52.4% 
Iowa, 1970 26.90 20.17 13.68 39.25 
Average 1 1.0 1.0 2.3 2.4 
nvanber of 2 1.0 1.0 2.3 2.4 
farms per 3 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.4 
owner 4 1.0 1.0 2.1 2.3 
(number) 5 1.0 1.0 2.2 2.1 
6 1.0 1.0 2.1 2.2 
7 1.0 1.0 2.3 2.3 
Iowa, 1958 1.0 1.0 2.3 1.3 
Iowa, 1970 1.0 1.0 2.20 2.30 
Average 1 177.3 166.8 352.7 196.1 
owned 2 194.2 203.9 263.7 222.5 
acreage 3 205.1 207.6 250.1 232.2 
per owner 4 177.8 161.5 289.2 180.4 
(acres) 5 183.8 233.8 213.3 205.1 
6 186.2 210.4 219.7 182.7 
7 178.6 178.8 218.9 199.3 
Iowa, 1958 1909 178.2 161.3 416.5 228.1 
Iowa, 1970 184.1 192.8 247.2 198.9 
Average 1 77,339 84,315 163,743 86,988 
value of 2 72,213 110,847 89,326 83,905 
land per 3 100,155 116,829 130,608 104,491 
owner 4 105,000 91,303 154,196 98,816 
(dollars) 5 48,535 67,768 57,491 56,096 
6 68,820 88,560 79,241 69,662 
7 82,847 90,016 94,220 91,599 
Iowa, 1958 1888 44,000 39,316 91,325 59,214 
Iowa, 1970 73,892 89,390 101,834 85,137 
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Table B.2. (Continued) 
Economic Number Owner Part-owner Operator Nonoperator 
Item area reporting operators operators landlords landlords 
Average 1 177.3 166.8 151.6 80.9 
size of 2 194.2 203.9 116.7 92.9 
each 3 205.1 207.6 125.1 96.4 
farm 4 177.8 161.5 140.5 78.9 
owned 5 183.8 233.8 98.0 96.3 
(acres) 6 186.2 210.4 104.6 82.4 
7 178.6 178.8 95.5 87.0 
Iowa, 1958 178.2 161.3 184.5 177.6 
Iowa, 1970 184.1 192.8 112.4 86.4 
Average 1 77,339 84,315 70,378 35,900 
value 2 72,213 100,847 39,527 35,047 
of each 3 100,155 116,829 65,306 50,240 
farm 4 105,000 91,303 74,902 43,216 
owned 5 48,535 67,768 26,430 26,340 
(dollars) 6 68,820 88,560 37,714 31,405 
7 82,847 90,016 41,077 39,980 
Iowa, 1958 44,000 39,316 40,305 46,270 
Iowa, 1970 73,892 89,390 46,300 36,989 
Table B.3. Tenure experience of all owners 
Tenure Number 
experience reporting Percent 
PHNRO 168 6.24 
PHNO 52 1.95 
PHRO 116 4.24 
PNRO 158 5.93 
PHO 14 0.52 
PNO 85 3.17 
PRO 176 6.59 
PO 34 1.17 
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Table B.3. (Continued) 
Tenure Number 
experience reporting Percent 
HNRO 32 1.16 
HRO 26 0.99 
HNO 27 1.06 
HO 6 0.21 
NRO 14 0.49 
NO 45 1.57 
RO 10 0.35 
0 3 0.11 
PHNROL 73 2.36 
PHROL 72 2.19 
PHNOL 31 1.03 
PNROL 81 2.53 
PHNRL 9 0.28 
PHNL 49 1.75 
PNRL 13 0.39 
PHOL 9 0.35 
PHRL 0 — — 
PNOL 62 1.52 
PROL 140 4.26 
PHL 0 — — 
PNL 102 3.46 
PRL 6 0.23 
POL 47 1.45 
PL 8 0.33 
HNROL 17 0.54 
HNRL 4 0.15 
HNOL 18 0.61 
HROL 24 0.92 
HNL 30 0.97 
HRL 2 0.06 
HOL 1 0.04 
HL 0 — — 
NROL 14 0.48 
NRL 3 0.12 
NOL 32 0.97 
NL 200 6.68 
ROL 11 0.43 
RL 0 — — 
OL 7 0.20 
L 37 1.21 
No response 871 28.74 
Total 2939 100.00 
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Table B.4. Estimates of number of owners, by sex, tenure and number of 
farms owned in Iowa, 1970 
Sex 
Male 149,323 
Female 29,209 
Total 178,532 
All owners 
Owner operator 1 famns 49,414 
2 farms 
3 farms 
4 farms 
5+ farms 
Total 49,414 
Part-owner operator 1 fam 28,677 
2 farms 
3 farms 
4 farms 
5+ farms 
Total 28,677 
Operator landlord 1 farm 402 
2 farms 14,377 
3 farms 2,671 
4 farms 453 
5+ farms 197 
Unknown no. of farms 996 
Total 19,096 
Nonoperator landlord 1 farm 416 
2 farms 45,155 
3 farms 9,944 
4 farms 3,480 
5+ farms 976 
Unknown no. of farms 8,502 
Total 68,473 
Owners with unknown 1 farm 9,867 
tenures 2 farms 1,957 
3 farms 22 
4 farms 35 
5 farms 23 
Unknown no. of farms 968 
Total 12,872 
State total 178,532 
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Table B.5. Estimate of number of owners by tenure, occupation and state 
residency in Iowa, 1970 
Occupation and 
tenure groups In Iowa 
State residency 
Out of Iowa Unknown 
Occupation 
Farmer 
Retired farmer 
Housewife 
Businessman 
Laborer and other 
Unknown occupation 
Total 
79,306 
25,577 
15,794 
20,608 
21,141 
3,534 
165,960 
901 
756 
2,251 
5,204 
3,013 
297 
12,422 
67 
61 
22 
150 
Tenure 
Full-owner operator 
Part-owner operator 
Operator landlord 
Nonoperator landlord 
Unknown tenure 
Total 
48,845 
28,442 
18,381 
57,685 
12,607 
165,960 
501 
235 
654 
10,766 
266 
12,422 
67 
61 
22 
150 
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Table B.6. Tenure experience of farmland owners; classification scheme 
for agricultural ladder experience 
Owners reporting nonfarm experience 
Owners reporting farm experience only 
P/HNR(0/L) with N 
P/H/RO/L without N 
Basic agricultural 
ladder experience 
Other patterns of 
experience previous 
to ownership 
P/HRO group 
P/HNRO group 
f H/RO group 
H/RNO group 
PC group 
PNO group 
PHRO 
PHROL 
PROL 
HROL 
PHNRO 
PHNROL 
PNRO 
PNROL 
HNRO 
HNROL 
r HO 
; HOL 
) RO 
/ ROL 
Ç HNO 
J HNOL 
1 NRG 
i^^NROL 
PHOL 
PHNO 
PHNOL 
PNO 
PNOL 
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Table B.6. (Continued) 
Owner operator 
without previous 
farm experience 
Nonoperator landlord 
with previous farm 
experience 
Nonoperator landlord 
with no previous 
farm experience 
NO group 
RL group 
[RNL group 
P/HL group 
^^/HNL group 
NL group 
{ NO NOL 
PHNRL 
PNRL 
HNRL 
NRL 
PHNL 
PNL 
HNL 
{ NL 
Table B.7. Tenure classifications of owners according to previous 
experiences reported 
Experience Tenure 
f PNO 
\ RNO 
J NO 
Nonfarm experience < PRNO 
) RNOL 
/ PNOL 
1 PRNL 
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Table B.7. (Continued) 
Experience Tenure 
Nonfarm experience 
Hired hand experience 
Nonfarm and hired hand experience 
Neither nonfarm nor hired hand 
experience 
HRNO 
HRNO 
mo 
PHNO 
PHRNOL 
HRNOL 
HNOL 
PHNOL 
PRHNL 
RHNL 
PHNL 
HNL 
PROL 
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Table B.8. Concentration of farmland ownership acreage (area I, 1958-
1970) 
Percent of owners Percent of farm acreage 
Acres of owned land 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Less than 49 4.62 5.31 0.52 0.68 
Less than 69 6.51 8.46 0.91 1.33 
Less than 99 18.23 26.87 4.09 6.82 
Less than 139 26.61 40.92 7.48 13.23 
Less than 199 50.05 66.88 19.38 29.17 
Less than 279 65.81 79.65 31.81 42.55 
Less than 359 75.54 88.28 40.86 55.47 
Less than 519 87.06 96.82 58.69 77.74 
Less than 699 92.24 98.51 69.03 84.59 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Table B.9. Concentration of farmland ownership acreage (area II, 1958-
1970) 
Percent of owners Percent of farm acreage 
Acres of owned land 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Less than 49 2.77 9.53 0.26 1.00 
Less than 69 4.15 11.64 0.50 1.39 
Less than 99 17.57 23.82 3.94 4.67 
Less than 139 30.07 35.64 8.70 9.32 
Less than 199 44.88 57.86 16.28 21.83 
Less than 279 63.39 77.44 29.59 38.92 
Less than 359 74.03 86.57 39.90 50.10 
Less than 519 86.99 93.80 56.73 64.10 
Less than 699 93.47 97.62 69.44 75.12 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table B.IO. Concentration of farmland ownership acreage (area III, 1958-
1970) 
Percent of owners Percent of farm acreage 
Acres of owned land 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Less than 49 2.91 4.99 0.34 0.47 
Less than 69 4.52 5.30 0.70 0.57 
Less than 99 14.22 15.59 3.76 3.25 
Less than 139 24.57 28.69 8.62 8.31 
Less than 199 52.67 54.58 26.03 21.55 
Less than 279 69.49 73.29 40.70 36.90 
Less than 359 79.52 87.94 52.60 56.23 
Less than 519 89.55 96.41 68.85 72.02 
Less than 699 95.37 97.97 81.90 76.73 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Table B.ll. Concentration of farmland ownership acreage (area IV, 1958-
1970) 
Percent of owners Percent of farm acreage 
Acres of owned land 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Less than 49 5.44 11.11 0.69 1.23 
Less than 69 6.40 13.63 0.92 1.81 
Less than 99 23.06 30.03 6.48 6.96 
Less than 139 36.52 45.20 12.94 14.23 
Less than 199 56.39 70.03 26.13 31.72 
Less than 279 69.85 83.78 38.90 45.52 
Less than 359 80.10 91.44 52.12 58.80 
Less than 519 91.31 95.94 71.43 71.68 
Less than 699 94.51 98.82 79.23 86.21 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table B.12. Concentration of farmland ownership acreage (area V, 1958-
1970) 
Percent of owners Percent of farm acreage 
Acres of owned land 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Less than 49 6.02 9.87 0.78 1.48 
Less than 69 8.47 13.99 1.39 2.63 
Less than 99 22.97 28.39 6.53 7.94 
Less than 139 37.03 40.18 13.78 14.46 
Less than 199 60.24 61.11 30.40 30.91 
Less than 279 76.31 80.59 46.69 52.46 
Less than 359 83.45 89.32 56.32 65.72 
Less than 519 90.14 97.20 68.33 83.81 
Less than 699 95.72 98.99 82.72 90.46 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Table B.13. Concentration of farmland ownership acreage (area VI, 1958-
1970) 
Percent of owners Percent of farm acreage 
Acres of owned land 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Less than 49 4.66 5.81 0.59 0.78 
Less than 69 6.32 9.96 1.04 1.89 
Less than 99 20.65 22.09 6.44 6.29 
Less than 139 41.31 39.11 17.58 15.35 
Less than 199 63.64 65.01 34.49 35.09 
Less than 279 79.30 82.80 50.71 53.76 
Less than 359 87.96 91.53 63.16 67.24 
Less than 519 93.96 97.55 74.56 84.52 
Less than 699 97.62 98.89 84.37 89.16 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table B.14. Concentration of farmland ownership acreage (area VII, 1958-
1970) 
Percent of owners Percent of farm acreage 
Acres of owned land 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Less than 49 7.47 9.06 1.01 1.10 
Less than 69 10.90 11.48 1.92 1.73 
Less than 99 23.02 26.45 6.20 6.85 
Less than 139 37.96 44.21 13.80 16.28 
Less than 199 59.98 66.34 29.32 32.12 
Less than 279 75.53 83.60 44.51 51.48 
Less than 359 85.22 91.25 57.80 63.57 
Less than 517 92.49 96.67 71.68 77.65 
Less than 699 95.72 98.79 79.36 86.53 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Table B.15. Concentration of value of ownership (area I, 1958-1970) 
Value of owned land 
Percent of 
Percent of owners value of owned land 
($1000) 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Less than 19.9 8.43 4.35 1.36 0.46 
Less than 49.9 41.24 33.60 15.40 8.62 
Less than 74.9 62.80 54.64 31.84 19.33 
Lêss than 99.9 76.86 70.71 47.58 31.07 
Less than 124.9 84.04 78.22 57.74 39.88 
Less than 149.9 87.47 85.40 63.65 50.31 
Less than 199.9 93.72 92.55 76.99 64.45 
Less than 249.9 96.53 96.57 84.81 75.27 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table B.16. Concentration of value of ownership (area II, 1958-1970) 
Value of owned land 
Percent of 
Percent of owners value of owned land 
($1000) 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Less than 19.9 16.92 8.88 3.48 0.83 
Less than 49.9 55.38 37.00 23.25 10.18 
Less than 74.9 75.39 59.83 52.96 23.83 
Less than 99.9 83.07 75.99 53.30 37.44 
Less than 124.9 90.76 84.80 66.28 47.39 
Less than 149.9 93.32 88.39 71.64 54.15 
Less than 199.9 95.88 94.31 78.80 66.70 
Less than 249.9 96.39 96.57 80.58 71.54 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Table B.17. Concentration of value of ownership (area III, 1958-1970) 
Value of owned land 
Percent of 
Percent of owners value of owned land 
($1000) 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Less than 19.9 5.20 2.11 0.94 0.13 
Less than 49.9 40.88 20.73 17.75 4.68 
Less than 74.9 68.76 38.94 39.62 13.06 
Less than 99.9 81.02 58.97 53.36 24.61 
Less than 124.9 84.73 71.97 58.99 34.99 
Less than 149.9 89.56 79.94 67.81 42.92 
Less than 199.9 93.27 91.65 75.85 62.56 
Less than 249.9 96.98 95.19 86.39 69.28 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table B.18. Concentration of value of ownership (area IV, 1958-1970) 
Value of owned land 
Percent of 
Percent of owners value of owned land 
($1000) 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Less than 19.9 6.66 4.47 1.17 0.38 
Less than 49.9 41.47 25.54 16.29 5.97 
Less than 74.9 64.43 42.48 34.52 13.46 
Less than 99.9 74.91 63.52 47.18 27.43 
Less than 124.9 84.79 75.71 58.91 38.69 
Less than 149.9 88.86 81.33 66.16 45.19 
Less than 199.9 93.67 89.43 76.47 58.11 
Less than 249.9 96.26 93.62 83.58 68.24 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Table B.19. Concentration of value of ownership (area V, 1958-1970) 
Value of owned land 
Percent of 
Percent of owners value of owned land 
($1000) 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Less than 19.9 39.01 20.66 13.03 3.84 
Less than 49.9 79.57 58.71 47.79 25.60 
Less than 74.9 88.87 77.33 62.97 44.11 
Less than 99.9 94.29 85.47 75.68 56.45 
Less than 124.9 97.64 93.62 85.41 72.85 
Less than 149.9 97.89 95.75 86.50 78.43 
Less than 199.9 98.66 98.29 89.91 86.67 
Less than 249.9 98.91 99.22 91.56 91.20 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table B.20. Concentration of value of ownership (area VI, 1958-1970) 
Value of owned land 
($1000) 
Percent of owners value 
Percent of 
of owned land 
1958 1970 1958 1970 
Less than 19.9 16.04 7.29 3.86 1.12 
Less than 49.9 64.92 42.22 35.10 15.05 
Less than 74.9 85.44 62.77 58.82 29.90 
Less than 99.9 91.03 78.02 67.56 45.88 
Less than 124.9 95.13 88.47 76.24 60.82 
Less than 149.9 95.87 91.58 78.33 66.87 
Less than 199.9 98.10 95.71 85.45 79.57 
Less than 249.9 98.84 97.59 88.36 95.26 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Table B.21. Concentration of value of ownership (area VII, 1958-1970) 
Value of owned land 
($1000) 
Percent of owners value 
Percent of 
of owned land 
1958 1970 1958 1970 
Less than 19.9 14.83 7.10 3.14 0.77 
Less than 49.9 53.10 33.54 23.45 9.62 
Less than 74.9 76.06 51.91 45.67 19.43 
Less than 99.9 86.82 67.17 60.13 32.30 
Less than 124.9 90.40 80.55 66.57 46.74 
Less than 149.9 93.51 86.37 73.23 54.92 
Less than 199.9 96.14 93.43 80.26 68.43 
Less than 249.9 97.09 96.41 83.77 76.96 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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APPENDIX C 
Statistical Tests^ 
Most important objective of a sample survey is the inferences which 
can be drawn about the characteristics of the population which it repre­
sents. If we want to estimate P, the proportion (expressed as percen­
tage) of landowners with certain characteristics in the state, then we 
have to look up for p, the corresponding characteristic computed from the 
units that fell in the sample. Throughout this study, care has been given 
to draw up a representative sample. To this end, each individual land­
owner was corrected for his varied chance of entrance into the sample 
2 
through a weight assigned to him. Similarly, weights were assigned to 
each area when estimating for the state. 
Even with all the care given in drawing a representative sample, it 
may be possible for p, the sample proportion, to differ from P, the 
"true" or population proportion. There are two main reasons for the 
difference: 
(1) Due to sampling variation or sampling error. 
If instead of one, a number of different samples are drawn 
from the same population, the sample proportion p would vary 
from one to the other. This is one of the reasons. 
^The explanation of statistical tests and use of nomograms have been 
derived from Strand (88, pp. 6-11). The actual formulas used in the con­
struction of nomograms are included in this study. They were found 
together in the source material of the previous land ownership studies 
(89 and 90) and had not been published in the bulletin. 
2 
For each individual owner, a weight of 1 was given if he had one 
ASCS number, 0.5 if he had two, and so on. 
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(2) Due to nonsampling errors. 
This difference arises because the questions were inter­
preted differently by different persons, or responses were vague 
and uncertain or were not correctly edited. This fact is not a 
shortcoming of a sample survey and could easily arise even when 
100 percent of the population, like the census, is included in 
the study. 
Variations in the sample proportion are measured by the "standard 
deviation" or "standard error". While it is complex to have a precise 
estimation of standard error, a good approximation of of the sample 
3 
proportion p is provided by the binomial formula. The magnitude of 
Sp is seen to depend on p and N, the number of units in the sample. 
Significance of difference of proportions 
The standard deviation may be used to provide approximate con­
fidence interval for the population proportion P. As an example, with 
95 percent of confidence, we can argue that the true proportion P would 
lie between p + 1.96 S^. In the 90 percent confidence level, the formula 
is p + 1.65 S . 
- P 
In this study, we are interested in comparing the percentages for 
two characteristics. The differences we observe between sample propor­
tions may arise either from actual differences on the corresponding popu­
lation proportions or due to "sampling" or "nonsampling" errors. A deci­
sion criteria is needed to determine whether the observed differences 
^Binomial standard deviation of a proportion is S = ]j ^ 
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might have arisen from the variation inherent in the sample. When the 
differences between sample proportions are large enough, it is reasonable 
to argue that at least part of the difference is due to "real" differences 
between the corresponding populations and not due only to the variation of 
the samples. This difference is termed "significant". Even then it is 
highly improbable for the differences to be due entirely to the variation 
in the sample but not impossible. 
Calculation of the standard deviation of a difference between two 
population percentages is similar to the way used in obtaining the stan­
dard deviation of a proportion. However, now the estimated standard devi­
ation of a difference depends on the sample proportions p^ and p^, 
and the corresponding sample sizes and N^. Similarly, 95 and 90 
percent confidence intervals for the population differences D may be 
derived from d + 1.96 and d + 1.65 S^, respective, where d stands 
for the sample difference. 
If such a confidence interval does not extend from a negative number 
at the one limit to a positive number at the other limit (thus does not 
include zero), then it is highly improbable at 95 or 90 percent level that 
such a difference has arisen from sampling considerations alone. Such 
sample differences are concluded to be significant at the particular level 
they are tested. In this case, it can be argued that there are real 
differences between the two population proportions. 
In this study, nomograms for 80 percent least significant differences 
are not included and tests are not conducted on the 80 percent signifi­
cance level. The reason for it is that while it is 1 in 20 and 1 in 
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10 to make an error of significance at 95 percent and 90 percent confi­
dence levels, respectively, this error increases to 1 in 5 with 80 
percent confidence level. That is, if we use the 80 percent level we 
will be making an error by calling a difference significant once every 
five times, even when no real difference exists. This the author thinks 
is a high margin of error and so does not test data on this confidence 
level. 
Construction of Nomograms for Testing Significance 
of Differences of Percentages —Mutually Exclusive 
Two sets of nomograms. Figures C.l to C.6, have been constructed to 
aid in comparing differences between two percentages. Through the use of 
these graphical constructs, two percentages can be tested for signifi­
cance at either 95 percent or 90 percent confidence level without the 
calculation of the standard error. 
Two different types of nomograms are presented for testing signifi­
cant differences of percentages. Figures C.l and C.2 should be used for 
determination of a significant difference in percentages of units in the 
same sample with two "mutually exclusive" characteristics. By mutually 
exclusive, it is to be understood that the unit (which is the farmland 
owner in this case) should possess one and only one of the characteris­
tics. For example, in relation to tenure classification, the owner should 
be identified with either of the four categories but he cannot be in two 
categories at the same time. The rule to follow when in doubt is to see 
if all characteristics appear in the same table and sum up to 100 percent. 
In such cases, sample sizes and are the same and are called N. 
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ÎNJOMOGRAM FOR DETERMINATION OF 95% LEAST 
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE OF PERCENTAGE^ u-
UNITS IN A SAMPLE WITH MUTUALLY EXC^S^VE 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR VARYING SAMPLE SIZE N 
50r I I I ' I 
N =  2 0 0 0  
N =  1 2 0 0  
35tJNo Sign i f icant  D i f ference 
iqn i f icant  D i f ference 
0  5  10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 
LARGER PERCENTAGE 
Figure C.l. Nomogram for determination of 95 percent least significant 
difference between two dependent percentages for varying 
sample size N (89, p. 120) 
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NOMOGRAM FOR DETERMINATION OF 90% LEAST 
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TWO DEPENDENT 
PERCENTAGES FOR VARYING SAMPLE SIZE N 
N=800 
N=I200 
N=2000 
N=3000 
Mo Significant Difference 
N= 100 
N = i 5 0  
N=200 
N= 300 
N=400 
Significant Difference 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 
LARGER PERCENTAGE 
Figure C.2. Nomogram for determination of 90 percent least significant 
difference between two dependent percentages for varying 
sample size N (91, p. iO) 
259 
In other words, N is the total number in the table which corresponds 
4 
to 100 percent. 
Computation of least significant differences for mutually exclusive 
categories of varying sample sizes. Figures C.l and C.2, for 95 percent 
and 90 percent levels, respectively, are based on the formula 
P, = P, + ^ [l ± / 1 + 2(N + t^)P_ 1 
where 
t = t statistic (1.96 or 1.65) for 95 percent and 90 percent, 
respectively* 
= given percentage levels going from 2 to 50 percent, 
= confidence interval for the other percentage given P^, and 
N = total number of respondents. 
To give an example for the use of Figures C.l and C.2, suppose that 
800 respondents are represented in the table of "tenure of farmland 
owners". We use Figure C.l first to determine significant difference at 
the 95 percent level. Since 800 is 100 percent of the table, N = 800. 
Suppose owners indicated that 15 percent are nonoperating landlords while 
10 percent are operating landlords. Since 15 percent is the larger, mark 
4 
The standard deviation of the difference then is 
. ,/ PiCi - pp . p^g - p,) 2 
à ^ N N N • 
The final term is known as the covariance term and enters the formula 
because the two percentages are not independent. 
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this on the horizontal border of Figure C.l and 10 percent on the vertical 
border. Drawing horizontal and vertical lines in the graph from 15 and 10 
percent marks, respectively, indicates their point of intersection. In 
this example it is observed that the intersection point falls below the 
line indicated by N = 800, which means that the differences of percent­
ages are significant at the 95 percent confidence level, so should be 
identified by two stars (**). 
Levels of N other than the ones drawn for must be interpolated 
between the curves to the nearest values shown. Scales of neither graph 
extend to 100 percent since the smaller percentage can never be greater 
than 50 percent. When the larger percentage is greater than 60 percent, 
it will always be significantly different from any other percent for 
samples of 100 or greater. 
Construction of Nomograms for Testing Significance 
of Differences of Percentages—Independence 
In the previously discussed mutually exclusive case. Figures C.l and 
C.2, the percentages that are compared are dependent on each other since 
an increase in one of the characteristics leads the other characteristic 
to decrease and vice versa. These characteristics add up to 100 percent. 
However, in this case, characteristics are no longer mutually exclusive; 
the decline in one does not force the other to rise, and therefore they 
are called independent. Then Figures C.3 to C.6 should be used whenever 
the percentages that are tested are independent of each other. These 
figures should be used whenever two independent sample percentages are to 
be tested, such as the 1958 survey vs. the 1970 survey. They should also 
Figure C.3. Nomogram for determination of 95 percent least significant 
difference between two independent percentages from samples 
of various sizes 100 to 800 (89, p. 123) 
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NOMOGRAM FOR DETERMINATION OF 95% LEAST SIGNIF 
OF PERCENTAGES OF UNITS WITH SPECIFIC CHARAl 
FROM TWO SAMPLES OF VARYING SAMPLE SIZES 
95 90 95% LEAST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE - PERCENT 
DETERMINATION OF 95% LEAST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE 
STAGES OF UNITS WITH SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS 
3 SAMPLES OF VARYING SAMPLE SIZES 100 TO 800 
N= 100 
N= 200 
N= 300 
N= 400 
N = 600 
N= 800 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 
OBSERVED PERCENTAGES 
DIFFERENCE- PERCENT 
Figure C.4. Nomogram for determination of 95 percent least significant 
difference between two independent percentages from samples 
of various sizes 1000 to 2000 (89, p. 125) 
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NOMOGRAM FOR DETERMINATION OF 95% LEAST SIGNIFIC 
OF PERCENTAGES OF UNITS WITH SPECIFIC CHARAC 
FROM TWO SAMPLES OF VARYING SAMPLE SIZES 10 
3.0 2.5 2.0 15 10 
LEAST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE- PERCENT 
40  
OBSE 
INATION OF 95% LEAST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE 
)F UNITS WITH SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS 
S OF VARYING SAMPLE SIZES 1000 TO 2000 
N= 1200 
N=I400 
1600 
N-- 800 
N-2000 
95 ERENCE-PERCENT 
OBSERVED PERCENTAGES 
Î 
NOMOGRAM FOR DETERMINATION OF 90% LEAST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN TWO INDEPENDENT PERCENTAGES FROM SAMPLES 
OF VARIOUS SIZES 100 TO 1,000 
? t 
400TT 
t t 
12 II 10 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 
90% LEAST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE, PERCENT OBSERVED PERCENTAGES 
Figure C.5. Nomogram for determination of 90 percent least significant difference between two 
independent percentages from samples of various sizes 100 to 1000 (91, p. 11) 
NOMOGRAM FOR DETERMINATION OF 90% LEAST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN TWO INDEPENDENT PERCENTAGES FROM SAMPLES 
OF VARIOUS SIZES ipOO TO 3,000 
r— VV 
3.75 3.50 3.25 3.0 2.75 2.50 2.25 2.0 1.75 1.50 1.25 1.0 .75 .50 .25 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
95 90  85  80  75  70  65  60  55  50  
90% LEAST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE,  PERCENT OBSERVED PERCENTAGES 
Figure C.6, Nomogram for determination of 90 percent least significant difference between two 
independent percentages from samples of various sizes 1000 to 3000 (91, p. 12) 
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be used whenever comparisons of percentages from two independent tabula­
tions of the same sample are required, such as comparison of the same 
tenure classes in two different areas.^ 
Computation of least significant difference for independent percent­
age categories of varying sample sizes. Figures C.3 through C.6, for 95 
percent and 90 percent confidence levels are based on the formula 
where 
t = t statistic (1.96 or 1.65) for 95 percent and 90 percent, 
respectively, 
p = percentage level intervals from 2 to 50 percent, and 
N = total number of respondents. 
The use of these nomograms (Figures C.3 to C.6) is more complex than 
the previous ones. Their use will be explained by an example. 
Suppose that we would like to determine if there is a significant 
difference between the percentages of nonoperating landlords in one area 
as opposed to their percentage in another economic area. Assume that 31 
percent of 200 respondents are nonoperating landlords in one area as 
When the two percentages to be compared are independent of each 
other, the standard deviation of difference is without the interaction 
term, i.e. 
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opposed to 39 percent of 300 respondents in another area. Is the differ­
ence between the two percentages for these two areas significantly 
different? 
To test for the significance, we go first to the 95 percent confi­
dence level, which is Figure C.3. First enter 31 on the lower right scale 
marked "observed percentages" and draw a vertical line until the curve 
N = 200 is reached. From this point draw a horizontal line until the 
vertical scale in the central portion of the nomogram is reached and mark 
the point of intersection. Similarly, enter 39 on the lower right scale, 
but reach the curve N = 300 instead and continue the operation. 
There are now two marks on the vertical scale in the central portion 
of the nomogram. From the lower mark, trace an imaginary arc, guided 
by the arcs on either side and indicate its point of intersection on the 
lower left scale. In this example, it will be about 5.6. From this 
intersection on the lower left scale, draw a vertical line to intersect 
a horizontal line drawn from the upper mark on the vertical scale. From 
this point of intersection, again trace an arc to the lower left scale 
and mark it. In this case, it is 8.5 which the nomogram states is the 
least significant difference in percentage form. 
Then the actual percentage difference which is 39 - 31 = 8 is com­
pared to the nomogram least significant difference of 8.5 percent just 
determined. Since the observed difference is smaller than the least sig­
nificant difference, at the 95 percent confidence level, it is concluded 
that the difference is not significant. Had the observed difference been 
41 - 31 = 10 percent (thus greater than 8.5), we would have concluded that 
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the difference was significant at the 95 percent level. 
Now the same percentages will have to be tested for significance at 
the 90 percent confidence level since it was not found to be significant 
at the 95 percent level. Similar operations are performed but this time 
on Figure C.5. The nomogram in this case shows 6.7 percent to be the 
least significant difference. Since the observed percentage of difference 
was 8 and larger than the least significant difference, we conclude that 
there is a significant difference at the 90 percent confidence level and 
identify the result with one star (*). 
It will be observed that the lower left scales of Figures C.3 and C.4 
end at 14 and 4 percents, respectively. The reason for this is due to 
the fact that any larger difference in percents based on samples of 100 or 
more in the former and 1000 or more in the latter will always be signifi­
cant at the 95 percent level. Figures C.5 and C.6 are used in the similar 
manner in determination of the 90 percent least significant differences. 
Again for the previously mentioned reason, the lower left scale of Figures 
C.5 and C.6 end at 12 and 3.75 percents, respectively. 
The independent percentage nomograms. Figures C.3 through C.6, can 
also be used for determining the confidence interval for a population pro­
portion, again for the 95 and 90 percent levels.^ Taking the previous 
example again, if it is desired to estimate the true population percentage 
of the nonoperating landlords in the second area reporting 39 percent of 
An approximate formula for the confidence interval is 
CI = / . 
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300 respondents, the similar procedure is followed, as has been described 
earlier, u p  to the point where the lower left s c ale was intersected a t  
5.6 percent. Then with 95 percent confidence, we can state that 33.4 to 
44.6 percent of the owners are nonoperating landlords in that particular 
area. In other words, it is 39.0 + 5.6 percent. Using Figure C.5 instead 
of Figure C.3, we can get the confidence interval with 90 percent level 
which is 39.0+4.5 percent. 
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APPENDIX D. DATA USED IN DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS 
2 
AND COMPUTED D FOR TENURE GROUPS AND CLASSES 
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